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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the economics of child labour and child education within developing 
and developed countries. 
The first part of the thesis examines child labour and child education in developing coun-
tries. It investigates the motivations of parents to send their children to work and analyses 
the so-called commitment problem of child labour in a dynamic, overlapping generations game 
theoretical model. As a novelty, this model relaxes the requirement of an observable history 
of play and models the decision problem as an overlapping generations cyclic game. We show 
that first-best contracts may me implemented, implying optimal child education and low child 
labour, if a bequest sanction can be imposed by grandparents. We also discuss the special role 
that grandparents have within this model. 
The second part of the thesis analyses the economics of child education within a developed 
country context: the transmission of education across generations and the impact of a schooling 
reform on educational choice and later outcomes. In a first chapter of this second part, we 
examine specifically the influence of grandparents, as postulated by the model in part one, on 
the education of grandchildren. A unique dataset on three generations, the National Child 
Development Survey of the UK, is used. As a special feature, we apply recent econometric 
techniques to deal with censoring in a semi-parametric setting. The results indicate that it is 
not education but rather unobservable factors on the parent and grandparent level that affect 
the educational choice of grandchildren. These unobservable factors may be interpreted as 
innate ability or parenting skills. In a second chapter within this part, a schooling reform, 
the introduction of comprehensive schools in the UK and its impact on educational and labour 
market outcomes is evaluated. We find, using data from the National Child Development Survey 
and applying a new, quasi-differenced matching estimator, that bias corrected estimates of the 
reform suggest no effect on the means, but a sizeable effect on the variance of outcomes. We 
interpret this finding as indicative of a higher risk inherent to the selective education system. 
In summary the thesis sheds some new light on the economics of education and child 
labour, both in a theoretical and an empirical context, and provides a valuable reference and 
starting point for future research in this area. 
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Introduction 
This thesis focuses on child labour and child education. The first two chapters are 
devoted to analysing child labour in developing countries, whereas the last two chapters 
address empirical questions related to child education in a developed country context. 
The first chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence on child labour. Using 
a theoretical model, the second chapter analyses the decision between child labour and 
child education in a developing country context. The last two chapters are dedicated 
to the empirical analysis of two important questions in the economics of education: 
transmission of educational achievement across generations in the light of grandparental 
influence and the impact of changes in the education system on labour market and 
educational outcomes of pupils. 
This thesis provides in four chapters some new elements in the analysis of both 
child labour and education. The topics of child labour and child education are linked, 
if one is willing to assume child labour and education are, to some extent, substitutes. 
It has been well documented in developing country contexts that excessive child labour 
affects education achievement adversely and thus, such an assumption seems not im-
plausible. The phenomenon of child labour and child education can thus be analysed 
from an economic perspective of parental or child choice, although the perspectives are 
clearly different whether one chooses a developing or a developed country setting. In 
a developed country setting, child labour will be prohibited by law, but the possibility 
of part-time work exists typically in adolescence. Furthermore, individuals may leave 
school at the minimum school leaving age and choose to enter the labour market as 
early as possible. What distinguishes the two settings is the age at which the child 
enters the labour market, but the connection is the choice between education and early 
1 
labour market participation. 
In developing countries, children of ages 5-15 often have to conform to their 
parents choices in terms of education or labour for them. It is often thought that 
extreme poverty is responsible for parents to choose child labour for their children instead 
of education. The thesis will insist, as in the previous literature, that there might be 
important other reasons and not only the obvious poverty argument for parents to choose 
child labour for their children. Such reasons can be found in so called commitment 
problems, i.e. the impossibility for children to make binding promises to their parents 
to repay any educational investment children received. This thesis reviews the evidence 
on the motivations of parents to send children into work in chapter one, which gives a 
general overview over the child labour literature and underlines open questions. Chapter 
two focuses then on commitment problems in an overlapping generations model. In this 
chapter, it is shown that commitment problems prevent efficient investment in children 
in a non-cooperative game. It is then argued, that the usual game theoretic solution to 
such intergenerational games, trigger strategies, cannot solve the commitment problem 
if the history of play is unobservable. The novelty of chapter two is thus to address 
commitment problems within this limited information setting and to introduce bequest 
sanctions to overcome the information constraints. The chapter develops an entirely 
new model for overlapping generation games by modeling them as cyclic games. This 
assumes essentially that the history of play is irrelevant, and that individuals are entirely 
forward looking. While parents cannot solve the commitment problem, we show that 
grandparents can. The intuition for this result is that grandparents may punish deviators 
with strategic bequests. They can, as opposed to parents, save over a longer horizon 
and make bequest resources grow at the same rate as resources in the economy grow. 
Additionally, grandparents observe their children's actions towards their grandchildren, 
which limits deviation strategies. Furthermore, grandparents can bequest credibly to 
grandchildren instead of to their own children. The special role of grandparents is then 
also empirically assessed in Chapter three, within a developed country context. 
Chapter three and four shift the focus of analysis to developed countries. In de-
veloped countries, young adults choose the amount of education they acquire after the 
minimum school leaving age. However, the decision of a young adult might be con-
2 
strained by many factors, such as social background of the parents, their income and 
also inherited traits. Indeed, families with low income might be in a similar commit-
ment problem situation as families in developing countries, i.e. they might not receive 
any compensation from their children for investing into their education, which is as-
sumed costly. The alternative for young adults in developed countries is perhaps not 
child labour, but at least to drop-out of school at the relevant minimum age and start 
working. In Chapter three, this thesis analyses UK data, where such a drop-out at the 
minimum age is alarmingly high. This part of the thesis tries to assess if grandparents 
do have any influence (strategic or not) on grandchildren's education. A unique three-
generational dataset from the UK, the National Child Development Survey, is used to 
assess this hypothesis. This chapter applies new techniques to deal with both endogene-
ity and censoring in a parametric and semi-parametric regression context. Instrumental 
variable techniques are used to assess the intergenerational effect of grandparents' and 
parents' education on children's education. Furthermore, the paper provides evidence 
that education effects of parents and grandparents on children are small, but the effect 
of unobservable factors is significant and large. This is an interesting insight for educa-
tional policy, as any such policy should analyse these unobserved components in greater 
detail to affect educational transmission between generations. 
Chapter four, coauthored with Stephane Bonhomme at CEMFI, Madrid, then ad-
dresses a related question of school quality and education in developed countries. As has 
been argued in the child labour and child education literature, low school quality could 
prevent individuals from acquiring more education. The English and Welsh education 
system of selective education was often critisised for perpetuating educational inequal-
ity. It was argued that the division of the selective system into high quality, high-ability 
grammar schools and low-quality, low-ability secondary modern schools did not allow 
pupils, who failed the admission exam into grammar school, to acquire education beyond 
the minimum schooling age. Thus, an individuals choice of education and his lifecourse 
might be affected by the schooling system itself, which prevented him from accessing 
higher education. A policy of establishing comprehensive schools was introduced in 
England from 1965 onwards as a potential remedy to this alleged systemic issue. The 
comprehensive schooling reform, rolled out in the UK between 1965 and 1975, merged 
3 
high ability grammar and low ability secondary modern schools into a single, so-called 
comprehensive school. We assess the effects of this reform on various educational and 
labour market outcomes and present a new econometric methodology to achieve this. 
Previous studies found a large, negative effect of the comprehensive reform, for example 
on years stayed in school and test scores. It appears, however, that traditionally used 
estimators with observational data, such as matching for example, are severely biased 
in this particular data context. In the face of the inadequacy of the usual econometric 
techniques we develop a quasi-differencing method to remove the bias from the match-
ing estimand. We find that comprehensive re-organisation has little effect on the mean 
of outcomes, but a large effect on the variance. We interpret this as the selective system 
being more risky than the comprehensive one - a reason for parents to prefer the latter. 
In summary, this thesis provides some new theoretical insights with regard to 
investment in and choice of child education in developing and developed countries. 
It presents an entirely new overlapping generations game theoretic model which uses 
cyclic games. Furthermore, this thesis presents in-depth, advanced empirical anaylsis 
on education transmission mechanisms between three generations and assesses a very 
debated school reform in England and Wales. We derive interesting insights which open 
up new and challenging research questions in the economics of education, the school 
quality and the intergenerational mobility literature. 
4 
Chapter 1 
Economic theories of child labour 
5 
1.1 Introduction 
Viewed in the light of our advancing civilisa-
tion and its greater opportunity for growth 
and human service, and also its greater de-
mands for preparation for lifes of highest 
usefulness, I say again, the evils of child 
labour cannot well be exaggerated. Samuel 
McCune Lindsay, Secretary of the National 
Child Labour Committee, 1903 
The last fifteen years have seen an astonishing growth in research on child labour. The 
above quote illustrates that child labour is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, child labour 
was found in presently developed countries, in Europe and in the United States for 
example, until the middle of the twentieth century. In the nineteenth, and the beginning 
of the twentieth century, child labour was a key preoccupation for governments and 
public policy, as historical documents illustrate. As child labour decreased in developed 
countries, it became relatively under-researched. It was only lire-discovered" at the 
beginning of the 1990s in a developing country context l . 
What can be expected from this present review and from the extensive reviews 
conducted by Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), Basu (1999), Bhalotra and Tzannatos 
(2003), Basu and Tzannatos (2003) and Edmonds (2007) ? 
Basu (1999) and Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) focus on the disconnected nature 
of theoretical and empirical research. While this now seems less apparent, Edmonds 
(2007) highlights the need for more peer-reviewed policy evaluation on child labour. This 
lOne can hypothesize that this rediscovery is due to an increased involvement of international organ-
isations, such as the United Nations, on a global scale. The early 1990's witnessed the end of the bipolar 
international order, and many international organisations saw their potential field of development policy 
extend, after decades of relative blockade and inertia within the organisation, Boutros-Ghali (1992). 
This might explain the renewed interest of policy makers in child labour 
6 
present article agrees with this line of argument, and would like to highlight important 
grey-zones that remain in the theoretical, but also empirical, child labour literature. 
This article is not meant to be an exhaustive summary of empirical research: for this, 
see the excellent article of Edmonds (2007). Rather, it intends to illustrate what we 
understand about the rationale of child work, and which areas of the literature require 
further scientific investigation. As will appear, despite intensive research, there remain 
important open questions. 
Research opinions both converge and diverge within the child labour literature. 
As the review will show, convergence of opinions have been achieved in agreeing that 
child labour cannot effectively be tackled by secondary instruments, such as bans or 
legal measures. It is rather the root causes of child labour that should be addressed. 
There is also some convergence in identifying these root causes empirically. Poverty, 
credit constraints, commitment problems and parental preferences within the household 
are considered important in explaining child labour. A unique convergence of opinion is 
also detectable as far as the worst forms of child labour are concerned: clearly, harmful 
work should be banned on moral grounds. Conversely, a consensus seems to emerge 
that some forms of child work need not necessarily be harmful. 
Divergence, however, arises from the different country studies. These illustrate, to 
what extent child labour is a cultural and country specific phenomenon. Although some 
general causes, as stated above, might explain child labour in most country settings, the 
heterogeneity in particular situations translates into specific policy options adapted to 
each country context. Extrapolation from one country context and imposing similar pol-
icy instruments within another country context is not to be recommended. In addition, 
child labour has received a very different treatment in other disciplines which also inform 
policy. Anthropology and development studies, to name only two, tend to analyse the 
child labour problem from its cultural perspectives, Groves (2004). These disciplines 
generally voice the concern that Western institutions apply "Western standards" to the 
problem of child labour, disrespecting local customs and traditions. Nieuwenhuys (2007) 
speaks even of a "sacralisation of childhood" by Western institutions, refering to policies 
aimed at reducing child labour. Thus, in summary, there is still no consensus on how to 
combat and understand the phenomenon of child labour in a cross-disciplinary manner. 
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The debate about the definition of "child labour" alone is illustrative of the diffi-
culties researchers face when trying to analyse the child labour problem. It is helpful to 
dwell on this for a while, as it is essential to define child labour adequately in order to 
discuss research or policy options. Let us exclude the worst forms of child labour from a 
potential definition. These are clearly extreme cases, harmful to child development, and 
there exists, as mentioned above, a consensus on banning them. But the classification 
of other child activities and work is problematic. When exactly is child work harmful? 
Is child work not also a way to learn additional skills? One could agree that one should 
call the activity 'child labour' if the activity is harmful to the future development of 
the child. Again, it seems difficult to define a valid counterfactual to this situation, 
Edmonds (2007), i.e. what a child would have done if it had not worked. As the most 
important part of child labour occurs within the household, the definition of "market 
work" is clearly also inadequate. Therefore, in this chapter, we opt for a wide definition 
of child labour, which includes market and domestic work, and includes also light (and 
potentially non-harmful) work. In the following, we will alternate between our definition 
of child labour and the official definition of the International Labour Organisation (ILO 
in the following), which does not take into account domestic work. The ILO defines 
child labour as child work that is harmful to development - with the above mentioned 
limitations. 
Child labour, as measured by the ILO, is a global phenomenon that primarily af-
fects developing countries, though it exists as well, to a very limited extent, in developed 
countries. Although the numbers of child labourers have declined steadily over the last 
40 years, labour market participation rates of children between 5-14 years are still high 
in some parts of the world. The report of Hagemann et al. (2006) reveals that a total 
of 190 million children between 5-14 years work, down from 210 million in 2000, ILO 
(2002). As one can notice from the statistics in Table 1.1, child labour participation is 
high in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Asian continent has most child workers in 
absolute value, whereas the participation rates are highest in Africa. Absolute numbers 
of child labourers have been on the increase in Africa, reversing the downward trend 
in all other regions. These statistics should be considered with caution. First of all, 
the definition of child labour used here is limited to market work or near-market work. 
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All estimates of the number of working children are thus an underestimate, since, as 
discussed, most child work occurs in the family farm or in the informal sector of the 
economy, activities which are inherently problematic to measure. 
Region 2000 2004 
('OOOs) (%) ('OOOs) (%) 
Asia a nd the Pacific 127.3 19.4 122.3 18.8 
Latin America and the Carribbean 17.4 5.7 16.1 5.1 
Sub-saharan Africa 48.0 28.8 49.3 26.4 
Other regions 18.3 6.8 13.4 5.2 
Total 211 17.6 190.7 15.8 
Table 1.1: Regional estimates of economically active children (5-14) in 2000 and 2004, 
Source: ILO (2006) 
As mentioned before, despite convergence in identifying the root causes of child 
labour and a wealth of country studies, there are lacunae to be filled. Eight years ago, 
Basu (1999) argued that theory and applied research are widely disconnected in the field. 
And still today, a closer link of applied research with theory must be encouraged. The 
main body of research in theory and applied work has produced an astonishing variety 
of results that often contradict themselves and lack, as discussed, a consistent and 
common theoretical approach, Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003). A more methodological 
empirical approach to child labour is also needed 2. Empirical research seems to have 
taken the lead on theory, often providing results without a solid theoretical foundation. 
Thus welfare analysis is not possible and policy implications are difficult to assess when 
abstracting from general equilibrium effects. Data limitations were certainly a valid 
excuse for a disconnection between theory and applied research, but this will hopefully 
be a thing of the past with some excellent datasets. 3 
In addition to this disconnectedness between theory and applied work, some the-
oretical problems are still unresolved. To give a few examples: the demand side of child 
labour has been neglected and the commitment problem of child labour has not been 
analysed within a dynamic framework, although admittedly, a static model cannot do 
2For an excellent overview of potential pitfalls of empirical approaches and a detailed summary of all 
empirical studies, see Bhalotra and Heady (2003) or Edmonds (2007) 
3S
ee 
Edmonds (2007), Bhalotra and Heady (2003) or http://www.ucw-project.org/ and 
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/index.htm for examples of information on datasets 
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the problem justice. Moreover, the literature has assumed (except, for example, in the 
contributions of Goldin and Parsons (1989), Manacorda (2006) and Bhalotra (2007)) 
that parents are altruistic. Thus the role of parental preferences is an under-researched 
topic. In the same vein, the role of children's preferences towards child work seems also 
an interesting, untouched field: are children really on their own supply curve? 
The present contribution links theory and applied work in a modest and concise 
way. It attempts to outline unresolved problems and research ideas in the context of 
child labour. It is a difficult task to partition the child labour literature into meaning-
ful subgroups. The following is a tentative outline, in order to give the review some 
structure. First of all, a historical overview seems appropriate: intuitively, one might 
think that the conditions of child labour since the period of proto-industrialisation and 
the so-ca lied" Industrial Revolution" would be very similar to the situation in today's 
developing countries. Returning to the present, one can distinguish between the supply 
and the demand of child labour, OEeD (2003). These two broad categories can then 
be subdivided into thematic subgroups. On the demand side of child labour, we will 
look at the following subgroups: (i) child-specific skills and productive technology, (ii) 
international trade, and (iii) household production 
Similarily on the supply side, we will examine four subgroups: (i) poverty and 
parental preferences, (ii) credit constraints, shocks and commitment, (iii) multiple equi-
libria, and finally a small section on (iv) norms and cultural factors. For every section, 
a paragraph on theory and applied research will be developed. The sections are thus 
self-contained and can be read separately. Having thus examined the past and the 
present of child labour, we venture to take a look into the future by describing poten-
tially successful policy: the last summary section illustrates important interconnections 
and includes a discussion on policy options. Throughout the review, we provide some 
illustrative graphs from a country panel data set of child labour, drawn from the World 
Development Indicators (2003). 
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1.2 A historical perspective 
Apprenticeships for young adults and children were common in medieval Europe, and 
involved early labour market participation. Children enrolled in such contracts were 
considered lucky, since learning a trade would yield high returns, especially if one rose 
within the hierarchy of the trade guilds, Becci and Julia (1998). Various arrangements 
governed the apprenticeship contracts, which can be thought of as "learning by doing" 
training, Becci and Julia (1998). Parents had to pay a fixed sum of money, depending on 
the trade to be learned by the child. The so-called "pauper apprentices" were a subclass 
of apprenticeships, and no parental payment was required. Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that chimney sweeps, for example, belonged to this category of child workers. Often 
they were recruited in poor areas where parents had to fear for the subsistence of their 
families. Parents were happy to send their children away, knowing that they would at 
least survive, Becci and Julia (1998). Pauper apprenticeships were very common towards 
the end of the eighteenth century in Europe. Thus, there were essentially two forms of 
early child labour, and child labour would not necessarily be harmful in some instances. 
Apprenticeships offered an opportunity to learn a trade, involved early child labour in 
order to acquire necessary skills, but also resulted in higher wage compensations later 
in life. 
An interesting hypothesis is that industrialisation may have distorted these es-
tablished mechanisms by lowering the returns to the established trades. The Industrial 
Revolution demanded cheap, unskilled labour. In addition, non-manual skills became 
relatively more valuable during this transition, Rosenzweig (1995). Learning by doing 
was the orthodox way parents tried to raise the human capital of their children. How-
ever, this form of human capital investment lost importance compared to schooling. 
In the post-Industrial Revolution era, early child labour was a disadvantage in skill ac-
cumulation, whereas before it had been a way to gain significant returns. Different 
human capital was necessary to yield returns and it was no longer exclusively trans-
mitted through apprenticeships, but also through schools. One might hypothesize that 
parents needed to adapt to this new setting, where schooling in early childhood became 
relatively more important. 
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Early theoretical ideas on child labour, however, from contemporary economists 
focus on income need and poverty as a rationale for child labour. Basu (1999) cites Marx 
(1867) who invoked the pure necessity to make ends meet. 
Many applied studies have examined the situation of child labour in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. For example, Goldin and Parsons (1989) focus on parent-
child relationships within the family. They find some evidence for a weak altruistic link 
between parents and children, and put it as "parents did not have strong (economic) 
altruistic concerns for their children". Goldin and Parsons (1989) suggest as well that 
it was rather technological progress, than parental altruism, which brought about a 
change in the prevalence of child labour. Manacorda (2006) identifies adult and sibling 
labour supply responses to changes in the child labour opportunities of children in US 
data from the early twentieth century. He uses different age discontinuity thresholds 
implied by state child labour laws in the US. This very original work of identification 
tests, therefore, the extent to which parents reduce their labour supply when children 
work. This would implicitly be consistent with a selfish attitude towards children. The 
data seems, however, not to support the selfishness hypothesis and, in this context, it 
seems rather poverty and not the exploitative preferences of parents that lies behind 
child labour prevalence. In view of such diverse evidence, parental preferences and child 
labour seem an intriguing topic, with still a wealth of research opportunities. 
Another branch of the economic history literature argues that child labour would 
only be used within simple, primitive technologies. Thus, technological progress could 
playa key role in eliminating child labour. Nardinelli (1980) claims that it was tech-
nological change, and not legislation such as the Factories Act, which caused a decline 
in child labour. In his view, children performed secondary tasks of assistance to adults. 
Technological advances, such as the self-acting spinning mule for example, made these 
tasks redundant. He presents some data on the employment of children and argues that 
child labour laws only accelerated a trend of withdrawing children from the labour force. 
Nardinelli's (1980) data shows large fluctuations in the textile sector child labour force, 
both before and after the legislation. This seems to relativise the reported decline as a 
consequence of legislation, since it could also be re-interpreted as a temporary decline. 
Nardinelli's (1980) claim that children were employed mostly in the textile industry is 
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certainly accurate, but other important employment opportunities existed in England, 
especially, for example, children working as domestic assistants, Kirby (2005). Exten-
sive data from Belgium, as in Cunningham and Viazzo (1996), produces evidence on the 
proportions of working children in several industries compared to the total number of 
workers. In the Ghent textile sector, participation rates were as high as 15-20% whereas 
they reached 26% in paper mills and 33% in tobacco factories. Hence children had 
ample employment opportunities, and it is, in general, difficult to explain the decline 
accurately with the limited sectoral data available. 
Nardinelli's (1980) analysis is also supported by Moehling (1999) who argues that 
child labour laws only "codified" a decline. Nevertheless, the issue is still debated, 
since Merkeerk (2004) underlines the importance of assessing the laws beyond their 
immediate context in the late 19th century, and taking into account the accelerated 
demographic transition and the wealth effect of colonisation in England. These economic 
and demographic factors could potentially drive child labour down faster. The decline 
could thus be plausibly unrelated to the child labour legislation. 
The main question remains to know the causes for the growth and the later decline 
of child labour activities, as this knowledge might have direct applications in todays 
developing country experiences. Horrel and Humphries (1995) claim that economic 
historians agree that the Industrial Revolution pushed the number of child labourers 
up. It is speculated that the employment opportunities for children caused an increase 
in child labour. From home production many families switched to industrial produc-
tion/employment and at the same time geographically from rural to urban locations4 . 
Horrel and Humphries (1995) identify increased male wages and changes in technology 
as the main theoretical driving forces in the reduction of child labour. Their data analysis 
suggests that older children left home earlier and shifted the burden of work increasingly 
to their younger siblings. Horrel and Humphries (1995) argue that child labour was sta-
ble during the Industrial Revolution compared to the period of proto-industrialisation. 
Although the child labour force increased in absolute numbers, its relative proportions 
remained unchanged. Interestingly, Horrel and Humphries (1995) find contradictory 
4Note as well that children became" unemployed" on the countryside, which incited families to move 
to the labour-absorbing cities 
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income and wage effects on child labour participation rates. For example in mining fam-
ilies, the wage effect on child labour participation was negative whereas it was positive 
in the case of factory workers. Here the poverty or "need" hypothesis holds only for 
some occupational groups, a phenomenon which would require further investigation in 
a modern setting. 
Historical analysis could gain from a more detailed dataset. The planned Victorian 
Panel study in the UK (1850-1901)5, could potentially constitute a rich source to retrace 
family living conditions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in relation to 
child labour. 
This section on historical child labour studies underlines the importance of under-
standing what led to the increase and subsequent decrease of child labour in historical 
times. Policy makers today are especially keen to know which factors led child labour to 
decline in industrialised countries at the end of nineteenth and at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The debate about the effectiveness of legal measures, but also about 
the role of parental preferences, is still lively in today's policy context. After having 
examined historical accounts of child labour, it seems now appropriate to turn the focus 
of our analysis back to the present. The next section outlines the main factors thought 
to influence the demand for child labour. 
1.3 The demand for child labour 
The demand for child labour has not received as much attention as the supply side. As 
a large part of child labour occurs as domestic work or in the family farm, Edmonds 
and Pavcnik (2004), the household supplies and demands child labour at the same time. 
Thus, all household analysis considers child labour demand, but there are only a few 
contributions to the literature that address the role of household production technology 
or the productivity of a child directly, in order to explain child labour. An important 
question, concerning household and industry demand for child labour, is whether children 
have specific skills or characteristics making child work more desirable? This aspect of 
child labour demand has been neglected in most of the studies, yet is one of the most 
5 http://www.data-archive.ac. uk/ randd /vps.asp 
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interesting research questions on the demand side. Bhalotra and Heady (2003), for 
example, underline the fact that child employment resolves agency problems within the 
household. In addition, one might hypothesize, children might be more docile and easier 
to discipline in addition to having lower reservation wages than adults. 
1.3.1 Child-specific skills and technology 
Theory The" nimble fingers" hypothesis is a classic buzzword to justify the existence 
of child employment. Children are supposed to have specific abilities or a higher produc-
tivity at certain activities than adults. This would contradict the now well established 
theoretical substitution axiom between adult and child labour of Basu (1999). 
There is some evidence that children perform different tasks over their child" life-
time" - hence some specialisation by age, OECD (2003). This would imply that children 
are employed in specific, age-specialized occupations. On the other hand, and in terms 
of technology, children are seen to perform tasks which can, supposedly, be replaced by 
machines. Hence more modern technology drives the demand for child labour down, a 
conjecture we already touched upon in the historical section, Nardinelli (1980). Given 
the informal nature of children's employment and the small tasks they perform (e.g. 
in the service sector), there is today no study that has found an effect of technologi-
cal improvement on child labour. However, as Figure 1.1 shows, there seems to be a 
clear negative correlation between agricultural productivity and child labour in a panel 
of countries observed in 1960-20006 . This strengthens the evidence that there is some 
productivity argument in relation to child labour, be it within the household or within 
agricultural environments. 
The research of Dessy and Pallage (2005), for example, examines the relation 
between productive technology and child labour on a theoretical level. A coordination 
failure between companies and parents may exist in developing countries: because par-
ents do not invest in higher human capital for their children, firms do not invest in better 
technologies which require more human capital from workers, and vice versa. This could 
induce a vicious circle, perpetuating poverty. This would be a valuable starting point 
6There are sometimes no datapoints for the year 1960 in this panel data drawn from the World 
Development Indicators 
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Figure 1.1: Value added in the agricultural sector and labour market participation rates 
of 10-14 year olds in developing countries. 
for an empirical analysis. 
Davies (2005) examines another interesting demand-side argument which we will 
briefly discuss. It involves labelling initiatives by producers, and it can be thought of as a 
demand-side intervention. The demand for child labour by employers could be influenced 
by raising the costs of using child labour inputs. Labelling non-child labour products and 
banning products that have been made with the use of child labour has been endorsed 
by the United States in the past, Basu (1999). The argument is that labelled products 
should discourage consumers in developed countries from buying products made by 
children. Employers would then not use child labour. Davies (2005) shows, in an 
original and simple model, that labelling does not necessarily reduce child labour use 
to zero. In his model of Bertrand competition, (i) cost differences between adult and 
child labour and (ii) price-sensitive consumers make child labour use attractive. Price 
sensitive consumers do not care whether products have been made using child or adult 
labour. Hence some employers will still continue to use child labour intensive production 
lines. 
Social labelling, which aims to inform the consumer about the cirumstances of 
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production, especially about labour standards, has received increased attention in re-
cent years, Basu et al. (2006). In a variation on the work by Davies (2005), Basu et al. 
(2006) examine the impact of such labelling and associated trade sanctions. The gen-
eral conclusion of Davies (2005) is not changed; however, Basu et al. (2006) discuss 
also the implementation of such labelling programs. Interestingly, the threat of trade 
sanctions on all products, regardless of whether they are produced with child labour or 
not, discourages the affected countries from maintaining a credible labelling system. 
Another argument against labeling which reduces child labour opportunities is a 
welfare argument. If labelling decreases child labour, children (and parents) may be 
worse off if they are not compensated for the foregone child wages, Basu et al. (2006). 
Applied work and discussion In spite of the theoretical contributions discussed above, 
there is not much empirical work on child labour demand. 
Anker et al. (1996) attempted to test the nimble finger hypothesis. They did not 
find a ny evidence that children weave carpets faster than adults in a dataset of carpet 
production in India. The data they collected is however possibly subject to measurement 
error, since age is not reported reliably and the production of carpets by children is not 
well documented. The authors rely on the very small sample sizes of high quality carpets, 
and the recorded intensity of work of children, to infer about their weaving capacity. 
However, it seems difficult to disentangle the effects of child and adult production in 
this context. Thus any conclusion should be drawn with care, and further studies in this 
area would certainly be of great interest. 
In relation to technology, an interesting study of cocoa producing farms in Cote 
d'ivoire, using child labour, documents that children work less in higher productivity 
environments, Nkamleu and Kielland (2006). This could be due to an income effect. 
Higher productivity might imply higher wages for adult workers, which in turn induces 
them to replace children. This would also fit into the argument of multiple equilibria 
on the labour market, Basu and Van (1998). The effect could also plausibly be due to 
the use of modern technology, such as machines and fertiliser, which suppresses child 
labour opportunities. Unfortunately, the study of Nkamleu and Kielland (2006) does 
not allow us to distinguish between these alternative explanations, as they would have 
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very different policy implications. 
The hypothesis of child-specific skills has received surprisingly little empirical at-
tention. This is probably because the hypothesis of child-specific skills itself has been 
used by advocates of child labour, and thus does not fit into the discourse or research 
agenda of international organisations. It would be of prime importance for policy to es-
tablish a clear connection between child labour and child skills or productive technology. 
Appropriate data collection seems still a priority in this context. 
1.3.2 Household production 
There is a wide-ranging literature on fertility, child labour productivity and schooling 
in developing countries, Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Levy (1985). However, in all 
recent surveys, little attention has been dedicated to the topic of household production. 
Household production effects are mostly addressed within gender or sibling effects, Ed-
monds (2006b). Most studies that examine the effects of siblings or birth-order on child 
labour touch upon the fascinating topic of household production when they examine, 
for example, comparative advantage between siblings or the effect of work experience of 
siblings in market/domestic work. 
As the bulk of child labour occurs on the family farm or within households Heady 
and Bhalotra (2000), it seems crucial to revive the interest in evaluating shadow wages 
and income contributions of children to household or farm production. The productive 
contribution of children is often not well understood, as they may, for example, perform 
complementary tasks. Such complementary tasks, such as water and firewood fetching, 
cattle guarding, without which adult production would not be possible at all, is difficult 
to value. The unavailability of high quality data, such as time use surveys, but also 
the methodological problems of measuring child or adult shadow wages, are clearly 
detrimental to further work on the issue. 
A detailed assessment of home production would plausibly allow us: (i) to test 
the substitution axiom, (ii) to evaluate the impact of productive technology on child 
labour and (iii) to test the specific skills hypothesis. 
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Applied work It is relatively well documented that children contribute significantly 
to household work, Psacharopoulos (1997). There is also evidence on comparative 
advantage between siblings, documented by Edmonds (2006b). In Edmonds's data from 
Nepal, older girls seem to work more than their younger siblings, which suggests the 
importance of work experience. In addition, increasing numbers of younger siblings, and 
longer birth intervals between them, increase the workload of older girls. Thus home 
production, so Edmonds (2006b) argues, seems to generate comparative advantage: 
girls spending more time in domestic work. Interestingly, adding a younger brother to 
households with a girl generates more market and domestic work for girls, whereas adding 
a younger brother to a household with a boy results in augmenting the boys' market 
work only. Edmonds (2006b) expands slightly on the differential returns to education 
for boys and girls, which will affect their schooling or their involvment in domestic work. 
But how productive are younger children, girls or boys, in general in domestic work? 
This is an essential question which should be addressed, also in view of comparing their 
productivity to the returns from education. 
Applied work on the productivity of children has been done by Rosenzweig and 
Evenson (1977), Levy (1985), Cockburn (2001), Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias (1994). 
They have attempted to evaluate shadow child wages and productivity. These studies 
find that children are indeed quite productive, less so than adults though. Cockburn 
(2001) for example finds that children are to some extent substitues for adult labourers, 
and that they are about one third to one half as productive than adults. They contribute 
only a small fraction (5%) to household income. Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) and 
Levy (1985), but also Cockburn (2001), find a connection between produtive assets used, 
or mechanisation, and a reduction of child labour. These findings are very interesting 
from a policy point of view, since development of the agricultural sector could thus be 
a way of curbing child farm labour. 
The problem in this literature is the lack of available data on inputs, but more 
specifically it lies in the assumption of a separation of consumption from income. Rosen-
zweig and Evenson (1977) and Levy (1985) rely on structural models to identify the 
effects of child productivity on fertility, and Cockburn (2001) and Skoufias (1994) use 
an IV strategy to explore the contribution of children to household income. While there 
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has certainly been some research on local labour markets, child time allocation and 
occupation of children, Edmonds (2007), very few research papers have attempted to 
quantify child productivity. In this area, there are still many open questions. These ob-
viously extend to the relative returns from child labour and education and other facets 
of child labour theory, and require a deeper understanding, also for a successful policy 
to reduce child labour. 
1.3.3 International Trade 
Theory International trade does not immediately connect with a demand-side argu-
ment, and thus might be misplaced in a demand for child labour section. A standard 
argument from trade theory implies, however, that increased openness raises the return 
to the relatively abundant factor. In many developing countries, unskilled labour can 
be seen as the abundant factor, and child labour opportunities should thus become 
more prevalent. But increased openness might have ambiguous effects on child labour 
demand. Raising the return to child labour activities might lead to a replacement of 
children by adult workers. It might also lead to increased child labour, depending on the 
size of the wage increase and the characteristics of the country's labour market. 
There are now more theoretical publications that examine the relationship between 
trade and child labour. Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) construct a model examining trade 
sanctions. Trade sanctions lower the price of the product of the unskilled industry. In the 
presence of borrowing constraints, this feeds through into household's discount rates. 
Raising household discount rates leads then to lower investment in child education. In 
his model, trade openness, having the opposite effect as the sanctions, is principally 
good. Openness may lower the interest rate to world levels, and foster educational 
investment if households are not credit constrained. This analysis abstracts from the 
problem of commitment, which will be discussed in the next section. Chaudhuri and 
Gupta (2004) show, to the contrary, that trade liberalisation need not have a positive 
effect on child labour and that the effect depends on the relative factor intensities in the 
export and import sectors. A controversy remains thus on the effects of trade openness. 
In terms of trade sanctions, Ranjan (2001) establishes that bans on child labour 
products often run into enforcement problems. The welfare of the poorest households 
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might be reduced by such a ban. More recent work by Grossmann and Michaelis (2007) 
discusses the effect of trade sanctions in an imperfect competition model. Only firm-
specific bans would be effective in such a setting, with a tariff rate varying with the 
amount of child labour incorporated into the good. Bans on trade of child labour 
products might have unintended welfare consequences. We refer the interested reader 
to Section 1.4.3 below and the model of Basu and Van (1998), where the usefulness of 
bans is discussed in general terms. 
Applied work and discussion Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004) showed in a cross-section 
of countries that trade openness does not explain high levels of child labour, once one 
accounts for the income differences between countries. The statistically insignificant 
elasticity of child labour with respect to trade openness asserts thus no effect. eigno 
et al. (2002) come to the same conclusion. Judging from these two studies alone, trade 
sanctions might not be an effective instrument in curbing child labour. This might 
be explained by the low prevalence of child labour in the exporting sector of some 
countries. Neumayer and Soysa (2005) examine the effect of foreign direct investment 
on child labour and find that countries more open to foreign direct investment tend to 
have lower child labour participation rates. This would support theories of openness that 
argue for a positive effect, for example through higher adult wages, meaning that children 
will be withdrawn from the labour force, or through better technology that displaces 
child labour. In summary, the link between trade and child labour is also empirically 
"under-investigated" , and present studies do not provide enough corroborating evidence 
on the overall effect of trade openness or trade sanctions on child labour. 
1.4 The supply of child labour 
1.4.1 Poverty, parental preferences and household decision-making 
Theory A theoretical approach to child labour and poverty can be expressed in terms 
of the "luxury axiom", Basu and Van (1998): children's leisure time is a luxury good. 
Only households with very low non-child labour income will send their children to work. 
This implies that parents are altruistic towards their children, and take into account 
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the value of children's time. Thus the "luxury axiom" , and to some extent the poverty 
hypothesis, has, as its antagonist, the beneficial parental preference hypothesis. The 
necessity argument above invalidates the reasoning that parents send their children to 
work because they have preferences for child work, Lopez-Calva (2001). In the media 
and in the public image, child labour is often seen as a substitute for parents' leisure 
time, Basu and Van (1998). In the theoretical literature, such non-altruistic parents 
have not received much attention. As it is plausible that altruism need not necessarily 
be assumed, this is would be a valuable extension to pursue. Some evidence of non-
altruistic parents can also be found in the preceding section on history. Moreover, the 
poverty hypothesis associated with the hypothesis of altruistic preferences has been 
challenged by some researchers, Bhalotra (2004, 2007). This is justified, insofar as 
many studies in developed countries found only weak evidence of altruism (Bhalotra 
(2004) and references therein). An interesting case of a rejection of altruism in a 
developed country is Blow et al. (2004), documenting that parents direct child benefits 
relatively more towards alcohol purchases than towards purchases for children. Also, as 
Bhalotra (2004) rightly states, many programmes in developing countries assume either 
that parents are non-altruistic, or that parents ignore what is best for their children, in 
developing transfers and programs conditional on parents' actions. 
Many researchers, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004), maintain that poverty is the main 
determinant of child labour. However, some applied work, discussed below, shows the 
link poverty-child labour is debatable at the household level, given that we do not observe 
parental preferences. This has important consequences for policy recommendations. 
Another extension of the child labour literature, which follows the questions 
on parental preferences is to assess who makes the decisions in the household and 
whose preferences determine child work. This is the non-unitary approach to household 
decision-making or bargaining. Following Basu (1999), the bargaining literature on child 
labour can be divided into two areas: intra-household bargaining and employer-parent 
bargaining over the child. In all these models, one does not assume parental altruism. 
Children are modelled as goods over which the bargaining process takes place. 
The employer-parent bargaining approach assumes that parents bargain with an 
employer over the wage w to be paid to the child. The threat point of this bargaining 
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game is the no-agreement or stand-alone income that employer and parents earn. Gupta 
(2000) reasons that rises in adult wages implicitly lower the employer's threat point. 
Consequently child wages rise in line with adult wage increases. Parents can however only 
influence child wages if they can coordinate their actions towards an employer. As the 
potential market of unskilled labour is relatively large in developing countries and child 
labour is mobile and substitutable, the influence of parents on wages seems debatable, 
and thus employer-parent bargaining models have not received much attention. 
Intra-household bargaining models have been more popular in analysing child 
labour supply by the household. These barganining models revoke the assumption of 
unitary household decision making, McElroy (1990). Conflicting interests and views in 
the decisions on how to share and allocate household income are allowed for, McElroy 
and Horney (1981). More recently, Moehling (1995), Moehling (2003) and Blundell 
et al. (1994) have developed and used such models in relation to decisions on child time 
allocation. 
A typical model assumes that household members have a different weight in the 
decision-making process. For example the weight could depend, as in Basu (1999), on 
the share of income that a household member contributes to household income. Thus, 
there is a collective problem as opposed to a unitary problem, denoted by: 
maxO:(Yb Y2)UI (Xl, X2) + [1 - O:(Yb Y2)]U2(Xb X2) 
Xl,X2 
where 0: is an index of power in the household. Suppose the Xi are consumption vectors 
and the Yi incomes. Then 0: could be thought of as depending on the wealth a household 
member brings to the household (bequests in a marriage from the side of the women 
for example, education of the household members, and cultural factors). Here one can 
see the effect of households income Yi on the maximisation problem directly through 
the household power factor 0:. 
Having examined the theoretical approaches to poverty, parental preferences and 
household decision-making, we turn now to the empirical results of this part of the child 
labour literature. 
Applied research Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) analyse child labour in Indian vil-
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lages. In this excellent article, the authors find that families are likely to experience 
poverty, high fertility and high child labour at the same time. This corroborates a 
possible motive of the household to increase child labour income through increased fer-
tility. Other studies have confirmed a strong link between poverty and child labour. 
Skyt-Nielsen and Dubey (2002) test the subsistence hypothesis alongside four other hy-
pothesis. Like Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) and Ray (2002), Skyt-Nielsen and Dubey 
(2002) find a strong correlation between poverty and child labour. The authors of the 
various studies emphasise that in their view, a general consensus has emerged to asso-
ciate child labour with lack of income. As a variant on this theme, Skyt-Nielsen (2001) 
argues that high school costs, approximately one month of their annual income, prevent 
parents from sending their children to school. Grootaert and Patrinos (1998) argue that 
it is not the high cost of school but the implicit opportunity cost of lost (child-)wages 
that prevents child schooling. On the individual household level, the poverty effect re-
mains debated. Ray (2002) for example finds a strong link between poverty and child 
labour is absent in urban and semi-urban areas whereas it is present in rural areas. In 
an original way, Bhalotra and Heady (2003) provide evidence of how land ownership can 
increase child labour. In this model, children are more productive than hired workers. 
Hired workers are more difficult to monitor and children will work in their own interest, 
i.e. to inherit the family farm. Thus, wealthier land-owners might actually prefer to use 
their own children as (child-) workers than to rely on hired labour. 
Bhalotra (2007) tests the poverty hypothesis by deriving the implications of the 
hypothesis from a theoretical household model. The test is based on examining the 
wage elasticity of a child's labour supply. Bhalotra's (2007) idea is the following: if a 
household is very poor, then children work towards a subsistence income target. The 
elasticity of a child's labour supply should then be negative. Indeed, as the child wage 
rises, children should work fewer hours to meet the subsistence income target. Bhalotra 
(2007) finds that boys seem to work out of poverty compulsion, since their child wage 
elasticity is negative, whereas girls' labour supply seems not to respond to changes in 
child wages; the girls' wage elasticity being insignificantly different from zero. This raises 
interesting questions about parental preferences, but also, as in Edmonds (2006b), about 
differential returns to education and work for boys and girls. Finally, it challenges the 
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effectiveness of poverty- alleviating policies to reduce girls' child labour activities. 
Bhalotra (2004) finds evidence of altruistic preferences within the family, exam-
ining adult and child consumption responses. Interestingly, however, the altruistic link 
seems weaker when households spending on tobacco is examined. Thus, there could 
be evidence of some preference heterogeneity over child consumption between differ-
ent households. The endogeneity problem encountered here, due to the self-selection of 
smokers, could however not be resolved due to the lack of credible instruments, Bhalotra 
(2004). 
With reference to the household barganing theory7, Duflo (2000) tested the uni-
tary household model using a study of the South African old age pension benefit. The 
pension benefit may provide a 'natural experiment' setting, since persons/households 
that are just eligible for the pension benefit may be compared with those that are not 
yet eligible but are otherwise sim ilar. The setting of Duflo (2000) is interesting, since it 
allows us to distinguish the use of benefit money, depending on the recipient within the 
household. Duflo (2000) finds that pension income received by women was likely to be 
redirected to female grandchildren. This was reflected in increases of height-for-age and 
weight-for-age Z-scores of children living in the same household as the pension recipient. 
There was no such increase for children living with male pension recipients and also no 
effects for boys living with their grandmothers. Child outcomes may vary, depending 
whether the money goes to "the wallet or the purse", Duflo (2000) and depending on 
child gender. 
There seems to be evidence, although mixed, that the status of children plays 
a role in household decision-making, Basu and Van (1998), Udry (1996) and Bowning 
(1992)). Moehling (2003) showed that children have more" power" within the household 
if they contribute to household income. Moehling (2003) analyses in a recent working 
paper how much power, or influence, children have when the decision to buy a particular 
7The collective model of the household has come under increased criticism. In empirical work it 
seems very difficult to justify measurement of power in the household. Duncan et al. (2002) refer to this 
problem as the "Achilles heel" of applied work: income seems to be a good proxy for household power, 
however, one can often not disentangle if the observed income is exogeneous to household decisions or 
if it depends on past decsions, say past labour supply decisions. Hence, only exogeneous variations in 
income of one of the recipients can give good predictions. Consequently, one needs to be careful to 
apply this setting within appropriate context. However, it can yield interesting insights, as in Duncan 
et al. (2002) or Duflo (2000). 
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good is made. Such psychological factors might thus playa role in the children's decision 
to accept work. 
A more general idea would thus be to ask whether children are on their labour 
supply curve or not. This is definitely a question of central importance, especially for 
targeting policy interventions. Satz (2003) is the only research article that addresses 
this question from a normative point of view. If children are happy supplying child 
labour, and this translates into increases in status and well-being, and furthermore if 
child labour does not interfere with health and human capital accumulation, policies of 
banning child labour seem misdirected. 
The bargaining models, Duflo (2000), but also the household production models, 
Edmonds (2006b), point to an important gender effect of child labour, which seems 
worth a short mention within the research work on parental preferences and parental 
bargaining. This gender effect is apparent in the statistics of Hagemann et al. (2006), 
see Table 1.2. Slightly more boys than girls are engaged in market work in the age 
group 5-11; however, this gender bias becomes very pronounced in higher age groups. 
The explanation for this might be increased non-market/household work, or preferences 
for girls to be educated. Accounting for unobserved household work, girls appear more 
likely than boys to work and miss school, OEeD (2003). 
The data from a country panel data set seems to confirm the poverty hypothesis 
in Figure 1.2, since over the five decades, child labour participation rates are higher in 
countries where GDP per capita is lower. 
Although there seems to be a consensus on the relative importance of poverty in 
the explanation of child labour, poverty seems not the unique, nor the most important 
determinant. Poverty might mask other factors at work at the household or country 
level, such as parental preferences and commitment problems (see section below). 
Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) relate child labour to the unequal distribution of 
income, not to poverty alone. Such an approach can be compared to the political econ-
omy models at the end of the present chapter. In addition, child labour is traditionally 
associated with developing countries, which are low income countries. But child labour 
has also been reported, although to a lesser extent, from developed countries. Pet-
tit (1998) gives some insights into the case of the UK. Thus, other driving forces of 
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Age group Child Labour - Gender distribution 
2000 2004 
('OOOs) (%) ('OOOs) (%) 
5-11 109,700 107,647 
Boys 56,300 51.3 53,103 49.3 
Girls 53,400 48.7 54,544 50.7 
12-14 76,600 58,105 
Boys 41,500 54.2 31,848 54.8 
Girls 35,100 45.8 26,257 45.2 
Total 5-14 186,300 165,752 
Boys 97,800 52.5 84,951 51.3 
Girls 88,500 47.5 80,801 48.7 
15-17 59,200 51,911 
Boys 34,000 57.4 32,250 62.1 
Girls 24,800 42.6 19,661 37.9 
Total 5-17 245,500 217,663 
Boys 132,200 53.8 117,201 53.8 
Girls 113,300 46.2 100,462 46.2 
Table 1.2: Child labour and its gender distribution 
child labour than income poverty should exist and need to be investigated. The next 
section gives an important other rationale for parents to choose child work. Credit con-
straints and commitment problems have also been analysed within the literature on the 
economics of education as factors preventing optimal schooling investment in children. 
1.4.2 Commitment problems, shocks and credit constraints 
Theory Parents have incentives to send their children to school and invest in their 
human capital, instead of sending them to work, if such an educational investment 
increases the total income of the children, and the family above the income attainable 
under a full child labour and no schooling regime. If we can believe that education 
means capital formation and has not a pure signaling role, as in Chevallier et al. (2004), 
and translates, through a human capital production function, Ben-Porath (1967), into 
higher incomes, then parents could be better off by sending their children to school. This 
would enable them to earn, as a family, higher wages through their educated children. 
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Figure 1.2: Log of constant dollars per capita GDP and labour market participation 
rates of 10-14 year olds in developing countries. 
For completeness, it should be mentioned here, that parents have also to take into 
account returns to other investments, and notably investments in the capital market, 
when making a decision between child education and child labour. But supposing the 
returns to education were high and thus the most profitable investment. Then parents 
should rationally invest in child education. 
The problem is, however, that the children will earn the higher wages, not the 
parents. Thus, unless transfer arrangements or some form of reverse altruism between 
children and parents exist, there is no guarantee that the parents will reap the benefits 
of an investment in child education, while the parents are certain to incur the costs of 
the investment (lost child wages and schooling costs). This is the intuition behind the 
commitment problem within the household. Children might not repay the parents' ex-
penses, nor allow a sharing of resources across the family. This is perhaps the single most 
interesting research topic besides the poverty hypothesis. Since a very influential article 
of Baland and Robinson (2000), the topic has been classified as resolved on a theoretical 
basis. Although an excellent model, the intergenerational connections of commitment 
constraints are not well understood in the Baland and Robinson (2000) model, which 
28 
lacks dynamics and possible strategic interactions between family members. There is 
some important research to be done in this area of intergenerational contracts and child 
labour. 
Another factor, besides commitment problems, are imperfect credit markets which 
prevent parents from investing optimally: parents cannot lend or borrow against the 
child's future income. Along the same lines, the lack of insurance and credit markets 
in developing countries imply that a child's labour capacity might be used as an old-
age insurance or to smooth out shocks. Several papers have addressed this strand of 
literature. Ranjan (2001), Dehejia and Gatti (2002) and Rammohan (2001) claim, and 
produce evidence, that children's work increases with negative income shocks to the 
household and in the presence of borrowing constraints. Thus, children's work earnings 
can be seen as a consumption smoothing device, that help households to maintain their 
permanent income over the lifecycle, Dehejia and Gatti (2002). 
Baland and Robinson (2000) consider not the role of incomplete capital markets, 
but also the role of bequests. Because, as discussed above, future income (after invest-
ment) is realised by the children and not the parents, there is a commitment problem 
even with perfect credit markets. Perfect markets alone do not solve the commitment 
problem of child labour, a key insight of Baland and Robinson (2000). The role of 
bequests is as follows in this context: by reducing bequests to their children, parents 
could compensate themselves for the foregone consumption and/or for the amount of 
money they invested in their children. However when bequests are zero, then parents 
simply run out of resources. As children cannot commit to repay any expenses, child 
labour is, as a result, inefficiently high. Inefficiently high means, in this context, that 
society as a whole could be better off if children were educated. 
As other research has shown, Wagener (2002), repayment by children is not com-
mon in developed countries. In some instances, remittance payments to parents or the 
wider family are observed in developing country contexts. In particular immigrants to 
developed countries transmit to their families in developing or transition countries. The 
literature on remittances argues that such transfers are sustained partly by strategic 
motivations, Stark (1995), Cox (1987). Although we observe such child-parent, child-
family transfers, the commitment problem potentially exists because repayment only 
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depends on some form of reverse altruism between children and parents, or on strategic 
transfer arrangements. Underlying cultural norms or rules could enable societies to sus-
tain transfer payments that solve such commitment problems. Even if such culturally 
encoded strategic transfer arrangements exist, they can be perturbed by various factors 
of uncertainty and must depend on family characteristics, i.e. outside options or avail-
able punishments for deviators from the norm. Also, it is not clear why child labour 
is so prevalent if such a contractual incompleteness as the commitment problem, can 
be overcome by simple intergenerational trigger strategies, Lopez-Calva (2003),Rangel 
(2003).While trigger strategy set-ups usually do not imply a punishment, except revert-
ing to the one-shot Nash equilibrium of the game, it seems very important to realise 
that such trigger strategy set-ups require ample information on past family members' 
play. Such a perfect information setting, having information on all relevant actions of 
past generations, seems perhaps not the most natural. This part of the child labour 
literature, related to commitment problems and strategic exchange within generations, 
requires still closer scrutiny. The following chapter of this thesis intends to provide some 
a nswers to these open issues. 
Applied work In terms of the consumption smoothing hypothesis, Skyt-Nielsen (2001) 
argues that parents take a loan on the human capital market instead of in the formal 
credit market. This is a very original way of analysing the problem. Parents might take 
these decisions in order to maintain their consumption levels, which are often close to 
the subsistence level and below the poverty line. Skyt Nielsen finds returns to schooling 
of 6-7o/c p.a. in Zambia, which should make an investment worthwhile. Thus other 
immediate constraints (such as a high preference for immediate consumption or lack of 
collateral) or commitment problems might prevent parents from realising these gains. 
Rammohan (2001) showed that the development of financial markets and the 
increase in financial rates of return can lead to higher investment in schooling, a corre-
sponding decrease in child labour, and also plays an important role in fertility decisions. 
The main channel through which financial markets affect the households in the model 
is through lower borrowing rates, brought about by more competitive financial markets. 
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Edmonds (2006a) studied the effects of an anticipated increase in income on 
child labour and schooling in a very detailed way, and within the same data context as 
Duflo (2000) above. He finds that the largely anticipated increase in pension income in 
South Africa leads to a significant decrease in child labour. This finding is consistent 
with liquidity constraints, but also with commitment problems and altruistic parental 
preferences. Indeed higher income will yield higher investment in child education through 
altruism, if we assume parents were credit-constrained initially. However, this is still 
consistent with commitment problems, since one could possibly conceive that informal 
credit market arrangements exist in South Africa and would allow even poor households 
to borrow. Thus the evidence is also consistent with parents not wanting to borrow 
because of commitment problems. It is very difficult to show the existence of such 
commitment problems, since they seem observationally equivalent to credit constraints. 
Edmonds (2006a) illustrates however, that credit constraints or commitment problems 
are a large determinant of child labour, and not only poverty or high returns to child 
labour, as often stated. 
1960 1970 1980 
0 
0 
0 
- a:l 0.. 0 :::::J 
00 0 
0 l~ ~~o ~o 08 ~g> 00 .00 
0 0 
~ CD 
0) \t~o (J) 0 g>v -0 0 o N ~ ~ 0 0 
...... 
0 50 I 0 
...... 
c 1990 2000 (J) 
0 ~ 
:!2 a:l 
~ 
U 0 000 CD 
ai 10 u 0 ~ S v ~ 00 :::::J 0 0 N ~ 00 0 .D 
co oCO ...J 0 
o 0 
o (I 
o 50 100 150 0 50 100 150 
Domestic credit provided to the private sector (%of GOP) 
Graphs by Year 
100 150 
Figure 1.3: Domestic credit provided to the private sector (% of GDP) and labour 
market participation rates of 10-14 year olds. 
Credit market imperfections seem to playa weaker role on aggregated data. As 
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an illustration, we plot in Figure 1.3 a proxy of credit market existence (domestic credit 
as percentage of GOP) against child labour participation rates. It seems that there is 
a steep association in the past, for example in the 1960-1980's but this has become 
less distinguishable over time. This could be explained by the poor proxy measures 
of the selected variables. Another explanation could be the reliance of households on 
other means of credit than those provided by formal institutions, or also, of course, the 
existence of the aforementioned commitment problem. 
1.4.3 Multiple equilibria 
Theory Basu and Van (1998) and Basu (1999) have shown that child labour can arise 
as a consequence of multiple equilibria in the labour market. Multiple equilibria can be 
obtained by combining the already discussed" luxury axiom" with an assumption that 
child and adult labour are partially substitutable, the "substitution axiom". 
The argument proceeds as follows. Suppose the adult wage is w, and the child 
wage is ~'ee, a fraction of the adult wage, 0 < 'Y < 1. For a given demand for labour in a 
competitive labour market, it depends on the prevailing adult wage rate if the children 
are sent to work or not. Suppose the wage is below some lower limit W, which we will 
call the subsistence threshold. Then children are sent to work. This is implied by the 
"subsistence axiom": parents will send children to work only if income falls below this 
threshold. Note again that consequently parental altruism is assumed here. 
In the market, there exists an equilibrium where all children and the parents work 
if the wage rate is at or below the subsistence threshold W. If the wage were to rise, 
children are withdrawn from the labour market, because they earn only a fraction 'YW 
of the total wage, and adult income rises over the threshold. It is better that parents 
supply all the labour to reap the full benefits of the wage increase. At a sufficiently high 
adult wage, no children will work and all labour demand is met by adults. Hence, there 
are two stable equilibria. In the low wage equilibrium both children and parents supply 
labour, in the high wage equilibrium only adults supply labour. The most fascinating 
analysis of Basu and Van (1998) is related to the welfare effects of a child labour ban. 
A ban on child labour might increase the adult labour wage rate, if we suppose that 
there is no excess supply of adult labour on the market. Reducing child labour thus 
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increases the demand for adult labour and the associated wage. Interestingly, a ban 
on child labour only improves welfare if the post-ban adult wage is sufficiently high to 
compensate a family for the lost child wages. The problem of the welfare effects of a 
ban resurfaces in many settings, for example as explained in the section on trade bans or 
labelling initiatives, policy needs to determine the welfare effects of such interventions. 
Basu and Van's (1998) model provides an elegant illustration that widely advocated 
bans might have unintended welfare consequences, i.e. when the adult wage does not 
raise sufficiently in response to the ban, the family might be worse off. 
Another explanation for child labour can be found in unemployment, Basu and 
Van (1998). Assume the same model as above, with the additional feature that a 
fraction A of workers own the firms in the economy and receive also profit income, Basu 
(1999). Then a fraction of workers (1 - A) will earn only wage income. 
The dividend-earning workers will never send their children to work. Thus, only 
poor workers will send their children to work: again, a necessity argument. If we consider 
now such an equilibrium where poor families (i.e only non-profit earning workers) send 
their children to work, unemployment will foster child labour. An intuitive explanation 
without going through all the details of the model is that the less likely it is that parents 
find work, the more they will rely on their childrens' wages to generate family income. 
Another branch of the child labour literature, examining the role of child labour 
in growth models, has also given evidence of such multiple equilibria and development 
traps. For example, the theoretical contribution of Strulik (2004) relates child mortality 
to child quality investments. Suppose child mortality depends on economy-wide income. 
If child mortality is high and quality" unaffordable" (in the sense that it does not pay to 
invest in quality), parents will rationally not invest in quality and instead increase child 
labour. However this leads the economy as a whole into stagnation, since generations do 
not acquire human capital at all. High mortality remains prevalent because of stagnant 
income at the macroeconomic level. The economy can only take off if a new technology 
is introduced and makes income rise for some time. Then, less children die and parents 
invest gradually more in child quality, which in turn then also raises the human capital 
of the economy, and per capita income. 
Another model of fertility and child labour by Hazan and Berdugo (2002) uses 
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a similar argument. Under some restrictions, an economy might be in a poverty trap. 
High child labour and high fertility coexist. If the wage differential between parental 
and child wages increases, the value of child labour is reduced. This is essentially due 
to technological progress as well. Hazan and Berdugo (2002) come therefore to very 
similar results in a dynamic framework as Basu and Van (1998) in a static version. The 
wage differential between adult and child labour, or the adult wage alone, has to rise 
sufficiently. Moreover, the technological progress element underlying the work of both 
Strulik (2004) and Hazan and Berdugo (2002) can be compared to the approach to the 
topic of technological change on the demand side of child labour. This technological 
progress motivation is not yet well understood in applied work on the demand side, and 
leaves room for more investigation. 
Applied work and discussion There has been no explicit test of the theory of multiple 
equilibria in the labour market. This seems to be an obvious empirical lacuna to be filled, 
and could be done by analysing legal measures against child labour and their general 
equilibrium effects. 
However, there has been an empirical test of the growth models incorporating 
child labour and human capital formation by Hussain and Maskus (2003). The authors 
set up a very simple model of child labour where child labour exists, if the marginal 
benefit of child production exceeds the marginal benefit of education. Thus, Hussain 
and Maskus (2003) analyse the determinants of child labour and child education in a 
cross-section of countries. They estimate a system of equations as follows: 
Human capital depends on past human capital, quality of schooling and past child 
labour: 
Child labour at time t depends on past human capital, cost of education and 
quality of schooling: 
CHILDLABt = Ql + ,81HKt-l + ,82COSTt + ,83 QUALt + tIt· 
Output depends on past human capital: 
OUTPUTt = Q3 + ,88HKt-l + t3t· 
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These recursive specifications are needed to identify the system uniquely. Hussain 
and Maskus (2003) employ the seemingly unrelated regression technique to allow for 
possible correlations between the error terms of the equations. One problem is that 
the exclusion restrictions used are derived from an underlying structural model, which 
might simplify the process of child labour accumulation significantly, i.e. why should 
present human capital not enter the child labour equation and why does child labour not 
enter the output equation? Although one can critisize the system approach, their model 
provides plausible estimates: past human capital influences the stock of child labour 
negatively (inter-generational effect) and lower school density (proxy for high costs) 
induces more child labour. The model is also a theory-based estimation, a precious 
species in this literature. It gives additional evidence that parents who face low school 
quality and experience high child labour will send their children as well into child labour 
- a poverty trap situation. 
Another very interesting article in the literature on child labour and poverty traps is 
Souza and Emerson (2003). Here, the authors estimate the intergenerational persistence 
of child labour by examining parents and grandparents of child labourers. It appears 
that children are more likely to start work earlier if their parents were themselves child 
labourers or have lower education attainment. Also grandparents have an influence, since 
they decided on the human capital level of the parents. Souza and Emerson (2003) 
interpret this finding as a persistence effect, which goes beyond income and poverty 
alone and would point to norms and other forms of influence. However, it is likely that 
the father's or mother's child labour participation captures a lower lifecycle income of 
parents and is a good proxy for lower income. This would then be a reconciliation with 
the poverty hypothesis. On the other hand, it appears that returns to education are 
high in Brazil and thus children can potentially expect a much higher income. This 
is consistent with the view in the multiple equilibria literature, that there is a 'good' 
equilibrium of higher incomes without child labour. 
As a matter of discussion, the results in the multiple equilibria framework seem 
plausible, especially the theoretical conclusions on labour markets and growth models. 
Empirical tests still lag behind and should be encouraged. 
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1.5 Norms, cultural factors and the political economy of 
child labour 
Norms and traditions are often invoked in theorectical as well as in empirical work, Skyt-
Nielsen and Dubey (2002), Skyt-Nielsen (2001), Souza and Emerson (2003). Norms and 
traditions can playa role in transfer behaviour within the family. This could be directly 
applied to a model similar to the one of Baland and Robinson (2000), where transfers 
are impossible due to commitment problems. Norms or agreed sanction mechanisms 
could overcome these shortcomings, Lopez-Calva (2001). 
In terms of cultural factors, Lopez-Calva (2003) proposed a social stigma model of 
child labour. In very simplified terms, suppose that the social stigma cost B(n) of child 
labour depends negatively on the number of persons who send their children to work. 
Consequently the social stigma cost is low if child labour is widespread and accepted 
as 'normal'. If there is however an increased awareness of the (potentially) negative 
effects of child labour or if there is a change in perception, some households might 
withdraw their children from the labour force. This increases social stigma costs to all 
other households in the model. Eventually, no child labour exists if social stigma costs 
rise sufficiently. 
The pattern in Figure 1.4 illustrating child labour in rural and urban areas (sym-
metric graph) could well be the consequence of different norms in these two areas. It 
is clear that it could also reflect the different employment opportunities of children, 
or alternatively, different stages of development. This is open to discussion, but child 
labour in a country dominated by rural regions seems much higher than in an urbanized 
country. 
Political economy contributions examine the interactions between citizens, voting 
behaviour and child labour. The enforceability of legislative bans on the demand side 
of child labour is analysed. Would citizens vote for such a ban? Families, employers, 
exporters and also the government might have similar and compatible incentives to 
maintain child labour, Anker et al. (1996). Tanaka (2003) and Doepke and Zilibotti 
(2003) develop models where restrictive child labour laws are not voted for or supported, 
because they induce welfare losses for the very poor, and because the poor are the 
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Figure 1.4: Urbanisation and labour market participation rates of 10-14 year olds In 
developi ng cou ntries. 
largest population fraction. Th is has important feedback efFects on the demand and 
supp ly for child labour, since propositions to ban child labour might not be enacted into 
legislation. Even if bans are voted for or if the government is autocratic and dictates a 
ban , such measures subsequently run into enforcement problems. It is well known that 
most child labour activities take place in the informal sector, where child labour laws 
and other labour standards are generally not well respected . Thus, the beneficairies of 
informal sector prod uction might have endogeneous reasons not to control or enforce 
such standards. Political economy contributions tend to emphasize that parts of the 
society have an interest in not voting for or not enforcing bans on child labour and 
maintaining the status quo. A slightly modified version of the model with an empirical 
test is provided by MafFei et al. (2006): political repression by the elite seems to impact 
child labour levels. 
Summary and policy approaches Considering the weak empirical evidence on de-
mand side interventions, additional research would be necessary into the role of tech-
nological progress, the hypothesis of child-specific skills and household production. In 
terms of possible policies let us first consider a ban on child labour or a ban on products 
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made with child labour (trade-ban, labelling). 
Theoretical research seems to agree that a trade ban or trade-liberalisation might 
have ambiguous effects on child labour. Labelling initiatives may be beneficial in pre-
venting children from work, but they do not solve the immediate welfare effect on poor 
households which will forego this child income, Basu et al. (2006). 
Kis-Katos and Schulze (2005) defend, along the lines of theoretical work on trade 
sanctions but also on the political economy of child labour, the argument that child 
labour regulation is unable to address the root causes of child labour, and that domestic 
policies are more suitable. As discussed in the section above on trade, sanctions are 
not targeted enough towards child labour intensive production, and penalise a whole 
export sector. Often, they are also perceived as the revival of protectionist reflexes by 
the developed North. In terms of the political economy of legal measures, two main 
features permeate from the theoretical literature: 1. Child labour may be desired by 
the elite, Maffei et al. (2006) or by a majority of the population if it entails major 
gains, Tanaka (2003) 2. Legal intervention will only be effective if it is well enforced, 
Basu (1999), Grootaert and Patrinos (1998), which again depends on the preferences 
of the population in point 1. In general, policy options on the demand side need further 
empirical research as to their effects. The labour supply model of Basu and Van (1998) 
demonstrates that, additionally, the welfare effects of a ban must be analysed with care. 
Basu and Van (1998) argue for the employment of bans only if they constitue a "benign" 
intervention, since a new, stable equilibrium and welfare improving equilibrium needs to 
be reached. 
Thus the topic of a ban as a policy option links directly to a multiple equilibria 
setting. Bans can be effective, if there exist multiple equilibria. Which other policy 
options are suggested by multiple equilibria models? As seen above, growth models 
suggest interventions such as "education for one generation" or redistribution policies 
to solve the multiple equilibria problem in one generation. This then translates automat-
ically into benefits for all following generations. The main conclusion of the literature on 
bans and multiple equilibria is that households, and whole economies, might be trapped 
in poverty. This implies high child labour and low growth in the future. This broad 
idea is then easily added to poverty as an additional determinant of child labour. It 
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is surprising that there seems to be relatively little empirical evidence on the effects of 
bans on child labour. This seems an important issue to pursue in terms of policy options 
on the demand side. 
We have reviewed the main evidence on the supply side of child labour. Poverty, 
the issue of insufficient credit markets, compounded by commitment problems, and 
cultural factors are all very important to explain child labour. What are the policy 
options on the supply side? 
Clearly, fostering growth would enhance the general per capita income level and 
hence reduce child labour. However, growth is not always equitable. Therefore one could 
also imagine redistribution policies. A general discussion is which incentive structures 
should be created within redistributive policies. If poverty is a main determinant of 
child labour, direct household poverty relief might be a policy instrument. If on the 
other hand poverty is not important but relative returns to child labour and education, 
then the quality of education should be increased. Skyt-Nielsen (2001) argues that 
policies which provide education free of charge and also free meals to school-attending 
children have been a success. These have to be associated however with educational 
subsidies that replace the child's earnings from work to be effective, argue Grootaert 
and Patrinos (1998). Ray (2002) cites employment generation schemes in poor areas 
that were pushing poor households above the poverty line as successful in curbing child 
labour. 
Addressing the market imperfections implied by the lack of credit and insurance 
markets seems another valuable approach. Although formal credit markets are incom-
plete in developing countries, informal credit markets are filling this gap. Hence, we 
would expect parents to be able to borrow, Udry and Pranab (1999). Especially in rural 
regions, where child labour is most prevalent, Heady and Bhalotra (2000), such markets 
exist in order to smooth out agricultural shocks. Hence, there ought to be other forces 
at work which could explain the high incidence of child labour, and a credit market 
expansion does not seem to be the most urgent option. 
If commitment problems within the household are dominant, measures to remedy 
market imperfections will not be helpful. It seems difficult to empirically disentangle 
commitment problem effects from borrowing constraints. In the context of commitment 
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problems, a credit market liberalisation might not bring about the desired outcome, 
since commitment constraints still bind. 
Possible incentive structures to resolve commitment problems and credit con-
straints could be composed of transfer payments to parents conditional on school atten-
dance of their children, raising the return to education through better quality of teaching 
and better schools. Conditional cash transfer programs seem to have had success, for 
example in Mexico with Progresa, OECD (2003). However, do we really understand the 
dynamic impact of such programs? The commitment problem is a dynamic problem, 
as it affects inter-generational transfers of both children and parents. Will a temporary 
transfer be enough to lift parents out of a bad equilibrium with no intra-family transfers 
to a better equilibrium with transfers? These questions still remain unanswered, yet 
answers are crucial for a well designed policy. 
Various models have tried to assess whether parents have gender-dependent pref-
erences over child quality, Edmonds (2006b). Also there is a growing literature that 
brings into question the unitary model of the household, Basu (1999). The collective 
model of the household points in both theoretical and applied work to important gender 
effects. These can be observed in the distribution of child labour and child schooling. 
Moreover, parents or grandparents' gender is thought to influence resource allocation, 
Duflo (2000). This could mean that traditional poverty alleviation could function more 
efficiently if transfers were made to the appropriate gender. It turns out that, empiri-
cally, transfers to women result in better outcomes in terms of child health. Another 
more theoretical policy recommendation within the bargaining literature appears to be 
parental education programmes. Additional education can rise the 'threat points' in the 
bargaining game and make women more influential. Especially the 'empowerment' of 
women could then prove a successful measure to fight poor child "quality" outcomes 
(poor health, malnutrition, no school attendance). 
What has been done, what was succesful? Edmonds (2007) groups all possible pro-
grams directly affecting child work, and not being general development programs, into 
six categories: information campaigns, income replacement campaigns, flexible school-
ing programs, reintegration projects, restrictions on employment and conditional cash 
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transfers. While Edmonds (2007) critisizes the lack of of peer-reviewed evaluations of 
most of the programs, except for the last two programs mentioned, another dramatic as-
pect of child labour policies is apparent. Not only are theory and empirical research often 
disconnected, but also with respect to policy, the implementation and cross-disciplinary 
social science research seem to be separated. To give only one example, Groves (2004) 
mentions only very seldomly the actual outcomes of the program implementing ILO 
Convention 188 in Honduras, but managerial aspects are in the forefront of the discus-
sion. Certainly, the managerial and communication approach is crucial for a successful 
program, but it should be undertaken with consultation of other social scientists and, fi-
nally, proper evaluation. It seems that a cross-disciplinary approach to child labour is not 
yet established, and that, as Edmonds (2007) explains, scientific evaluation criteria and 
research are secondary when it comes to the practical implementation of programmes. 
We have cited already some policy interventions that have worked. Although 
there is some modern evidence Dayiolu (2005) that schooling legislation can help to 
curb child labour, there has not been much other work on legal measures. It appears 
that the success of legal measures depends most likely on the degree of enforcement, 
Basu (1999). 
Most programmes implemented are either school quality or conditional cash trans-
fer programmes. Let us examine these in turn. 
Educational quality also influences the return to work, thus school quality measures 
have been discussed to make child schooling more attractive. Figure 1.5 shows an 
association between school quality and child work in our panel data. For example, 
using a simulation exercise, Jafarey and Lahiri (2005) compare the option of facilitating 
credit to families to the option of an increase in school quality. The best policy option is 
dependent on the relative elasticity of credit supply. If school quality is increased, parents 
need to be able to forego income and send their children to better schools. Thus, a "food 
for education" program might be better if credit supply is nearly inelastic. Unfortunately, 
the authors brush aside the commitment problem. With commitment problems, school 
quality improvements will most likely not lead to an optimal increase in school enrolment 
in this model. Conditional cash transfer programs avoid the commitment problem in 
one generation, but do not address the commitment problem in future generations. The 
41 
commitment problem is a key issue behind the effectiveness of many policy interventions. 
Conditional cash transfers programs seem to work. They have also received proper 
evaluation. Famous examples are Bolsa Escola in Brazil, Bourguignon et al. (2003) 
or Progresa in Mexico, Schultz (2004). Schultz (2004) estimates that the Progresa 
program, which affects school enrolment, reduces household and market work by 4.3% 
points for girls at the secondary school level. The effect for boys at the secondary school 
level is slightly smaller, but an overall effect of the program is nevertheless a reduction 
of 2.40 0 in market and household work for boys. Schultz (2004) extrapolates that the 
program has increased baseline schooling from an average of 6.8 years, by 0.66 years. 
There was no effect of the program on the fertility of poor women. 
The conditional cash transfer programme seems to work, because it directly affects 
the returns to schooling and work and avoids commitment problems. It is however 
difficult to distinguish the income effect of Progresa from the effect of the program on 
schooling costs. Similarily, it is not guaranteed that conditional cash transfers are the 
most appropriate policy, given the school quality improvement, legal ban, compulsory 
schooling or any demand side policy option. 
Todd and Wolpin (2002) extend the evaluation of Progresa, by proposing an 
original method of validating a structural estimation model by a policy experiment. 
Todd and Wolpin (2002) then, at least in a partial equilibrium framework, simulate the 
effects of other policies on child labour. Interestingly, they mention the possibility that 
because more people attend school, the wage on the child labour market might rise. This 
would somehow mitigate the effect of school attendance, since the returns structure 
would be affected in the opposite way, i.e. by child work becoming more attrative. 
Simulating an increase in child wages by 25% associated with the Progresa program 
raises girls' enrolment in school only by 89% of the original treatment baseline and boys 
reach only 69% of the original baseline effect. Thus, this paper provides evidence of 
further effects of such cash transfer programs. The unknown response of child labour 
demand and the short time impact of the program might paint a too rosy picture. The 
program additionally does not really address commitment problems in a longer term or 
intergenerational setting, since the program is working only on a temporary base. Thus, 
for a successful policy, it seems crucial to understand the commitment problem using 
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a dynamic approach. The most promising policy option might need to tackle three 
potential reasons for child labour: 1) cash transfers reducing the poverty constraints 2) 
artificially removing the commitment problem from the household by issuing such cash 
transfers with conditions, and 3) the policy must provide an inter-generational linkage 
so that current children know that their own children will have better opportunities as 
well, and that eventual returns from schooling will be shared across generations. 
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Figure 1.5: School quality (pupil-teacher ratio) and labour market participation rates of 
10-14 year olds in developing countries. 
Thus, from a policy point of view, conditional cash transfer programs seem suc-
cesful. Three challenges at least remain: better research and evaluation of demand 
side programs (affecting the return to child work, say, by introducing new technologies) 
seems urgent, as Todd and Wolpin's (2002) point to important (partial) equilibrium ef-
fects of increased school enrolment. Secondly, efforts have to be made to evaluate and 
experiment in general with a more diverse range of policy options. Thirdly, theory and 
practice have to be linked to implementation in a cross-disciplinary effort. Progresa in 
Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil are example of a succesful cross-disciplinary and prac-
tically oriented approach, but these programs are too few, compared to the dimension 
of the global child labour problem. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
Child labour is a phenomenon with multiple facets. Empirical research has provided 
an astonishing amount of possible answers to the economics behind the question of 
why children work. Some powerful explanations re-emerge in various country settings: 
Extreme poverty, market failure (lack of credit markets but also commitment problems) 
and parental preferences seem to be at the heart of the child labour problem. In addition, 
intergenerational persistence, non-perceived societal or non-realised private returns to 
education are, together with cultural and gender effects, the most salient theoretical 
arguments on the supply side of child labour. 
A revival of theoretical and empirical interest in the demand side of child labour 
appears important. Especially the role of technological progress should be investigated 
in greater detail, but also models should be developed to evaluate the economic contri-
bution and productivity of children. 
Some remaining empirical and theoretical challenges need to be addressed. The 
modelling of the commitment problem of child labour has not been extended to a 
dynamic framework. Policy design should take into account the intergenerational aspect 
of commitment problems, as illustrated above, for example, by the choice between 
Progresa-type cash transfers and alternative policies. An additional question, namely if 
child laboureres are on their supply curves, remains unanswered. 
At the moment of writing, child labour figures are high, and continue to rise 
In subsaharian Africa. It is not yet very well understood how child labour responds 
to policy interventions, except in the case of cash transfer programs. Moreover, the 
disconnection between theoretical and empirical research also seems to extend to a 
disconnection between practical implementation and research. Unless the root causes 
of child labour are clearly isolated, we cannot claim full economic understanding of 
the international child labour issue, and further research and policy evaluation are both 
necessary. 
The next chapter aims to provide some theoretical insights by scrutinizing the 
commitment problem of child labour within an intergenerational and dynamic frame-
work. 
44 
Chapter 2 
Cyclic overlapping generation 
games: Grandparents' bequests 
and child labour 
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2.1 Introduction 
The children during the tender years of in-
fancy are well fed and properly taken care 
of, and when they are grown-up, the value 
of their labour greatly overpays their main-
tenance. When arrived at maturity, the high 
price of labour and the low price of land 
enable them to establish themselves in the 
same manner as their fathers did. 
Adam Smith, Part Second, Causes of the 
prosperity of New Colonies 
The report of Hagemann et al. (2006) estimates that worldwide more than 217 million 
children of schooling age are working. Child labour occurs primarily in developing coun-
tries, and thus poverty should, intuitively, playa role in high child labour participation 
rates. Children seem indeed to work out of poverty compulsions, but poverty is certainly 
not the only determinant of child labour. Child labour can be analysed as an alternative 
to child education, assuming the two goods are substitutes. Returns to education in 
developing countries are high and schooling seems thus a valuable alternative to child 
labour. Why do parents send their children to work instead of to school? This chapter 
argues that commitment problems lie at the heart of this puzzle of unrealised returns to 
schooling. The commitment problem means, that once children have received educa-
tion and earn higher wages, they might not repay the education expenditures that their 
parents incurred. Children cannot commit to parents to repay!. 
Credit constraints have often been cited, as well in developed countries, as an 
impediment to invest optimally in children. This is certainly an important aspect. Par-
ents forego income when they send children to school, namely the child labour income, 
and have to pay eventually additional schooling costs. It is argued that the impossibility 
to borrow is a factor in the child labour decision, i.e. parents prefer to smooth their 
IThe commitment problem of children to pay back can also be viewed as an incomplete contract 
problem, as in Maskin and Tirole (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999). The parents have no property 
rights on the human capital that the child embodies once it is produced, so to say. 
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consumption through child labour, and not through a loan. In many countries where 
child labour is prevalent, official credit markets are imperfect, and thus, one rightly 
suspects missing credit markets as the culprit. On the other hand, and as is well docu-
mented by Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), many informal arrangements of borrowing 
exist, especially in agricultural contexts. Thus, functioning credit markets might not 
as much influence the child labour decision as the commitment problem does, I.e. the 
impossibility for parents to recover debts from children. 
Thus one is tempted to focus the attention on the commitment problem, as In 
Becker and Tomes's (1986) paper. This commitment problem, and not only imperfect 
markets, might be one of the root causes of child labour as Baland and Robinson (2000) 
already remarked. The present article extends their work by postulating the commitment 
problem as an overlapping generations problem. 
This contribution intends to analyse the sustainability of child-parent transfers 
within a cyclic overlapping generations game. This game setting does not, in contrast to 
other work, require the conditioning of strategies on past behaviour of family members. 
Usually, strategies are formulated with respect to past actions of players in overlapping 
generation games, in so called trigger-strategy setups. The present game intends to 
capture the imperfect information family members might have of their ancestors' actions. 
Intuitively one can think about it as follows: a young member of a family might receive 
signals about past actions of family members. He is, however, unable to distinguish 
cheap talk from true information. We assume therefore, that such a young player does 
not condition his action on information of past play. 
In order to sustain first best contracts of exchange, players commit to bequest a 
certain fraction of their income to the next generation, if the next generation honors the 
contractual obligation. We show that it is difficult to generate such bequest equilibria 
without the possibility to save over a long horizon. Grandparents have thus a special 
role in the model, since they can save longer than in a two generational setting. 
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the model favours grandparents for addi-
tional reasons. In the model, there is a natural tension between committing credibly to 
an amount to bequest at the end of a generations life and the designation of an alter-
native beneficiairie in case of disinheritance. Disinheriting can be thought as costly to 
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the parent, and even more so, if no credible alternative beneficairie exists. Grandparents 
can however transfer all stored resources credibly to their grandchildren instead of to 
their children. This re-inforces the contractual position of grandchildren. Grandparents 
also live long enough to observe if their children execute a part of the contract with 
their grandchildren, before releasing bequest resources. This "locks" parents into the 
contract and plays also a key role in limiting deviation options of players. The model 
also explicitly takes into account the transition from an uneducated to an educated 
generation. This yields the insight that although equilibria exist once a generation IS 
educated, an uneducated generation might never be able to attain these equilibria. 
In addition, the present game might provide a tentative answer to the puzzle 
of bequests vs. inter-vivos transfers. The puzzle consists in the empirical regularity 
of observing an equal division of bequests among children or a bequest to the oldest 
child (primogeniture), but unequal lifetime transfers2 . We provide an explanation for 
equal bequest rules in developed countries or, to the opposite, primogeniture rules in 
developing countries. 
A literature review section will be followed by a section describing first-best inter-
generational transfers and the usual trigger strategy solution, which, as we show, relies 
on observability of the history of play. We then examine in the next two sections if 
first-best contracts can be enforced within the environment of an unobserved history 
of play. In the two-generational model, we establish a strong non-existence results of 
first-best contracts. First-best contracts can, however, be implemented in the three 
generational model, using bequest sanctions. Finally, policy discussions and conclusions 
are presented. 
2.2 Some insights from the previous literature 
This contribution encompasses different themes: the vast child labour literature, the 
literature on family contracts and bequests and game theoretic models ecountered in 
2The model might also apply in developed country contexts. In poor families of developed countries, 
similar commitment constraints may bind, in addition to a low valuation of schooling by some parents. 
Thus bequests can be seen as a compensation for transfers by children, which could be in time or money. 
In general one can show that bequests need only be small compared to transfers from children, which 
makes this model credible in such contexts. 
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Country Year Mean years Estimated Source 
of study of schooling return 
Bolivia 1993 10,7 Patrinos (1995) 
Brazil 1989 5,3 14,7 Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Burkina Faso 1980 9,6 Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Cote d'ivoire 1986 6,9 20,1 Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Egypt 1997 5,2 Lambropoulos et. al. (19 99) 
Estonia 1994 10,9 5,4 Kroncke (1999) 
Ethiopia 1972 6,0 8,0 Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Finland 1993 8,2 Asplund (1999) 
France 1977 6,2 10,0 Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Germany 1988 7,7 Cohn and Addison (1998 ) 
India 1995 10,6 Kingdon (1998) 
Jamaica 1989 7,2 28,8 Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Kenya 1986 8,0 16,0 Dabalen (1998) 
Korea 1986 8,0 13,5 Ryoo et. al. (1993) 
Kuwait 1983 8,9 4,5 Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Malaysia 1979 15,8 9,4 Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Mexico 1992 7,6 Psacharopoulos et al. (1 996) 
Table 2.1: Returns to education estimated from a Mincer type equation, selected coun-
tries. 
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overlapping generation games. This paper is novel on several accounts. Within the 
child labour literature, we develop a new model of dynamic commitment. In this model 
strategic bequests have a central role. We model the commitment problem as an over-
lapping generations cyclic game, relaxing the requirement to observe the history of the 
game fully. In order to situate this contribution within the wider literature, we give 
three brief accounts of the child labour literature, the literature on bequests and the 
overlapping generation games literature. 
Child labour literature An extensive survey of the child labour literature can be found 
in Basu (1999), Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) or more recently in Edmonds (2007). 
Our contribution focuses on the commitment problem and only this part of the litera-
ture will be briefly reviewed here. Baland and Robinson's (2000) article mentions two 
possible causes for child labour: incomplete markets (in the sense of borrowing con-
straints or commitment problems) and poverty. The approach of Baland and Robinson 
(2000) assumes parents cannot expect any repayment for the education expenses of 
their children. This is the famous commitment problem. 
In a static setting with altruistic linkage between generations, Baland and Robin-
son (2000) find that as long as bequests at the time of the child labour decision are 
positive and credit markets perfect, child labour will be at a socially efficient level. This 
is indeed a possibility but it assumes altruism from the side of the parent, since parents 
bequest out of an altruistic motivation. 
We model a situation in which parents are selfish and do not care about child 
utility. Also, children do not care about parental utility. This is perhaps an extreme 
case, but serves as a benchmark for future modelling. Parents and children might only 
agree to establish a (mutually) beneficial contract between themselves. Baland and 
Robinson (2000) assumed a static model, where dynamics are ignored. In the present 
model, we also consider the dynamics of child labour in the parent-child game. 
The commitment problem and its dynamic implications have not received much 
attention in the child labour literature. Lopez-Calva (2001) addresses the issue, but 
only to find that commitment problems are easily overcome through intergenerational 
trigger strategies. This is only possible if the entire history of play is observable or if the 
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information transmission on past play is perfect. To address child labour and education 
decisions in the context of public policy we ought to understand the commitment problem 
better. This has to be done in an intergenerational context, taking into account the 
informational constraints of the intergenerational game. 
Bequest literature The theoretic models of bequests or inheritance can be classified 
into at least four distinct categories, depending on the motive for bequests. The first 
hypothesis is altruism or in some variations "warm-glow" and 'Joy of giving" motivations. 
The testator leaves bequeathable wealth to his children because his utility is directly 
dependent on the beneficiaries utility or he simply enjoys giving. These models have been 
widely used in dynastic models in macroeconomics, Barro (1974), or in the economics 
of the family, Becker and Tomes (1986). 
In second place, one can mention the hypothesis of Abel (1985) of precautionary 
savings and hence accidental bequests. An individual cannot predict his exact date of 
death but can form expectations about the likelihood of death - if an individual dies 
earlier than expected, he leaves an "unanticipated" or accidental bequest. 
A third explanation for bequests is the motive for exchange or intergenerational 
reciprocity, eigno (1993) and Anderberg and Balestrino (2003). Bequests are seen as 
part of a wider system of exchange within the family. There might be some informally 
or formally agreed system of exchange that each geneation replicates. For example, a 
father might want care and attention in his old age from his children, in exchange for 
the promise of a bequest. 
This brings us towards the fourth point made by Bernheim et al. (1985); the 
strategic bequest motive. Parents or grandparents hold wealth in forms of bequeathable 
assets because they intend to influence the behaviour of their children. This comes 
very close to the model presented here. Bernheim et al. (1985) model the exchange 
of attention from a child as being related to the size of the expected bequest. The 
paper shows that the problem of an alternative beneficiarie overshadow this motive. Is 
it credible to disinherit a unique child? Bernheim et al. (1985) show that this problem 
is resolved if they are two children and the parents can threaten each one of them with 
disinheritance. This is still problematic since not beqeathing to one child might still be 
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emotionally costly and create an additional" envy" effect between children. Skipping 
one generation seems another means how to costlessly and credibly transfer bequest 
resources to alternative beneficiairies, and this is what grandparents can do in the model 
of this paper. 
Empirical work has usually great difficulties to reconcile the theory of bequests to 
observed behaviour. The central question why parents leave wealth undistributed until 
they die remains, if not unanswered, then at least insufficiently clear. If the motivations 
for bequests were purely altruistic, then certainly it would be rational to transfer wealth 
inter vivos and not delay transfers until death. In addition, there is the so called" unequal 
transfers- equal bequests" puzzle in observed behaviour. That is, parents do seem to 
have altruistic motives for transfers during the lifetime of their children, i.e. they transfer 
more to relatively poor children and less to relatively wealthy children. However, most 
parents seem to divide bequests equally among siblings, McGarry (1997). 
This behaviour is in disagreement with the altruistic bequest motive, since under 
this approach bequests should be compensating. Stark (1995) explains this phenomenon 
with interpersonal comparisons that siblings make post mortem. Then unequal division 
of bequests leaves some children relatively more deprived than the equal division of 
an estate. Other authors such as Bernheim and Severinoro (2000) claim that parents 
would like to leave a reputation of "fairness" after their death. Inter vivos transfers 
are likely not to be observable but bequests are observable. Hence by bequeathing an 
equal amount, parental preferences between children are perceived as equal or fair even 
though they might not be. 
Empirical evidence confirms there being no unique motive for bequests. There 
seems to be rather a heterogeneous collection of motives with exchange and reciprocity 
being important. Page (2003) shows that bequests might be intentional, since inter-
vivos transfers increase when inheritance, or estate tax increases. This is indirect and 
weak evidence. On the other hand, Perozek (1998) provides evidence to the opposite 
conclusion, while commenting on the results of the model of Bernheim et al. (1985). 
As soon as child characteristics are included in the model of Bernheim et al. (1985) 
attention given to parents seem not to depend on total bequeathable wealth but rather 
on the characteristics of the child. Hence, bequests would not be perceived as strategic 
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and are perhaps not intentional. Other contributions have argued that bequests could 
at the limit be a product of parental indifference - but this is less likely since why would 
parents take the effort to specify an equal distribution?, Laitner and Ohlsson (2001). 
It is also Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) who provide the first evidence that transfer 
and altruistic motives could be important both in Sweden and the US. The Swedish panel 
data and the PSID for the US used in this study are small samples, but rich in terms 
of income and wealth estimates, and allow the authors to exploit the panel dimension. 
The altruistic model seems to fit the data well, but with far smaller coefficients than 
theory would suggest. Hence the exchange motive could provide a better explanation for 
observed behaviour. This is also the quintessential conclusion of Arrondel and Masson 
(2002). The authors find that intergenerational reciprocity might explain most of the 
intergenerational transfers in France. Also, there is evidence that backward transfers 
(parent to child) are much more significant than forward transfers (child to parent). 
However, some of the forward transfers might be difficult to measure and hence any 
conclusions should be drawn with special care. 
In summary, and following recent research and empirical evidence, bequests are 
to be intentional in most of the cases and they are usually divided equally among 
siblings. Bequests obey heterogeneous motives, where altruism and reciprocity appear 
as the most favoured explanations. The present contribution tries to provide a link 
between the reci procity motive a nd the strategic motive to present a novel treatment of 
bequests. As will be shown in the cyclic overlapping generation game, bequests replace 
the information requirements on past play, and are thus strategic, but can also be seen 
as a reciprocity arrangement. 
Related overlapping generations game theoretic models eigno (1993) and An-
derberg and Balestrino (2003), but also Smith (1992) and Rangel (2003) are typical 
contributions in this literature. The main determinants of intra-family transfers are the 
intra-family return on an investment in children compared to the capital market return of 
the same investment. If the former exceeds the latter, self-enforcing transfer contracts 
may exist. 
Such models assume that families can implement trigger strategies. This sup-
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poses that a current generation can obtain information of actions/behaviour of past 
generations and is able to punish deviators by excluding them from the family system. 
Commitment problems are then resolved. Lopez-Calva (2001) is one example applied to 
child labour, but it could be that the informational constraints on such trigger strategy 
models are unrealistically strong. 
The unrealistic nature of informational requirements relates to the way generations 
might transmit information from one to the other. The observability of the entire history 
of play is the basis of the trigger strategy approach. It is however not clear whether 
such a perfect information environment holds, since proofs of past play are clearly not 
obtainable. Only unverifiable messages of past play exist, which can be "cheaply" 
modified by parents. It is clear then, that children do not have reliable information on 
past play. This is the problem we address with cyclic games - assuming the child has 
(and does not need) information on past play. In this context, bequests can be seen as 
a signal. They ascertain that the next generation has behaved "as expected" 3. 
Cyclic overlapping generation (OG in the following) games were thus chosen to 
model the interaction between family members. Cyclic games model a recurrent situation 
into which players can enter, and from which they exit after some time. Entry and exit 
can be unique (i.e. as in this case when we talk about generations) but we could allow 
multiple exit and entry (i.e. an individual trading in the financial market and entering 
and exiting it daily). Cyclic OG games can be seen as another representation of an 
infinitely repeated sequential OG game or also of dynastic OG games. Cyclic OG games 
require no memory of moves from previous players. Players are entirely forward looking 
during their lifecourse - they only consider strategies and the associated payoffs of the 
various possible cycles4 . 
3This could have also an ambiguous meaning, in the sense that later generations might align the next 
generation on their preferences and enforce more" conservative" outcomes than without such sanctions. 
This is an interesting extension to the model presented here. 
4 Appendix A.3 gives a detailed review of the similarities and differences of cyclic OG games and 
the repeated OG game. It would be premature to present these comparisons here, since we have not 
formally introduced cyclic OG games yet. 
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2.3 Intergenerational contracting 
In this section we describe the features of a first best intergenerational contract. The 
actual enforcement of a contract in a non-cooperative setting using trigger strategies is 
then examined. 
We build a model on the work of Baland and Robinson (2000). In addition to 
Baland and Robinson's (2000) model we allow for child-parent transfers and an infinite 
horizon overlapping generations model. Unlike Baland and Robinson (2000), we assume 
that generations are selfish. 
There are households composed of a single child and a parent. Parent and child 
are selfish and they only care about their own utility5. 
An individual lives for two periods. The first period is subdivided into two periods, 
the child and the young adult period. In the first subperiod, the individual is a child, 
which can either go to work or to school. In the second subperiod, we call the individual 
a young adult, which earns a wage and might decide to repay some of the schooling 
expenses to his parents. The second period of an individual is the parent period. Parents 
and children (child, then young adult) overlap and any such overlap will be labelled as 
period t, tEN. There is no discounting of future payoffs, as in Baland and Robinson 
(2000), for simplicity. 
Parents can send their child to work or to school. If the parents send their child to 
work, the parents earn child labour income, ltwfH. The variable It is the labour supply 
of the child (in hours) in period t and wfH represents the hourly wage. If the child is 
sent to labour, his human capital shrinks. 
Let ht represent the human capital production function at period t. The domain 
of this function lies on It with It E [0, lmax]. Thus ht(lt) represents the human capital 
attained by an individual in period t. Furthermore, ht is a decreasing function in Lt. More 
precisely, h~(ld < ° and h~'(ld < 0. The function h(Lt) has a lower bound h(lmax) = ho, 
5Parental altruism would make later derived cooperation results easier to sustain and the required 
bequest resources smaller but is not essential to such cooperation. Indeed Swinnerton and Rogers (2004) 
showed that even with reciprocal altruism, children do not necessarily transfer back to their parents. 
Once parents income is above a certain threshold, children consider that parents do not need transfers 
anymore, whereas parents would still like to receive them. A similar problem arises as well in our model. 
Indeed growth in (educated individuals) wages over time is necessary, otherwise children will not see the 
need to transfer to the next generation. 
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which denotes innate human capital. Figure 2.1 shows a hypothetical function h
t 
with 
these properties. 
l 
h(l) 
E 
"§. 
c; 
" 
.., 
~ 
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --
he = h(1""J 
Amount of Child Labour 
Figure 2.1: An example of a human capital production function and child labour. 
Child labour has a cost in lower future human capital of the child. Human capital 
translates (for convenience) directly into wages. A parent and a young adult receive 
a wage according to their human capital accumulated as a child. Thus a young adult 
receives a wage equal to ht (It). A parent receives a wage equal to ht - I ([t-I), which is 
determined by the amount of human capital accumulated in the previous period while 
working It-I. The dynamics of this setup are shown in Figure 2.2 
If the parent sends his child to school, he foregoes child labour income. We 
abstract here from school fees for simplicity, so the foregone child labour income is the 
only cost. In exchange for the foregone income he might expect some transfer, say 
Qtht(lt), with Qt E [0: 1], from the young adult in the future. Human capital theory 
would justify such a young adult-to-parent transfer. An educated young adult should 
earn significantly more than an uneducated young adult, even in a developing country 
context, see Table6 2.1. Furthermore, parents would like to obtain a compensation for 
their investment in education. We postulate that parents and children could agree to a 
6This Table is a shortened version of a complete Table, published in a research paper by Psacharopou-
los and Patrinos (2002) 
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Figure 2.2: The division in child and parent period and actions of children and parents. 
contract, in which parents will invest an amount It in the human capital of their children 
and young adults will transfer a fraction at out of their current income to their parents. 
2.4 The model 
Utility of a young adult in period t is given by 
The utility function of a parent in period t is given by 
We normalise the utility in the child's potential schooling period, the child subperiod, 
to be zero i.e. V CH = o. The amount of equilibrium transfers at will depend on the 
investment Zi. Thus we write at(lt) to make this dependency explicit. 
We will investigate the first-best level of transfers, Qt and Zi· This is a joint 
maximisation problem, involving parents' and children's utility functions. We show in 
the appendix A.2, that the first best outcome is reached if children choose a* first and 
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parents chose l* given n*, given that a stationarity condition on a is satisfied and a 
maximum of the individual's utility function with ()' > 0 exists. 
2.4.1 The first-best solution 
Thus, in the first best case, parents chose it and take at(lt) as given. Thus, parents 
maxImIse 
Parents chose Zt so that the following condition is satisfied for an interior solution in It 
(2.1) 
that is chosing an [* < [max, parents must be at least as well off receiving (reduced) child 
labour income wfHz* and the transfer at(l*)ht(l*) as under full child labour income, 
U ,C HZ t max' 
A young adult, taking as given It, chooses his contribution, at, as follows. The 
influence that an individual has on his lifetime utility is through at and It+l. His lifetime 
utility is given by 
The interpretation of this equation is that an individual looks forward and chooses 
at with respect to his own future wage ht(lt), the child labour income It+lWf+If and 
the transfers he will receive from his children at+lht+l (It+l), choosing himself the child 
labour involvement of his children in the next period, Zt+l. In order to solve this problem 
we assume stationarity, that is 
It+l = It =l \;j tEN, 
at+l = at - a \j tEN, 
vt+l vt - V \;j tEN, 
Ut+l Ut =U \j tEN. 
Furthermore, we introduce an exogeneous wage growth rate g. This implies that 
wages at time t, here symbolised by human capital, are related to wages at time t - 1 
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by a proportional and exogeneously given factor g. We will call this factor the wage 
growth rate. Thus ht(l*) = ght- 1 (l*) and wfH = gwf-if. 
We can then write the optimal a as the solution to the maximisation problem 
given l*: 
n~ax1"(ht(l*)(1 - a)) + U(ht(l*) + l*gwfH + aght(l*)). (2.3) 
Notice that the subindex t only concerns the human capital production function 
and child wages, which are supposed to vary over time t. The first order condition 
(FOe) for a is then 
-ht(l*)V'(ht(l*)(l- a)) + ght(l*)U'(ht(l*) + gl*wfH + gaht(l*)), (2.4) 
and initially, at a* = 0 we assume V' < U', otherwise it would not be possible to 
improve total family utility by transfering. Thus there would be no positive transfer by 
definition and no mutually beneficial contract. Since V' is increasing in a and U' is 
decreasing in a, this will eventually give an upper bound on a*. The above equation 
also defines the minimum growth 9 necessary to maintain the contract. We show now 
that this growth 9 must greater than one. 
Suppose there is no difference between a child and a parent's utility function, 
U = V = Hr. Assume that M' is the inverse function of W'. Thus we have 
ht(l*)(l- a) = M' (gW' (ht(l*) + gl*wfH + gaht(l*))). 
Solution for specific functional forms 
Lemma 1 If W is a bijective function of the form W (x) = ~Ct~; then W' (x) = xcx, 
a E 1R but a i= 1. Let M' be the inverse function of W' such that M' (W'(x)) = x. 
Let k E 1R be a scalar, then 
M' (kW'(x)) = M'(k)x, 
Analogously 
W' (M'(k)x) = kW'(x). 
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Proof 
]I.!' (kW'(:r)) = M'(kxCX ), 
with 
Analogously 
o 
The above Lemma helps to solve for the transfer in a more general setting. Note 
that some of the utility functions comprised are popular choices such as In( C), and 
h C1-'"'I t e constant elasticity of substitution utility function 1-),' and thus a fairly general 
selection. Using the previous result, 
* ht (l*) - M' (g )ht (l*) - M' (g )gl*wfH a = -.:...........:.----=.;;.~--.:.....-...:.....------::;;;...;...;:----=--
M'(g )ght (l*) + ht (l*) 
Thus for 0. to be positive the numerator of the preceding expression should be greater 
than zero, since the denominator is always greater than zero, as M' > 0, 9 > 0 and 
h > O. The following condition must hold for a positive transfer to exist: 
ht(l*) - M'(g)ht(l*) - M'(g)gl*wfH > 0, 
and thus 
M'(g)ht(l*) + M'(g)gl*wCH < ht(l*). 
It follows 
Al'(g) ht - 1 (l*) 
(1 - M'(g)) < l*wfH ' 
, ht-1(l*) 
M (g) < l*wfH - ht- 1 (l*)" 
Re-applying the result from proposition 1, we have 
W' ( ht -1 ( l * ) ) 
9 > W'(l*wfH + ht- 1 (l*))" 
From the properties of W' it follows that 9 > 1. Furthermore 9 depends on the returns 
to child labour and human capital at the optimum l*. 
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In order for future transfers to be possible, growth in wages over generations will 
be necessary. Otherwise, no positive transfers exist1. 
Proposition 1 The first-best contractC* = (a* l*) has 0:* > 0 wheneverg > W'(ht-I{l*)) 
, W'(ht-l (l*)+l*w CH )' 
In this contract l* = h'-l (/\[' 9 w CH ) and 0:* = ht(l*)-M'(g)ht(l*)-M'(g)gl*wfH 
1+/\[' g) M'(g)ght(l*)+ht(l*)' 
If w'lht-I(l*)) . 
9 < l\-/lht-lll~ )+l*wCH), no such contract eXIsts with 0: > O. 
Proof If Equation (2.1) is not true, 
then parents chose lmax and there is no contract C*. 
If Equation (2.4) is not true, 
W'(h(l*)) 
9 < W'(h(l*) + l*wCH) 
then 0: < O. If a = 0, C* is of no interest and 0: < 0 is not sustainable under the 
model. 0 
The set of a possible contract is well defined by equations (2.1) and (2.4). There 
is however the well known additional commitment problem, Becker and Tomes (1986). 
The commitment problem can be summarized as follows: No child has a direct incentive 
to repay his parents if there are no altruistic links between generations. The child is 
always better off not repaying his parents. If the parent can however not recover a 
transfer payment from his child (and if he is sufficiently selfish), parents will not send 
children to school or make an optimal investment in child education. 
Once educated the child will prefer to transfer 0: = 0 and in anticipation of this 
choice, a parent will chose at worst lmax, the highest amount of work hours possible for 
their child or at best no schooling at all. We will call this situation the null contract 
CO = {o: = 0, 1 = lmax}. The literature has so far argued that these problems can be 
7Since future transfers are absent from the static setup, this is already an interesting extension. If 
growth prospects are uncertain in developing countries, this might be an important element in tackling 
child labour from a macro-economic perspective. Such growth over time could imply a similar game 
theoretic solution as in the usual macroeconomic literature. Every generation transfers their whole 
wealth to the generation before and makes everybody better off. This is not possible in the cyclic setup, 
since we would again need strong information requirements on past play and the history of moves. We 
will discuss the strong information requirements below, but see also the Appendix. 
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overcome in family or dynasty games, using intergenerational trigger strategies. We 
outline these trigger strategies below. We then argue, that trigger strategies imply 
perfect information about past play which is unlikely to hold. 
In order to analyse the existence of a beneficial contract between generation, the 
previous literature will be followed, e.g. Rangel (2003) by assuming generations can play 
intergenerational trigger strategies. 
2.4.2 Equilibria with full observability 
Simple trigger strategies Suppose there is a strategy space S for every individual, 
implying that a young adult picks an Q E [0,1] and a parent picks an l E [0, lmax]. 
A particular strategy of S can be denoted s E S, of which s* = (a*, l*) is a possible 
element. 8'" has each young adult choose Q* and each parent l*, the first-best contract. 
Define then, as in Rangel (2003) a history function J-L(ht ) , where ht denotes the history 
of play of overlap t. The history of play can either be cooperative (C), deviation (D) 
or punishment (P). Assume the history of play is known, i.e. at least at-I needs to be 
observable in this set- up8. 
A simple trigger strategy prescribes the following 
8(ht ) (Q*, l*) if J-L(ht ) = C, 
s(ht ) (0, l*) if J-L(ht ) = P. 
and J-L can be defined recursively as follows: 
Definition 1 
C if J-L(ht-I) = C and Qt-I > Q*, it-I < l*, 
C if J-L(ht-I) = P and Qt-I < Q*, it-I < l*, 
P otherwise. 
Sin any model, children cannot directly observe what parents did when parents were children 
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The idea is that I' keeps track if the organisation is in a cooperative or a pun-
ishment phase, Rangel (2003). Now, other conditions need to be fulfilled in order to 
be able to sustain such a first best equilibrium. The first condition concerns deviation 
options, the second condition concerns informational requirements. 
The minimum necessary conditions for the existence of a contract are (2.1) and 
(2.4). The contract needs also to be beneficial to every generation, which is the deviation 
constraint: 
llT (h t (1*))+ ~l T (h t (1* )+lmaxu,c H) < W (ht (l*) (l-a*))+ W (h(l* )+l*wCH +ga* ht (l*)) 
(2.5) 
We will call this condition the intergenerational return constraint. The intergen-
erational return constraint (2.5) states that once a child is educated (here symbolised 
by the educated wage in the parent equation) it must prefer to still apply the contract. 
Note that this condition is not necessarily satisfied by the optimality conditions, as the 
optimality conditions apply only to chosing an It which is equal for parents and children. 
The optimality requirements does not allow the choice of lmax for children and an l* for 
parents, as above. 
Proposition 2 The first-best contract can be implemented using simple trigger strate-
gies if Equation(2.5} holds and under full observability, (RangeI2003) 
Proof Consider the simple trigger strategies, s(hd, as defined above. If the history of 
play was cooperation, then a player should abide by cooperation, this yields 
W(ht(l*)(l- a*)) + W(h(l*) + gl*wCH + gc/ht(l*)). 
If a young adult deviates and sets a < a*, then he should be refused a transfer 
a* by the next generation, a punishment phase P is initiated. The young adult will then 
obtain, choosing l* for his children: 
W(ht (l*)) + W(h(l*) + gl*wCH ). 
This will be, by optimality, less than the outcome of cooperation. The next generation 
will, under full observability, identify the player, who played a punishment as a "police 
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men" and future generations will resume cooperation with him. The execution of the 
punishment is beneficial to the "police" player since 
H' (h t (1*))+ H r (h(l* )+g[* u,e H +ga* ht (l*)) > W (h t (l*) (1-0'*))+ W (h(l*)+gl*wCH +ga* ht (l*)). 
Now the deviating adult could, as a parent, also chose l = lmax for his children. 
This would yield 
as a worst possible deviation. Thus Equation {2.5} ensures that such a deviation is not 
profitable, since by Equation {2.5}, 
ll' (h t (1*))+ llr (h t (l*)+glmaxWCH) < W (ht (l*) (l-a*) )+W (h(l*)+gl*wcH +ga* ht (l*)). 
The same scenario applies now to the parent who cooperated. Suppose a parent 
deviates after transferring a* and chooses l > l*. Then, by the simple trigger strategy 
definition, we enter immediately a punishment phase and parents will not receive a 
transfer a* from their children, whereas the children can be identified as "police persons" 
again - i.e. as carrying out a justified punishment. Thus for l > l* parents would receive 
W(h(l*)(l - a*)) + lV(h(l*) + glwCH ). 
which is less than the optimal amount under cooperation. 
Cooperation in each generation can be enforced. 0 
Informational requirements and observability The above game of trigger strategies 
assumes that the history of play is known, at least up to the last two generations. 
Bhaskar (1998) and Yoon (2001) give the same example concerning the impor-
tance of the assumption of an observable history of play. Consider a trigger strategy in 
which every player can only remember what the previous generation did. So a player 
in period t can only remember what a player in period t - 1 did. Player t must give a 
transfer to t - 1 when he is young. If he fails to do so, then he must be punished by 
player t + 1. In the above set-up this corresponds to playing P. However, when player 
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t + 1 initiates the punishment sequence, player t + 2 cannot distinguish if the agent 
justifiably initiated a punishment or if that agent simply deviated. Player t + 2 cannot 
verify what player t did, because he does not observe the history of play. Thus, agent 
t + 1 will also be punished in any case, since this is the best reply. Thus agent t + 1 
has an incentive to conceal player t's deviation and do as if nothing happened. Clearly 
then player t will playa deviation - thus there is no other equilibrium than the non-
cooperative Nash solution in this context. This has been referred to as the "Anti-Folk 
Theorem", Bhaskar (1998). Thus the above proposition breaks down, and no trigger 
strategy equilibrium can exist if the history of play is not observable, at least up to two 
generations. Cyclic games push this logic to an extreme, since in cyclic games, there is 
absolutely no memory. Some other equilibria are possible, because cyclic games feature 
sequential moves and potential sanction threats, such as disinheritance in this model. 
Baland and Robinson (2000) invoke the threat of parents not to bequest to chil-
dren once they are grown up and did not transfer. Such a threat requires enough 
parental resources, but also credibility. We analyse a stylised model of two generations, 
in which parents cannot save and compare it to a three generational model, in which 
parents can save and live one period longer: as grandparents. This addresses the re-
source part of the constraint. In order to address the credibility part, we suggest that, 
as grandparents overlap with their grandchildren, they are more credible enforcers of 
such a bequest equilibrium. In fact, grandparents observe part of the actions of their 
children towards grandchildren, and can thus condition the bequest on their children's 
behaviour towards their grandchildren. They can also much more credibly commit to 
bequest all the reserved wealth to their grandchildren in case their own children deviate 
from the norm. They might do this by costless transfers at the end of their life, which 
is not in contradiction to our definition of a bequest. This bequest rule will have the 
additional effect that grandchildren will be better endowed to enforce contracts with 
their own children. 
Before we continue with the model, we will define bequests as used in this paper. 
Definition 2 Bequests in this model will be assets that are clearly earmarked for trans-
mission to the next generation. An individual cannot consume them once they are 
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earmarked. However, they have the property that they can be diverted to the recipient 
of the individuals' choice at the end of his life and are perfectly observable. 
In summary, this paper does the following: it asks if the first-best contractual 
situation can be implemented using bequest sanctions in a setting where there is no 
information on the history of play. The information on past play is the crucial distinction 
between the game outlined here and trigger strategy games as above. Thus we relax 
the observability assumption and see what can be sustained in a non-cooperative setting 
with bequest threats. In order to address the limited observability, we model the decision 
problem as a cyclic game. Cyclic games have no memory and players enter them without 
knowledge of the history of play. 
We start with a two generational model, where parents and children overlap. We 
show that in these models, the first best contract cannot be implemented even with 
bequest sanctions. In a three generational model, we show that the first-best contract 
may be implemented using a bequest sanction. The bequest shifts the commitment 
problem from children to grandparents. We assume grandparents can write conditional, 
legally enforceable, bequest contracts. The bequest constitutes a costly signal, replacing 
the missing history of play but the bequest also needs to be large enough to favor payoffs 
of cooperating individuals over individuals that deviated. 
The intuitive reasons why the model works in a three generational context are: (i) 
bequests grow in this model (savings from parent to grandparent period), (ii) grandpar-
ents have a credible and costless alternative beneficiairie: grandchildren, (iii) grandpar-
ents can observe the actions of parents towards their children, and limit the deviation 
options of parents. Thus, grandparents solve the credibility problem of commitment and 
grandparents solve the information problem of the game. 
2.5 The extended model: cyclic games 
We use cyclic overlapping generation (OG) games to model the decision problem. Cyclic 
OG games are related to repeated overlapping generations game (OLG-game in the 
following). In this OLG-game literature, optimal outcomes are often enforced through 
the use of trigger or grim trigger strategies. As we have seen, the transfer game between 
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parent and child can support first best contracts if we use trigger strategies. These 
trigger strategies require information on the past behaviour of family members. In a 
family setting, past behaviour is not verifiable, since most players are not alive yet, 
when the action(s) took place. The players have thus to rely on messages provided by 
previous players. Since messages about previous actions can be seen as cheap talk, the 
inference to be drawn from such messages is limited: every previous family member 
has an incentive to pretend he was executing the contract. We assume consequently 
that children cannot base there inference on these messages, since they are costless. 
Children therefore do not take messages on past behaviour into account. However, 
bequest resources can replace such noisy information, as they will be transferred only 
upon cooperation. Cyclic games are perfectly suited for modelling this situation as 
i) players are entirely forward looking ii) the game is not a simultaneous move game 
but a dynamic game in which bequest threats conditional on previous moves make 
sense. Cyclic games allow also a graphical representation of repeated dynamic games. 
Instead of having an ever expanding tree, one obtains a cyclical pattern. For simplicity, 
I consider first the two generational cyclic game. Then I extend the game to allow for 
three generations, or grandparents. 
2.5.1 The two-generational model 
Assume the child entering the game at overlap t needs to make the same decisions 
as a child in overlap t + k, k > 0 - their strategies are the same. Every player is 
a reincarnation of the previous player. The only change in every generation occurs 
through the exogeneously given growth rate. We simplify the problem by discretizing 
the strategy space as discussed in the previous section. A cyclic game is defined as in 
Selten and Wooders (2001) 
G = (X,Z,E,P,A,7r, W), (2.6) 
where a set of decision points, X, is determined and assumed to be finite. There are 
payoff points in the game, Z, whose set is finite. Exit points are defined as a subset of 
payoff points, E c Z. 
P is a partition in subsets of X U Z such that P = (Xo, Xl, ..... Xn' Zl, .... Zn)' 
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where UXi = _\ and UZi = Z. Furthermore Xo is called the set of random points and 
all other points -\i for i i= 0 are called the set of decision points for player i. Each set 
Zi contains a non-empty subset of exit points, E i . 
The function A maps from subsets X U Z to subsets X U Z. Hence A(.) IS 
a directed graph linking decision points with decision points and/or exit points. 7r 
describes a probability distribution over the directed graphs of A. 
llY assigns a payoff to every payoff point. 
We change this set-up to adapt it to a cyclic OG context. The following describes 
the game in an informal way, before introducing it more formally. 
We start with the two generation model to examine sustainability of the first best 
contract. Assume two generations are alive at anyone time, a parent and a child. Each 
parent has a single child for simplicity. 
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• pu 
T 
Figure 2.3: A representation of the infinitely repeated game as a cyclic game. 
Let us first look at the game in a fairly general way, without describing a particular 
path. Start the game with a child player that looks forward onto the choices open to 
him during his lifetime. As a child, he must make a first decision, to transfer T or 
not to transfer _YT. Every decision in a cyclic game is made at a decision point. In 
Figure 2.3, there are eight child decision points .CH. The game can start from any of 
these points. After making his decision, the child will become a parent and thus reach 
a parent decision point, .p. In Figure 2.3 there are four parent decision points. As 
a parent the player must decide to educate, symbol E, or not educate, symbol N E, 
his own children. The player has then made all his decisions in his lifetime. Before he 
exits and receives a payoff in one of the payoff points, symbol 'V, he must await the 
decision of his child to transfer to him or not. A parent payoff obviously depends on 
this choice. Note that there are sixteen payoff points in the game of Figure 2.3 and 
they have subindex i, i E {I, ... , 16}, indexing the values of the different payoffs, not 
the player receiving them. At these payoff points, a parent also exits, thus in this game 
the sets E and Z contain the same elements, E = Z. 
Of course, a child player could start the game in any of the eight child decision 
points of Figure 2.3. Observing the child starting the game on one of these decision 
points depends on previous moves by the parents. The child ignores this history. He 
observes only if he was educated or not. Indeed, a child enters the game before a parent 
makes the decision to educate or not to educate. Thus a new child player enters the 
game when an old, previous parent player exits. A child enters the game at the preceding 
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exit point of a previous parent v. The history beyond this first move is irrelevant to the 
child's entirely forward looking decision. This makes the game very different compared 
to standard OLG games. 
Let us now examine a particular path of the game. Suppose we start the game 
with a child player index t in the top left corner of Figure 2.3. This child has been 
educated by his parents t - 1, symbolised by the arrow, superscripted E and pointing 
from the parent to the child. The child makes a decision at his decision point. Suppose 
the child decides to transfer. In this case, the game reaches an exit point for the parent 
t - 1 subscripted Vi. In this point a parent t - 1 receives a payoff and exits. Also, a 
new child t + 1 is born into the game at this point. Also, in this point the previous 
child player t becomes a parent t + 1. As a parent, the player must decide to educate or 
not educate his children. Suppose the parent decides to educate his children. Then the 
game will continue with the decision point of his own child. Suppose the child decides 
to transfer. Then the game reaches the exit point for player t, a parent t where he 
receives a payoff. 
We can denote this payoff as being dependent on the strategies played by players 
t - 1, t and t + 1. Thus, in the particular point we described in the above paragraph, we 
have payoff point \71. yielding payoff W(St-l, St, St+l) = W(E, T, E, T), depending on 
the decision of a parent of the previous generation t - 1, a player of generation t ( first 
a child, then a parent) and a child t + 1. We have underlined the decision of player t. 
The exit points are labelled as in Figure 2.3 and the payoffs are represented accordingly 
in Table 2.2. 
Subscripts are omitted in Figure 2.3 for clarity. Cyclic games have the important 
property, that we can cut out the individual players' graph from entry to exit point of a 
player and obtain a finite tree. To clarify the time structure of the game more precisely 
and the property of obtaining a finite path for every player, consider figure 2.4. 
A payoff symbolised by W(E, T, E, T) would imply that a player was educated 
by his parents, the player then transferred as a child, educated his children and then 
received a transfer from his own children. As the education or transfer decisions are 
binary, there are sixteen (24) different exit points for an educated player and in total 
there are 16 exit points in this model. 
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In a more forrmal setup and respecting the previous notation we could write: 
G = (X,Z,E,P,A, W), (2.7) 
h h X - {C H E E U U . were t e - I - . j, PT ' PNT , PT , PNT } J E {I, ... , 8}, Zi = {V1 ... V16 }. In 
this game E/ = Zi, P being the partition in decision and exits points of Eq. (2.7) and 
A being the directed graph depicted in Figure 2.3. n' is the payoff function as defined 
in the payoff table. We assume there to be only pure strategies, thus the probability 
distribution 7r is degenerate and equal to 1. The strategy set of every player is defined 
as 
S = {{T, NT}, {E, U}}. 
refering to his possible strategies as a child (first entry) and as a parent (second 
entry) of the strategy vector. As mentioned, we discretise the strategy space, and 
assume that a young adult played T when he exactly transfers a > a*. Similarily, we 
assume a parent exactly played E when he made his children work no more than the 
equilibrium amount of child labour, l < l*. In all other cases, we say that the young 
adult did not transfer NT, or the parent did not educate, N E. 
A first task is to characterise the equilibrium in pure strategies for this two gen-
eration overlapping generations (OG in the following) cyclic game. The appendix A.l 
shows the derivation of this property from the finite normal form representation of two-
generation cyclic games and Nash's (1951) symmetry definition. 
2.5.2 Equilibrium in the two generation model 
Equipped with the tools from symmetric games, we can now search for an equilibrium 
point in our cyclic 2-generation OG game. The previous section outlined the features 
of a first best contract C* = (a*, l*). We will now show that, without any sanctions, 
the first-best contract is not implementable due to commitment problems. The payoffs 
of the game at the payoff points are given in table 2.2. The last column of this table 
duplicates the first entry of each of the payoff functions W in column 3, namely the 
move of parents t - 1 of child t. The table is also split in two parts, depending on the 
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decision of parents in t - 1, in order to emphasise that a player t will make a decision 
conditional on either being an educated player or being an uneducated player. 
Proposition 3 The two generation cyclic game has a unique equilibrium in pure strate-
gies with each player playing 8 i = (NT, N E), each player exiting in exit point V'16 
Proof We must consider only symmetric equilibria. Every player could play (T, E), 
(iYT. E), (.YT .. V E) or (T, 1\' E). (T, E) cannot be an equilibrium, since (NT, E) does 
better if everybody else was playing (T, E). This can be seen as W 5(E, NT, E, T) > 
n'l(E. T. E. T). (NT,E) cannot be an equilibrium since (NT,NE) does better from 
n's(E .. YT .. YE .. YT) > H'6(E,NT,E,NT). and finally (T,NE) cannot be an equi-
librium, since it would pay to deviate to (NT, N E) if everybody else was playing (T, N E) 
since n'.,(E, .YT. lYE, T) > W 3 (E, T, N E, T). 
Hence (lYT, iY E) is the only symmetric equilibrium. As the ranking of the payoffs 
In the exit points is preserved the pure strategy equilibrium is not affected by this 
tra nsforma tion. 
o 
Each player must therefore exit in exit point V'16 since 
(i) the same reasoning with respect to strategies applies in the bottom half of the 
table, exit points V' 9 - V'16, since the ranking of these payoffs is equivalent to the 
ranking OfV'l - V'8. 
(ii) no player t would like to educate the first generation of children. 
Parents have thus an incentive to design contracts punishing their children if 
children do not transfer, if this would overcome the commitment problem. Parents 
could, for example, not make a certain transfer to their children: we consider here the 
bequest transfer as a special case. Thus we are examining if the first-best contract 
C* = (a*, l*) can be implemented using a bequest sanction. 
It is common knowledge of all players that their path leads inevitably to exit point 
n Thus uneducated parents would be willing to forego up to the difference in payoffs v 16. 
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received in exit point \"13 and those received in exit point V 16, that is: 
ll'(~VE.l\'T,E,T) - n'(NE,NT,NE,NT)) > c5 > 0, 
if this would help to implement the contract with transfers. Indeed, if they could enforce 
the contract of transfers by not consuming an amount c5 and receive the payoff in V 13, 
ll"(.Y E. _YT, E. T) - 8, they must be better off with a contract that prescribes transfer 
0. * and education l* than under the no contract, Co, situation. This definition can 
be compared to an individual rationality constraint: an individual cannot be worse off 
implementing the contract than without any contract. 
The following definition formalises how much parents would be willing to give up. 
A 
Definition 3 A parent is willing not to consume a part of his income B t , called bequests, 
and transmit the bequest to his children such that 
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Figure 2.4: Obtaining a finite graph: the graph of an individual that was not educated 
within the cyclic game, cut on the entry (child) and exit point (parent) of the individual 
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01 
Exit 
point 
\7 1 
\72 
\73 
\74 
\75 
\76 
\77 
\78 
\79 
VlO 
V11 
V12 
V13 
V14 
V15 
V16 
Payoff 
symbol 
1r1 
W 2 
l-t"3 
W4 
W5 
W6 
W7 
W8 
W9 
WlO 
W 11 
W12 
W 13 
W14 
W 15 
W16 
Payoff dependent Payoffs period I Own Parents 
on strategies strategy 
11'(E, T, E, T) llr(ht(l*)(1 - n*)) + W(ht(l*) + !ot u/,IJ + .fjnoth,(lot)) E 
~F(E, T, E, NT) lV(lI t (l*)(1 - (\'*)) + lV(ht(l*) + !-t<'lJ}L''') E 
y.."(E,T,NE,T) \\'(lIt(l*)(1 -- (\*)) + ~V(ht(l*) + lrt/a:rWC'1I + .(JdthlOT/un:)) E 
H"(E, T, NE, NT) 11T(lIt(l*)(l - n*)) + lV(ht(l*) + 'n/ll/w(:") E 
W(E,NT,E,T) ~V(ht(l*)) + W(ht(l*) + l*wL'l! + .fjn*h{(l*)) E 
W(E,NT,E,NT) ~V(ht(l*)) + ~F(ht(l*) + l*'wOIl ) E 
W(E, NT, N E, T) 11 '(lit (l*)) + W(ht(l*) + lmaxwCH + ga*h/,(l*)) E 
W(E, NT, NE, NT) lY(ht(I*)) + W(ht(l*) + lmaxwCH ) E 
W(NE,T,E,T) 1V(ht(lmax)(1 - a*)) + W(ht(lmax) + l*wCH + ga*ht(l*)) NE 
W(NE,T,E,NT) ~V(ht(lmax)(l - ()'*)) + W(ht(lmax) + l*wCH ) NE 
W(NE,T,NE,T) ~V(ht(lmax)(l - a*)) + W(ht(lmax) + lmaxWCH + ga*ht(l*)) NE 
W(NE,T,NE, NT) lV(ht(lmax)(l - a*)) + W(ht(lmax) + lmaxwCH) NE 
W(NE,NT,E,T) W(ht(lmax)) + W(ht(lmax) + l*wCH + ga*ht(l*)) NE 
W(NE,NT,E, NT) W(ht(lmax)) + W(ht(lmax) + l*wCl!) NE 
W(NE,NT,NE,T) W(ht(lmax)) + W(ht(lmax) + lmaxwCH + ga*ht(l*)) NE 
W(NE, NT, NE, NT) W(ht(lmax)) + W(ht(lmax) + lmax wCH ) NE 
Table 2.2: Representative payoffs for player t in the cyclic game, no bequest move introduced. 
Additional notation We adopt the following notation: The consumption of a parent 
t is denoted by Ct. A parent may chose to bequest a certain fraction of his current 
consumption to his children, denoted by j3 E [0,1]. Thus the bequest is B
t 
= j3C
t
. For 
convenience, we denote the consumption under the first-best contract as C; = ht(l*) + 
l*u,cH + go:*ht(l*), and we calculate all bequests with respect to this consumption. An 
equilibrium contract will be denoted by C = (cx*, l*, j3*), specifying the fraction cx* to 
transfer, the amount of child labour l* and the amount of bequests j3* in every period 
tEN. 
In addition to this, we have the contractual rule set by parents' commitment 
to a bequest: every child that transferred receives a bequest and every child that did 
not transfer receives no bequest. Somewhat contrary to intuition, such a contract 
might equalise parents' ex-post payoffs, and this suffices to implement the equilibrium. 
In equilibrium, every parent generation receives a bequest j3*Ct - 1 from the previous 
generation and makes a bequest j3*Ct . Off the equilibrium path, deviating children 
(those that did not transfer) receive no bequest. 
The equilibrium may exist, as payoffs received In 'VI are lowered by a smaller 
amount than the payoffs received in 'V 5 for every fraction of consumption used as a 
bequest. Indeed, every cooperating individual receives a bequest in 'VI, which in turn 
raises his payoff whereas a deviating agent does not receive such a bequest. Both agents 
have to commit to the same bequest in order to receive transfers and thus a cooperating 
agent may be better off, depending on the size of j3. 
The intuitive reasoning why the contract could be stable is as follows: every 
educated child knows that the best possible deviation payoff under the contract, 'V5, 
implies implementing the proposed contract with the next generation. Thus, even if a 
child did not transfer, it still needs to commit to a bequest if it wants to implement 
the contract with the next generation. Suppose a child wants to follow this path, and 
deviates by playing NT in the young adult stage. The child becomes a parent. How 
much does the parent need to promise the next child in order to receive the transfer? 
This suggests that j3* must be such that W5 < WI. by which a parent equalises his own 
payoffs in 'V 5 and 'VI respectively. 
In the next paragraphs, we present three tables. Table 2.3 reproduces the top 
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part of the previous payoff table. Table 2.4 is the same Table as 2.3 but lists payoffs 
received, if a previous generation t - 1 implemented the proposed contract C* and the 
generation t did not make any commitments. Table 2.5 finally presents the payoffs 
under the contract C*, including a bequest choice variable in the strategies. The letter 
B denotes the action of bequeathing to children and the letter N B denotes the action of 
bequeathing to an alternative beneficiairie. We assume here that parents have commited 
to a bequest fraction 3* before they educated their children. Thus, they will always lose 
this amount of consumption, and hence, it is always subtracted from their payoffs. We 
assume also that the decision to bequest can be seen as a automatic choice, conditional 
on actions of the children. This follows from the definition of the bequest - once the 
amount of income is stored it can only be re-directed, not consumed. We assume thus, 
that although children cannot credibly commit to repay, parents can credibly commit 
to bequest, conditional on child actions. We will re-examine the credibility statement 
later. Note that since this bequest move is modelled as automatic, the number of payoff 
points does not change. 
The next proposition shows the impossibility of implementing the contract in a 
non-cooperative setting with bequest sanctions. 
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-..J 
ex> 
Exit Payoff 
point symbol 
V'I I\'t 
'\'2 II':! 
'\':1 \\':1 
'\' I II' t 
V'5 II'"~ 
'\' (; \\'(; 
V'7 \1'7 
V's Ws 
r "yo" depelld"llt 
on str.ltegies 
\\'(1", T, I':, T) 
W(E, '1',10, NT) 
\\ ' ( E , T, N I';, T) 
\ \' ( F, T, N F, /II T) 
\\'U:, NT, F, 'I') 
WeE, NT, F, NT) 
I\'(E, NT, N I';, '1') 
I\'(E, NT, NE, NT) 
r"y,lls peno'" (- Olllln f)'''''nt, 
,trdt"v.y 
1I'(IIdIO)(1 nO» + W(/q(l+) + ,"","ll + '1,,'h,(IO» [ 
\ \' (II ,( I' ) (I - " " » + W (It I (!" ) + I" ///' II ) E 
\\'(/.,(1")(1 ,,'» -I- Vv'(It,(,") -1-1,,,,,, //,1'11 '.'I"·It,(I"",,,» E 
\ \' ( II I (I' ) ( I " • » -I W (/1 til ") I I""" w C' II ) E 
\\'(ltd/"» + \\'(IIdl') + 1'11,1'11 -I- ",,"ltd['» E 
H'(III(I+» + Wllt(I') -I 1"//,1'11) E 
\\'(11,(1"» + 1\'(111(1") -I [""",,/111'11 + 'I"-Itdl",,,,,» E 
\\'(lIt(/·)1.+ \\'(ht{IO) + [m",r/ll"II) E 
Table 2.3: Representative payoffs for player t who had been educated, with player t not committing to bequest B:. 
Exit Payoff Payoff dependent Pay'oTrs' period t Own Parents 
point symbol on strategies strategy 
V'I W R 1 WeE, T, E, T) W(ht{l")(l - ,,"» + W(htCl*) + ["wCH + fI(l"ht{l") + (1*C;_l) E 
V'2 w R 2 WeE, T, E, NT) W(ht{[")(l - (l"» + W(ht{[") + l"wCH + (j"C;_l) E 
V'3 w R 3 W(E,T,NE,T) W(ht(l*)(l - ,,"» + \FehtCl') + IrnarWCH + 90'"htClTnax) + (j"C;_tl E 
V'4 W R 4 W(E, T, NE, NT) W(h t (l*)(l - ,,'» + W(ht{l') + lmaxwCH + fj"C;_I) E 
V'5 W5 WeE, NT, E, T) W(htCZ"» + W(ht{l") + l"wCH + 90'"h t (l*» E 
V'f) Wf) WeE, NT, E, NT) W(ht(ZO» + W(h(Z") + l"wCIl) E 
V'7 W7 I\"(E, NT, N E, T) W(ht(l"» + W(ht(l") + ImaxWCH + 90'" ht(l"» E 
V's Ws WeE, NT, NE, NT, NB) W(ht(l*» + W(ht(l*) + lmaxWCH) E 
Table 2.4: Representative payoffs for player t who had been educated; player t - 1 complying with the contract, player t receiving B;_l 
upon a transfer but no commitment at the end of player t's life. 
-.....J 
\0 
Ex;~ayoft- Payo epen ent Payoffs period t Own Parents 
point symbol on strategies strategy 
VI W jB W(E, T, E, T, B) W (ht(I·)( 1 - n·» + W( (hI (I·) + 1* w C H + go· h, (1* )(1 - {3) + {3C; _ 1 ) E 
V2 W B 
'2 W(E, T, E, NT, NB) W(ht(/* )(1 - a·» + W(ht(I*) + l·wCH + {3·C;_d E 
V3 W B W(E, T, N E, T, B) W(h,(I·)(l - 0*» + W(ht(l·) + IrnaxwCH + gO*hl(lrnax) + {3·C; - {3'C t -d E 
V4 w1 WeE, T, NE, NT, Nn) W(ht(l·)(l - nO»~ + W(hdl') + IrnaxwCH + {3·Ct_l) E 4 
V5 W B WeE, NT, E, T, n) W(htCI*» + W«hdl*) + l*wCH + I)n*ht(/*)(1 - {3.» E 
wm V6 WeE, NT, E, NT, NB) W(htCI*» + W(h(I*) + l'wCH ) E 
V7 W~ W(E, NT, NE, T, B) W(ht(l'» + W(htC 1*) + /.max wCH + gu·ht(l*) - {3*C;J E 7 
VB Wf WeE, NT, NE, NT, NB) W(htCI*» + W(htC~) + lrna:rWCH) E 
Table 2.5: Representative payoffs for player t who had been educated with players t and t - 1 complying with the contract, receiving B;_l 
upon a transfer and bequest B; at the end of his life conditional on a transfer. 
Remark 1 The bequest is defined as a time-constant fraction f3 out of total assets under 
cooperation in time t, C;. Consumption in equilibrium grows at rate g, thus bequests 
grow at rate g, i.e. B t - 1 = (3C;_1 = ~Cr 
Non-existence of equilibrium 
Proposition 4 (I) The fraction of consumption Ct , {3*, must be set such that W 1B > 
ll~f, ll~f > ll~s and 1Vf > nr4R for an equilibrium contract C = (a*,I*,{3*) to exist. 
(ii) In the two-generational model there is no solution. 
Proof To (i): For a solution to exist Wf > W5B, W1B > Ws and Wf > W
4
R. 
Consider other strategy choices than applying the contract, C*. 
An educated child that does not transfer can at most expect to receive Ws if it 
does not commit to a bequest. The player is worse off than in the proposed equilibrium 
contract C*, if {3* can be set in such way that wf > Ws. 
An educated child that transfers, but does not educate his/her children, receives 
llr2R. This would be the best possible deviation, given the child has cooperated. Thus 
the contract needs to rule out this situation. By setting wf > wf, this ensures 
implicitly that 1Vf > (W2R, W3R). 
Consider now the "partial contract" situation, I.e. a child only implements the 
contract with generations ahead of him. Suppose a child decides to deviate from the 
proposed equilibrium; the child does not transfer in the first period, but still intends to 
implement the proposed equilibrium in the second period (as in Wf) by bequeathing 
an amount {3 < {3*. 
Every next generation child and parent knows that the best possible contract can 
only be a contract that establishes wf > Wf, i.e. ex-post indifference between payoffs, 
and no generation will accept to repay if the bequest is {3 < {3*. Hence a child that 
deviated has to subscribe to a contract leaving at least {3* for the next generation to 
cooperate, but this implies W f > W f . 
To (ii): 
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The curves ll-f and ll}~ cross, if ever, only once in {3*. Initially, we have at 
3 = 0, llT5B > llT? Consider the partial derviatives with respect to (3: 
and 
an-B aJ = -Ct llT'(Ct(1- (3)). 
As C;(l - 3 + ~) > C;(l - (3), the marginal utilities W'(C;(1 - (3 + ii)) < 
9 
H-'(C;(l - 3)), additionally ~ >,0 this implies W? decreases at a slower rate than 
H"f· Thus, the functions may cross. As they are strictly monotonic and decreasing in 
3, they may cross, if ever, only once. 
A trivial feature of a crossing is that W? > Wf beneath the crossing point. If 
the curves do not cross, we must have still at any {3 that W f > W? We can now use 
the feature of the crossing of the curves to prove that no contract exists. 
Define 9 as the growth 9 implying a positive transfer a. Suppose all the conditions 
for a beneficial contract are met from the previous section. Setting (3C; = Bt = 
[* _[max + gQ*h(I~), we have that ars = Wf. Thus, Wf is already at the value of 
the payoff ll-s. If we can show that TV? is below TVs at this point, then the curves did 
A 
not cross before and no contract exists. Now at Bt. 
(l l*) wf = W(ht (l*)(l - a*)) + W(h(l*)(l - a) + max - wCH ), 9 
which is strictly below Ws· 
o 
The intuition for this impossibility result is relatively straightforward. Consumption 
of every generation grows by the exogeneously given rate g: however, the bequest 
sanction does not grow at any rate. The bequest is only transmitted from generation 
to generation. It becomes difficult for an individual to equalise ex-post payoffs of his 
children in this context. The possibility of savings, or the possibility to let bequest 
resources grow at an interest rate, changes this fundamentally. We allow grandparents 
to save their resources and this stylised fact helps them to sustain such contracts. Also, 
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there are the deviating options open to parents, i.e. receiving the bequest and sending 
their children to full child labour (ll'-lR) . If grandparents overlap with parents, they can 
observe the parents and condition the bequest on education of grandchildren. 
We illustrate proposition 2.5.2 in the Figure 2.5, where we depict the non-existence 
of equilibrium in this parametric example (log-utility function) for various values of g 
and /--1. As can be seen, the green cooperative utility plane TV? is always below deviating 
utility planes. 
0.0 
Figure 2.5 : The values of l-r? (green), Wf (red), Ws (green) and Wf (yellow) to 
illustrate non-existence of an equilibrium 
Another reason why grandparents are important IS related to the credibility of 
sa nctions9 . 
Suppose that establishing an alternative beneficiairie for the bequest outside the 
family is costly, i.e. psychic costs as well as monetary costs. Within the family, only 
children can be beneficiairies. As mentioned by Bernheim et al. (1985) siblings could 
be punished separately. However, this would still not allow contracts in our model and 
might entail psychic costs. If there are costs of disinheriting natural children and in 
the event children do not cooperate, parents must be worse off bequeathing to the 
9Bequests to the parents own brothers and sisters are not credible, since they as well might have 
only a limited time to live when the bequest is made (in our model they do not exist, but if they existed, 
they would theoretically die at the same time as parents. 
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alternative beneficiaire rather than giving the money to the children directly. This will 
be true even though children did not cooperate. To illustrate this, let Et be such small 
costs, then 
That is the utility from bequeathing to an alternative beneficiairie is lower than be-
queathing to own children even though they deviated. 
Definition 4 If costs of disinheriting are small, Et > 0, no generation would like to 
commit to a bequest B;' 
Clearly the mere existence of a grandparent generation resolves this problem as 
grandparents overlap with grandchildren. Grandparents can transfer bequests to grand-
children if the parents have not been applying the optimal contract. This seems a 
credible use of the bequest, since grandchildren will benefit from these measures. Also, 
the dynasty as a whole might benefit, since resources stay within the dynasty. 
The overall intuition why contracts might be enforceable with grandparents IS 
(a) grandparents might be able to accumulate more wealth because they can save over 
a longer horizon, (b) grandchildren provide a good alternative use of the bequest, (c) 
grandparents can control their grandchildren's education and reduce deviating options10 . 
2.5.3 The extended model: a three generational cyclic OG game 
We have established that without the full observability of the history of play and de-
spite having bequest sanctions, the first-best contract cannot be implemented in a two 
generational setting. In fact, payoffs are strictly decreasing in the received bequest and 
this determines the result. If we take bequest costs and/or the observability of whether 
lOOf course one could think also of reasons why grandparents might be worse for grandchildren, 
e.g. grandparents might foster the maintaining of more conservative values than parents. In addition 
grandparents might consume all the resources for bequest themselves if longer lives go hand in hand with 
higher medical or care costs. Articles by Edlund and Rahman (2005) point this way - grandparents seem 
to encourage more investment in what she admits to be public goods such as health of children than 
parents. But grandparents invest less than parents in private goods with which she thinks of education. 
One could argue that education in the context of exchange is not a exclusive private good, but parents 
and grandparents have interests to develop it further due to the transfer that they receive. 
83 
grandchildren are educated into account, grandparents seem to be able to take a more 
prominent role. 
Grandparents usually leave resources for their offspring. It is an unresolved ques-
tion why most leave bequests instead of giving inter-vivos transfers. There is evidence 
that grandparents might leave such resources for strategic reasons 11 e.g. maximising 
attention dedicated to them Bernheim et al. (1985) or in order to receive old age care, 
Wagener (2002). 
Introducing grandparents into the model The model of two generations outlined 
before extends naturally to a model of three generations. We can conceptualise grand-
parents as long-lived parents. The parents live one period longer, and can save at 
(gross) interest rate R for their retirement. Their payoff will be (under certain condi-
tions on R) increasing in the received bequest. In addition, grandparents overlap with 
their grandchildren, and can thus condition the receipt of a bequest on the education 
decision of parents. Grandparents "lock" parents into the education contract. Also, 
costs of disinheriting are zero, since grandparents can change beneficairie costlessly to 
their grandchildren. 
The total utility of a player is then given by 
which consists of a child utility, a parent utility and a grandparent utility. 
The labelling is unchanged, except that c denotes the minimum consumption 
that grandparents need to spend for formal sector old age care. R represents the gross 
llEvolutionary economics and biology also provide explanations why grandparents can have different 
preferences over investment in grandchildren than parents. Grandparents might be less selfish and more 
altruistic towards children, since they have "survived" above reprodutive age and therefore would like to 
favour the survival of others of their dynastyy. They maximise survival of their dynasty and not of their 
own survival. In a purely biological view this would mean to increase either quantity or the quality of 
offspring, Robson (2003). Grandparents will thus try to increase the quality of offspring (children and 
grandchildren). Parents might still be more concerned with their own survival and hence privilege this 
over their childrens' survival. Grandparents should feel particularly worried about their grandchildren in 
this biological context, since they are potentially at risk of being exploited by (more" evolutionary" selfish) 
parents. In this context we do not take these evolutionary arguments into account, but rather focus on 
the implications that grandparents have through their longer life horizon (savings) and observability of 
parents' actions. 
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interest rate. Similarly to the previous section, grandparents are willing to commit to a 
bequest of at least the difference in payoffs between the outcome without any contract 
and the outcome with contract. 
Now the contract also involves education of grandchildren. The game does not 
change as to the previously outlined game, since payoffs of an exiting player are affected 
by the same strategy choices as before. Grandparents exit only after their grandchildren 
are educated, however, the payoffs of grandparents are unaffected by the moves of the 
current parent. 
The following figure depicts the tree for an educated child. We have simplified the 
tree in three ways: as before, we take the move of previous parents as given, and analyse 
the game always conditional on that move. Also, as before, the grandparents commit to 
a binding bequest contract which establishes automatically their best-response at the end 
of their life. Thus if the previous generation transfered and educated (!) their children, 
this triggers a bequest. Any other moves triggers no bequest (NB) and a grandparent 
simply transfers stored resources to the grandchildren, i.e. disinherits. Given these 
assumptions, we can write the payoffs as a function of five different strategic moves of 
players t and t + I, that is W(St-l, St, St, St+l, St+l, St). A particular point in this payoff 
functions could be, for example, W(E, T, E, T, E, B), meaning that this is a payoff 
given a parent t - 1 educated (the first entry) and the current player transferred T 
(second entry) and educated (third entry) his own children; and given that his children 
transfered (fourth entry) and educated their children (fifth entry) he bequests (sixth 
entry). Note again that children make their decision conditional on St-l. thus this is 
still a two player game, thus previous results from two player cyclic OG games apply. 
In order to further simplify the graphical representation, we eliminated strictly 
dominated strategies from the graph, that is children never transfer if they were not 
educated. Thus there is no transfer arc after the decision point of a child which has not 
been educated previously. 
We also arrange the payoffs for an individual t in a payoff table as before. Define 
again Bt-l = j3Ct-l' where Ct-l = ht(l*)+l*wCH +ga*ht(l*). Hence parents choose 
again to commit to a certain fraction j3 of their current consumption C;, before they 
educate their children. They have to transfer the resources as grandparents in this 
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case - thus savings can increase any assets stored and also those received from previous 
generations. 
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The educated path of the bequest game 
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Figure 2.6: Simplified representation of all finite paths for an educated individual going 
from child entry to grandparent exit point in the cyclic game 
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Table 2.6: Payoffs to player t in the representative 3 period 2-player cyclic game with bequests: educated generation. 
For example the payoffs received at V 11 are equal to those received at V 12. The 
whole table can thus be represented in a much simpler way still, but this would not yield 
further insights. However, note that the payoffs have ranks assigned in the rightmost 
column, imposing B;_1 = 0 and B; = 0 and lmaxwCH < l*wCH + O'.*gl*wCH , thus 
doing as if there was no bequest move and as if there was a beneficial contract. Equal 
numbers imply equal rank. 
The following Lemma can be deduced as in the two generation case. For this 
purpose, let us define the grandparent generation as a pure" mechanism" . 
lemma 2 In the absence of any bequest resources from grandparents, that is whenever 
the bequest of the last generation say B t - 1 and the bequest of the current generation, 
B t , are zero, the equilibrium for every generation is to play (NT, L). 
Proof In the absence of any commitment mechanism and knowing that the equilibrium 
must be identical in strategies, (T, E) cannot be an equilibrium. This follows from the 
fact that a deviation would do better. Hence playing (NT, E) if everybody is playing 
(T. E) does better which follows from V7 > VI. But everybody playing (NT, E) cannot 
be an equilibrium either since (NT, L) does better from V 11 > V 5 . Also (NT, L) does 
better than VI, thus (NT, L) must be the only equilibrium possible. 
The payoff point V 11 is not stationary. If everybody plays the game repeatedly the 
family will be on the uneducated path and hence the outcome must be V 24(NT, N E, NT, N E), 
which is worse than VI. However, as in the two generation case, no player can pre-
vent this from happening, since contracts are not enforceable and a beneficial deviation 
exists. 
This can be improved upon by introducing a bequest. We proceed as before. The 
maximum uneducated parents are willing to put aside to enforce cooperation is given 
by a bequest, iJ that equalises V 19 to V 24 and the most educated parents are willing 
to give is the difference between VIand V 11. Now we need to consider that savings St 
will be different, depending on which path is chosen. 
We focus on some key comparisons in the payoff table. Without the bequest, we 
have "V7 > "VI > "V11. taking into account optimal savings. 
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Now, as in the two generation model, a child knows that he should only be 
transferring if the parent can threaten to withhold at least an amount (3Ct, with which 
the individual could then threaten the next generation effectively with. Hence {3Ct 
must again equalise the payoffs of the best possible deviation \77 and the payoff of full 
cooperation VI. Writing these out, we have 
WI - 11"0 (h,((') (1 - 0:')) + WI (h,(l') + ('wCH + go:' ht(l') + : c; - s .. ) 
+W2 (Rs** - c - (3Cn 
W7 Wo (ht(l*)) + WI (ht(l*) + l*wCH + ga*ht(l*) - s*) 
+W2 (Rs* - c - {3Cn 
Here s** denote optimal savings under the cooperative equilibrium and s* denote 
savings under defection as a child, and trying to re-establish cooperation later. Note 
that s* < s**, thus the final grandparent marginal utility in \77 is higher than in \71 
This leads to a solution in a path of {3 which equalises payoffs between \77 and 
v 1 in every period t. We can calculate the effect of {3 now by examining the partial 
derivatives of the two payoff functions with respect to (3. Then we can postulate the 
following, main result of the paper: 
Theorem 1 If {3 can be set in such way that WI > W7 > Wl1 or WI > Wl1 > W7, 
then there exists a beneficial contractual solution and a contract C = (a*, [*, (3*). A 
necessary condition is R > 9 if a non-mutually beneficial contract exists or R = 9 if a 
mutually beneficial contract exists. 
Proof W7 is initially greater than WI· The payoff Wl1 is greater than WI if the 
contract is not mutually beneficial (optimal), Wl1 is smaller than WI if the contract is 
mutually beneficial (optimal). If WI can be shown to be increasing in {3 and W7 can be 
shown to be decreasing in {3, then at least one solution must exist where WI = W7, if 
a mutually beneficial contract exists or WI = Wl1 if a non-mutually beneficial contract 
exists. Note first that Wl1 is unaffected by {3, and thus a constant. 
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) \' .. is monotically decreasing in f3, the bequest fraction made by the current 
generation: 
aW7 * ,(7)" * lh3 = - Ct H 2 (Rs - c - f3Ct ) < 0 
) \ \ is monotonically decreasing in the bequest to the current generation, but 
monotonically increasing in the bequest received by the last generation. We obtain 
i:!\l = G -s' (d)) W{ ( ct' ( 1 + !) - s .. ) +( -ct' +Rs' (f3) )wF)' (Rs** -c-f3C,') 
Using the FOe in optimal savings, RW~(.) = W{(.), we have 
= IV{(.) Gct' -s'(f3) _ ~ + RS~f3)) . 
Note that s(J) is the propensity to save out of a unit of bequest received. It is positive 
and increasing in :J, hence 8' (f3) > o. 
Thus for the effect of bequests to increase WI, me must have 
C* (~-~) > 0 
t 9 R ' 
and which implies an positive interest rate and gross rate R > g. 
Then, a solution consists in the intersection of WI with W7 if a mutually beneficial 
contract exists and in the intersection of WI with Wll if a non-mutually beneficial 
contract exists. Note that we require R > 9 if a non-mutually beneficial contract exists, 
but we require only R = 9 if a mutually beneficial contract exist, since then WI > Wll 
and if WI stays constant in f3 and W7 decreases in f3, a contract exists. 
The solution obtained will be denoted as the fraction of bequests out of period t 
consumption, Ct, f3* Vt E N. Since all consumption grows with rate 9 in every period, 
this does not change the equilibrium fraction of bequests. 
The contract implements thus a better payoff than any deviation outcome if it 
can be set at such a f3. This follows immediately from the ranking of payoffs and from 
the arguments of the two-generational model. 
Thus, with three generations and the possibility to save, we obtain a solution 
with bequest sanctions and first-best contracts. This is possible even when ignoring 
the history of play - which would not have been possible in a classical OLG-game with 
trigger strategies. The following remarks summarize important other features. 
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Remark 2 Note that now as well, contracts which are not first-best are implementable, 
since we have that the cooperation payoffs are an increasing function of bequests 13 and 
thus they can reach the non-cooperative solution, even though the cooperative payoffs 
are initially smaller. 
Remark 3 Note that now there are not the same deviation possibilities as in the two-
generational setup. The payoffs H'iR do not exist, since grandparents can condition the 
transmission of a bequest on grandchildrens' education enrolment - and thus avoid these 
possible deviations. 
Remark 4 The payoffs for the uneducated generation can be read off directly from table 
2.6, replacing children's and parents' human capital by h(lmax) and adding 12 to the 
payoff number. 
Another problem needs now to be addressed after knowing that an equilibrium 
exists in the educated generation: can this point be reached by uneducated generations? 
In other words, we need to investigate if the maximum uneducated parents are willing 
A 
to give up is large enough to enforce the contract with the next generation if f3 t > 13;. 
Lemma 3 (i) As long as R (i*wCH - lmaxwCH + ga*h(l*)) > (3(h(l*) + ga*h(l*) + 
l*wCH), an uneducated generation can reach the educated generations equilibrium and 
would like to implement the equilibrium. (ii) The bequest that the first uneducated 
generation is willing to make must be greater than minimum consumption, U2 (Rs" -
i3) > u(cmin .) 
Proof Consider the two possible payoffs in period t - 1, one denoted by WIg and the 
other one denoted by W24· 
The bequest B;-I, equalising these payoffs is the maximum bequest uneducated 
parents would like to commit to. As uneducated parents know the equilibrium contract 
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exists once children are educated, we then need to determine if bequests they are willing 
to give are sufficient. 
Assuming optimal savings, we need to compare only the last two utility terms of 
each payoff, ~l'2(.). They should be equal under optimal savings if the payoffs are equal. 
Thus, applying again the result from Proposition 1, writing ~ = W t - 1(.), we derive 
savings to be: 
t ~ = 
(h(lmax) + ga*h(l*) + l*wCH + ~C + ~B) 
1+~R 
" (h(lmax) + lmaxwCH + ~C) 
~ = . 
1 +~R 
Substituting these into the argument of the two last terms of the payoff functions, 
n-2 , and equalising the arguments, we have: 
R---O.( h_(_lm_ax_) +_ga_*_h_( l_* )_+_l*_w_C_H_+_~_C_+_~_B--,--) -c- fj = R (h(lmax) + Imax we H + KG) -c. 
1 + ~R 1 + ~R 
After some manipulation we obtain 
The required bequest in the next generation is 
which gives the result. 0 
We provide a small calibration example to illustrate the equilibrium. 
Calibration example Since it is difficult to evaluate the magnitude of transfers, be-
quests and child labour in a purely theoretical model, a small numerical example might 
be helpful. Assume again a single child family. We calculate only the uneven numbered 
payoffs \71 - \711 for an educated generation, since all even payoffs must be strictly less 
by the fact that in the case of even payoffs, the last child generation did not transfer. 
Weknowthath(l*) > h(lmax) > wCH. Weseth(l*) ~ 2xh(lmax), h(lmax) = 1, 
wCH = 0.4, R = 3 which is a reasonable value for a lifespan of around 30 years and 
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c = 1, k = 2. The human capital accumulation function is h(l) = K, - l2 for l > 0 
and h(lma.r) = ho, where ho represents the human capital endowment of the child. 
Furthermore we assumed the function W (.) to be of the logarithmic type. 
The following table shows the payoffs with and without bequest threat 12 
V'I 
V'3 
V'5 
V'i 
V'g 
V'u 
(3* 
B t = Jet = (3 (h(l*) + go:*h(l*) + l*wCH ) 
go:* h(l*) 
Bt-I = R(gn*h(l*) + (l* -lmax)wCH ) 
l 
I without contract (3* 
2.11423 
2.11423 
1.84388 
2.42602 
1.51502 
2.15567 
0 
0 
lmax = 1 
with contract (3* 
2.21920 
2.21094 
1.84672 
2.21919 
1.51502 
2.15567 
0.25599 
0.787 
1.001 
2.102 
l* gwCH 
= 2(g+l) = 0.13 
Table 2.7: Numerical example of payoffs with and without the bequest threat. 
The table shows that accepting the bequest contract changes the payoffs in such 
way that now the cooperative equilibrium does (just) better (V'1 > V'7). Also child 
labour is more than seven times lower under the contract. Note that without the 
contract, the no-education, no transfer equilibrium is preferred, as V'7 is the largest 
payoff, which leads to chose no transfer as a child. This being anticipated by parents, 
the no-education, no-transfer equilibrium is the outcome without any contract. 
The equilibrium bequest B; = (3e; is well below the maximum bequest that any 
A 
previous grandparent would like to commit to, Bt-I. Notice as well that the transfer 
received is higher than the bequest one needs to commit to before the receipt of the 
transfer. This is explained by the increase in resources through savings. 
In addition to this numerical example, we illustrate the sensitivity of the contract 
to the wage growth rate g, which we let vary between 1 and 3, and to the child labour 
wage, where we have first a high child labour wage !h(lmax) and a low child labour wage 
~h(lmax). The three-dimensional Figure 2.7 depicts the optimal contracts as planes in 
}R3, where utility is depicted on the vertical axis, and 9 and (3 are depicted on the 
12The Maple code to evaluate these payoffs can be requested from the author 
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horizontal axes. 
3.0 
beta 1.0 
Figure 2.7: The values of the payoffs WI (green plane), W7 (red plane) and Wl1 (blue 
plane) for values of 9 and {3, given a high and a low child labour wage. 
The first-best contract with bequests can be read off the figures by noting the set 
or junction of saddle points formed by the blue and the green plane in the left-hand side 
of the figure and thereafter by the junction of the green and the the red plane. This 
saddle point will make individuals just better off under cooperation and allows them to 
reach the green , cooperation plane. Furthermore, we can see how the figure to the right 
is flatter both in aspect and scale. In the left part of the figure, the returns structure has 
been altered in favor of higher child wages: one can distinguish that the planes have a 
steeper inclination . However, the space representative of deviation options (blue surface, 
surrounded by red and green planes) seems to have increased in the right diagram due 
to the planes being flatter . The equilibrium contract is not very much affected by this 
change. 
Fertility Suppose we extend the previous model and allow parents to choose the num-
ber of children. Clearly, parents can now potentially receive more transfers from children 
than before. Thus, they could enforce potentially better bequest contracts. However, 
parents receive only a single bequest from a previous parent generation. As they need to 
commit to bequest to, say, n E educated children, their utility is potentially decreasing 
in the bequests they need to commit to. We can thus infer directly from the conditions 
on the bequests how many children parents can educate. This is a great deal easier 
than to re-derive equilibrium conditions with children and these bequest constraint also 
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impose a constraint on the number of educated children. 
Suppose parents can chose the number of children n E [0, n max ] where nmax is 
the natural fertility limit. How does this change the allocation of education and the 
division of bequests between children? We assume parents either chose to educate a 
child or not to educate it. This yields n* = n E + n U, where n E is the number of 
educated children and n U is the number of uneducated children. Only those children 
that were educated, nE , and transferred, receive a bequest. 
Proposition 5 The number of educated children is bounded from above by n E < R, 
9 
thus allowing an unequal division of bequests and unequal inter-vivos transfers (some 
children work, some are educated13 ). We observe high fertility, n* = n max . 
Proof Using as above the FOe for optimal savings, we obtain: 
8Wl = C* (~_ nE)W'(C*(l + /3)) . 
8/3 t 9 R 1 t 9 
Thus for there to be a positive effect 
Then the term is positive for 
1 n E 
->-9 R' 
R 
n E <-. 
9 
The family will always choose a maximum of uneducated children since utility is 
increasing in n U, but only educating n E , thus n U = n max - n E . 
o 
lemma 4 If there are direct educational costs and no child labour opportunities, we will 
observe equal division of bequests, inter-vivos transfers and lower fertility if nmax > :. 
Proof In case of no child labour activities, parents chose n U = 0 since their utility 
is decreasing in n U , but educate n E < : children and divide bequests equally among 
them. 0 
13 Note that R is a gross lifetime interest rate and can thus take high values, e.g. > 2 
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The additional consideration of fertility gives the interesting prediction that we 
should see primo-geniture or other unequal bequest rules emerge if one cannot invest in 
the quality of all children. Additionally, if the number of children is small and they can 
all be educated we should observe equal division of the estate. 
2.6 Discussion and policy implications 
The cyclic OG game points to the importance of information on past play and observ-
ability of the history of play. The dynamics of the game highlight also the importance 
of sustained growth in wages and the possibility to save over generations, a point not 
obvious from the static setting. Grandparents can implement first-best contracts: they 
ca n save over a longer horizon, they have credible alternative beneficiairies (grandchil-
dren) and grandparents can condition contracts on the parents' behaviour. In summary 
grandparents facilitate contracts, which lead to a path of education and transfers. Once 
families attain the educated path (or are able to commit/ write binding contracts), 
they are likely to remain there. This would imply, that public policies have considerable 
intergenerational benefits that can be felt long after they were implemented. 
The traditional analysis of commitment had shown that the optimal policy to 
address child labour problems needs to be linked to the inefficiency arising from incom-
plete contracts. A family alone might struggle to implement such first best-contracts, 
if the family has no bequest resources or if no grandparents are alive. This would give 
a greater role to policy than previously thought. 
It seems therefore advisable not only to redistribute resources to the poor. Policies 
that redistribute income alone could certainly have a positive, short term effect on child 
labour, although not in our model. In our model, income transfers would need to be 
sustained for long periods in order to generate the expected increase in income necessary 
for families to generate sufficient bequest resources and the income transfers need to 
be in the form of a conditional transfer to parents. Note that conditional cash transfer 
programs would need to be implemented in every generation in order to yield a lasting 
decrease in child labour. 
A ban on child labour could be beneficial in our model if the reduction in fertility 
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(implied by Lemma 4) does not reduce parents' overall utility. Utility could however be 
reduced, since less children are working for wages and thus overall utility falls, if the 
family has many children. Given the relatively small amount of children that can be 
educated in the model, it would be plausible that only a welfare worsening ban exists in 
this situation. 
Some alternative policies to cash transfers and bans are a credit system for stu-
dents. Public policy measures could provide credit to students. These could be repaid 
by the grown-up children as soon as they find an employment (say by taxing the grown-
ups). However, such state transfers do not give resources to parents. In our model, as 
well as in Baland and Robinson's (2000), it is parents that forego resources in the first 
place to educate their children - and it is also parents that decide about child schooling 
in the age where returns from schooling are usually highest. Hence, as in previous work 
by Baland and Robinson (2000), an effective credit system on its own will not be suffi-
cient to guarantee that parents will not send their children into child labour, as opposed 
to the usual perfect market hypothesis. 
Now one could think of other transfer arrangements that could enforce intergen-
erational contracts similar to the ones considered here. 
A proposition along these lines is contained in the work of Rangel (2003): a social 
security system could provide incentives for parents to invest in the education or quality 
of offspring. Suppose the parents receive social security contributions once they enter 
grandparent age. The social security contributions are financed by contributions from 
the current parent generation. This could be done by taxing a fixed proportion of the 
current parents' generation income. A problem here is that these payments are most 
likely subject to free riding, since education investment is costly. Every parent would 
expect the other families to invest in education and, on average, parents will under-
invest in their children. Thus, education as a public good is likely to be underprovided 
and the solution to the child labour commitment problem is incomplete. 
Which public policies are then suitable? A combined solution seems necessary. 
A first step, according to the model presented here, suggests that any assistance be 
divided into two parts: i) providing resources to parents exclusively encouraging them 
to accumulate fixed assets and/or life insurance and ii) provide credit to parents to 
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temporarily counterbalance losses from child labour income. This will enable families to 
implement the discussed sanction system. 
Another, more plausible solution, would be a one-to-one third-party contract, 
where educated individuals are taxed in order to transfer the resources directly to parents. 
The transfers to parents have to fulfill conditions outlined in the text. In addition, parents 
receive a short term credit to counterbalance losses from foregone child labour. 
So far we have not addressed the associated general equilibrium problems and 
the macro-economic variables Rand 9 which are important in our model. In terms of 
general equilibrium considerations, having more children in school should raise the child 
wage, which in turn improves parent's utility from child work and might well undermine 
a beneficial contract. Schultz (2004) found such wage effects in Mexico. As far as the 
macro-economic variables are concerned, it is clear that expectations about both 9 and 
R are crucial for contracts to exist and hence stability and a functioning financial sector 
seem pre-requisities for any public policy to eradicate child labour. 
Another problem of the presented model and public policy is that the model 
implicitly assumes that grandparents do have beneficial preferences (i.e. they care only 
about the return to education and do not derive utility from child labour or education 
directly). This might not be entirely correct, since grandparents might force other 
generations through the bequest tool to align themselves on their own preferences, 
beneficial or harmful for society as a whole. Assume for example that grandparents 
have a preference for child labour because in their times child labour was much more 
common and accepted. Then such bequest contracts could have the opposite effect than 
intended. Grandparents could worsen child outcomes in terms of education, Edlund and 
Rahman (2005). 
Certainly more empirical investigation is needed to assess the role of grandparents 
In the commitment problem and the education decision. The present model points 
in any case to an important shortcoming of family transfer systems when information 
on past play is imperfect and the problem of families to maintain first-best contracts 
within such environments. Current policies (credit markets, poverty reduction, health) 
to address child labour do not resolve the commitment problem and the associated losses 
for society as a whole, since they do not simultaneously address the problems of poverty 
99 
and commitment. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The child labour literature has so far analysed the commitment problem from a static 
point of view. A dynamic, game-theoretic analysis of the commitment problem, ad-
dressing imperfect information transmission between family members as proposed in 
this paper is thus a significant step forward. This paper has made an effort to model 
the commitment problem in a novel way using a cyclic overlapping generations game. 
It derived implications for a contractual equilibrium between selfish families. 
Commitment mechanisms are difficult to sustain inside the family once we focus 
on strategies that are independent of the history of play. Cyclic games do not assume a 
previous history, are dynamic and thus ideally suited for strategic punishment strategies. 
Additional punishment mechanisms are indeed necessary to reach a cooperative outcome 
with commitment within this game. Generations are likely to remain in a cycle of poverty 
even though credit markets are perfect and returns to education are high if they cannot 
implement such sanctions. 
We show that commitment problems disappear if parents can commit to a bequest, 
can save over a long enough time horizon and can observe their children's behaviour 
towards grandchildren, i.e. if parents live long enough as grandparents. Replacing the 
missing history of play by a monetary bequest sanction solves the commitment problem. 
Grandparents have in addition other advantages to be the "market-maker" in such 
contracts: grandparents can costlessly transfer to grandchildren and can write binding 
and conditional bequest contracts. 
The policy implications of the model cast doubt on current approaches to eradicate 
child labour that focus only on direct poverty reduction through income transfers or pure 
educational credits. We propose a third party system of intra-family transfers to parents 
conditional on (educated) children's income combined with a micro-credit to effectively 
reduce child labour. A topic of further empirical research is the role of grandparents in 
relation to the commitment problem and education investment. 
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Chapter 3 
Education transmission across 
three generations 
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3.1 Introduction 
What difference can grandparents make in the educational success of their grandchil-
dren? Previous studies have focused mainly on the effect of parents' education on 
children's education using two-generational transmission models. The present chapter 
intends to extend this literature and point out new and interesting directions for future 
research. The extensive two-generational analyses are often referred to as "intergener-
ational mobility" studies. The concept of mobility refers to the ease by which members 
of a given society move up and down the ladder of life outcomes, such as income or ed-
ucation for example, given their parents' position in the outcome distribution. Mobility 
studies are interesting because they mirror the opportunities a given society offers its 
members to improve or change their position in the outcome distribution. Being thus 
influenced by grandparents in addition to parents opens up a new channel of thinking 
about mobility. Policy implications, however, are not the main interest of this chap-
ter, but rather it aims to empirically assess a potentially three-generational education 
transmission mechanism. 
The research question to be addressed is how much a child's choice of education 
is determined by her parents' and grandparents' choices. Analysing the child's choice, 
a researcher cannot observe every variable affecting the child's decision. Ability or 
parenting skills are typical examples of such unobserved components of a child's decision. 
If ability were genetically transmitted, for example, then more able parents would acquire 
better education, but would also have more able children - and these children would 
acquire better education through this channel. As a researcher does not observe ability 
directly, it is difficult to disentangle parental education from parental ability effects. 
We address this endogeneity concern by using instrumental variable techniques. 
Schooling reforms implemented in the UK in 1945 and 1973 and mothers' birth-order 
allow us to have credible instrumental variables to address the endogeneity of parents' 
and grandparents' education. In short, the present study is the first to have both 
three generations and an identification strategy addressing unobservables at parents' 
and grandparents' level. 
The question of whether grandparents enter the transmission mechanism is inter-
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esting, and not exclusively so because the wider literature has neglected it so far. Most 
citizens of developed countries benefit from longer lifespans and an increased time with 
their grandchildren. Transfers of resources from the grandparents' generation, such as 
gifts, bequests and childcare, can make a difference, even more so to the marginally poor 
family. One could think of credit constraints being relieved by grandparents. Grand-
parents' influence through various channels on grandchildren seem an exciting and new 
research topic which this study addresses at the forefront of the current mobility litera-
ture. 
The objective of this paper is thus to provide some descriptive evidence of grand-
parental influence and its channels, and to investigate whether the effects of grandpar-
ents' and parents' education on children's education are causal: is it really parents' and 
grandparents' education that matters for children's education choices or are there other 
important but perhaps unobserved factors of influence? 
A statement of caution is appropriate here. This contribution does not claim to 
isolate causal effects. Rather, it illustrates with a wide range of econometric techniques 
the point that censored regression effects can be seen as upper bounds and that un-
observable factors playa major role in the transmission of education. Whether such 
a finding may be extended to other outcome measures is open to debate. The pa-
per illustrates as well that parametric and non-parametric techniques yield different yet 
complementary results. 
The paper is structured as follows: The previous literature is reviewed, thereafter, 
relevant features of the current data are discussed and a preliminary data analysis is 
carried out which does not take into account the endogeneity of education. The subse-
quent section presents the identification strategy, taking unobserved variable bias into 
account, and the remaining sections feature selected results as well as sensitivity checks. 
3.2 The literature on intergenerational transmission 
The two papers of Becker and Tomes (1979), Becker and Tomes (1986) and the work 
of Solon (1992) have spurred widespread interest in assessing the intergenerational cor-
relation in earnings. The wider literature has been particularly concerned with upward 
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mobility: that is, if and how easily children improve upon their fathers' status, Dearden 
et al. (1997). Additionally, there has been an interest in studying such mobility in greater 
detail and parametrising the joint distribution of outcomes, such as for example educa-
tion, Bartolucci and Scaccia (2004). Models used by Chevalier et al. (2005), Chevalier 
(2004), Oreopoulos et al. (2006) or Carneiro (2005) can be seen as reduced form models 
of education transmission, where the intergenerational correlation in income or wealth 
is proxied by a correlation in education. In an extension, these models are augmented 
in this paper by a grandparent generation. 
There exist some contributions taking into account three generations, for example 
Plug and Vijverberg (2005), Maurin (2002) and Sacerdote (2005). Sacerdote (2005) 
examines a three-generation transmission mechanism by assessing the impact of slavery 
on the grandsons of slaves. He provides evidence that intergenerational effects disappear 
after only three generations. In general, grandparents are not given an active, explicit 
role in these studies. The present contribution tries to go beyond their findings by 
presuming an active role for grandparents. 
The empirical analysis faces an important statistical problem. Estimating causal 
effects of parental background variables such as education and income on childrens in-
come is complicated by the largely unknown transmission mechanisms, by measurement 
error and by unobserved important variables. The econometrician might not observe 
many of the essential inputs into the production function of child outcomes, Todd and 
Wolpin (2003). In addition, theory does not give us any clear hint towards the expected 
transmission mechanisms, Blowet al. (2005). Is it linear or non-linear, and which mag-
nitude is explained? In addition, many studies are affected by measurement error in 
the outcome variables. In studying income transmission, typically most of the father's 
income trajectory is in the data, but we observe only the first few years of the son's 
income profile. This leads to estimates of permanent income which are difficult to com-
pare. Education suffers from a similar problem, since individuals might take additional 
training programmes during their lifecourse. We only observe the first years of children's 
education trajectories. 
Previous research has relied on distinct approaches to identify the causal effect of 
schooling and income on the outcomes of the next generation and to address measure-
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ment problems. Chevalier (2004) identifies three main approaches. 
The first approach is to compare the children of identical twins, Behrman and 
Rosenzweig (2002). Certainly, the 'nature' background of at least one of the parents 
is the same and hence any differences might only arise from 'nurture', that is, different 
family background, care and other inputs. Other approaches have looked at twin-
differences: that is, the difference in outcomes between identical twins in relation to 
parental background. This differences out any unobserved variables in family background 
and education. Such approaches are only partially valid, since differences in preferences, 
even between twins, can be accentuated. Family background might not be all that 
matters for such decisions, but rather (unobservable) individual factors that affect each 
twin separately. Behrman and Rosenzweig's (2002) coefficients using twins were found 
to be 0.04-0.0149, and thus much smaller than the usual OLS estimates on mobility, 
which range between 0.2 and 0.4. Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) even found negative 
effects for mothers' schooling which they associate with decreasing home time of mothers 
for children with increasing education. The results indicate a positive bias in the cross-
sectional OLS coefficients. 
The second approach is to examine adoptees, Plug and Vijverberg (2005), Plug 
(2004). Plug and Vijverberg (2005) use extensive data on adoptees to estimate an 
unconfounded effect of income on schooling outcomes. The authors state that estimates 
of the impact of income on the education of the next generation are often biased or 
less credible since one cannot control for correlated parental ability. They argue that 
at least part of this ability is transmitted genetically. By using adoptees, any such 
bias by inherited factors is excluded, and Plug and Vijverberg (2005) find significant 
effects of income on child schooling. However, one cannot assume that they have found 
evidence of a causal effect, since wealthier parents could also have better child-rearing 
skills, assignment into "treatment" (adoption) might be selective, or adoptees might 
be different in other ways from non-birth children. Plug and Vijverberg (2005) provide, 
however, a large set of evidence that the transmission mechanism of income on education 
might be causal. In their specifications though a third generation measure, such as years 
of education of grandmothers/grandfathers never seem statistically significant. 
The last approach to evaluating intergenerational effects which one suspects to be 
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subject to unobservable variable bias are instrumental variables. Instrumental variables 
use an exogeneous variation in explanatory variables, which is independent of unobserved 
factors, to attempt to identify causal effects. Instruments can be factors that change 
the decisions of agents, unrelated to their own, unobserved factors. Popular instruments 
in education or income transmission are factors that raise schooling costs and policy 
reforms. 
The literature has used instrumental variables to estimate the effect of parents' 
education alone on children's education, using suitable natural experiments, Black et al. 
(2003), Chevalier (2004), Oreopoulos et al. (2006). The respective authors came to 
rather different conclusions. Black et al. (2003) found severely reduced effects or even 
insignificant effects when parental education was assumed to be endogeneous in data 
from Norway, as Chevalier (2004) states. Chevalier (2004) attributes this to the rather 
homogeneous society that was analysed in the Norwegian data. On the other hand 
Chevalier (2004) estimated coefficients on education that nearly double when he instru-
ments education. He identifies this as a local average treatment effect: that is, the 
reforms that he uses affected only those people who wished to leave school at 15 years. 
Thus the reform would particularly affect those individuals with a low taste for school-
ing and thus over-estimate the true effect. Oreopoulos et al. (2006) identifies as well a 
larger impact of schooling on grade retention when using an IV strategy than under the 
standard OLS approach. He argues that the larger sample and the greater variation in 
schooling laws in the US might explain an IV effect above the OLS effect. 
A positive OLS bias seems well-established in the adoption and twins literature 
whereas IV strategies have lead to different estimates. Smaller effects of education in an 
instrumental variable estimation are consistent with the assumption that unobservable 
ability, for example, is positively correlated to education. The results obtained in this 
paper have to be judged based on such previous evidence. 
This paper will focus on instrumental variable estimation uSing policy reforms 
in a three-generational context. The next section will outline the data and conduct a 
preliminary analysis before presenting the indentification strategy used. 
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3.3 Data and preliminary analysis 
The NCDS is an ongoing longitudinal survey of a British birth cohort born between 
March 3Td and March 9th 1958. The initial sample consisted of 17,000 individuals 
who were resurveyed on six further occasions in order to monitor their changing health, 
education, social and economic circumstances1 : - in 1965 (age 7), 1969 (age 11), 1974 
(age 16), 1981 (age 23), 1991 (age 33), 1999/2000 (age 42) and 2004 (age 48) 2. 
During the 1991 survey, a special sub-survey was undertaken concerning the children 
of the NCDS. A random draw of one third of the cohort members was administered a 
detailed questionaire about their children's development, health and education. Tests 
were administered to different age groups to assess mathematical abilities and literacy. 
The NCDS was conceived first as a one-shot birth survey and has since been 
extended to a longitudinal survey. We are going to base our analysis on a subsample 
of the NCDS data. We will examine the education of the children of the NCDS. Thus, 
our sample will only include families that have children who are at least sixteen years or 
older. We will mainly examine a sample of only the eldest children of these families. In 
some contexts, we will analyse a sample of all children which are already over sixteen. 
Our data is not as representative as the full NCDS sample, as we exclude parents 
who have children after the age of 32. Thus not all women in the orignal sample 
have completed their fertility cycle. This is clearly a drawback and affects the initial 
randomisation of the N CDS, consisting in selecting a birth cohort born in a particular 
week. Of course, in general, it is also open to discussion if initial randomisation in 
generation one will still yield random (representative) samples of the population three 
generations ahead, even if we would wait until the fertility cycle is completed. Despite 
these more general issues, one has to acknowledge that because not all children have 
grown up beyond schooling age, the sample retained here is biased. We select a sample 
of families with rather low levels of educational achievement, since families with lower 
education tend to have children earlier, and these are some of the children we observe in 
our sample. This has to be borne in mind during the whole analysis - and the comparison 
IThis and the following descriptions were adapted and shortened from a longer version available at 
http://www.cls.ioe.ac. uk/ studies.asp ?section=000100020003 
2The latest wave of 2004 is now out but is not yet incorporated into this analysis 
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of tables 3.1 and 3.2 reveal these differences in background variables of the grandparents 
and also in mean attainment of children of NCDS cohort members. 
Furthermore, and as mentioned before, there is censoring in the observed child 
education variable which affects about 40% of the observations. Thus 40% of the 
individuals of our sample are still in school at the time of the survey. 
Another potential pitfall of the NCDS is that the researcher always has a wealth of 
information on cohort members, but more limited information on partners. For example, 
we have the whole schooling history, from schools attended to the number of exams 
taken and test results for the cohort member, but we have only the years of education 
and some general measures for the partner. The same phenomenon appears also for 
grandparents. We have only observations on the cohort member's grandparents, and 
thus two important figures in our transmission story are missing. 
But despite these shortcomings, the NCDS is to our knowledge, together with 
the CNSLY the only study which provides such a wealth of information. The limitations 
mentioned can be partly overcome by the use of advanced econometric techniques. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Grandfather's education 6487 4.08154 2.07616 1 12 
Grandmother's education 6487 3.99337 1.60905 1 12 
Mother's education 8889 4.30745 2.61720 1 32 
Father's education 8849 4.22409 2.80246 1 31 
Proportion of sample divorced 11372 .11501 .31905 0 1 
Log of 2000 CM income 7945 6.82521 .82935 .08 10.63 
Household size 11370 3.46763 1.33794 1 10 
CM's father died 11056 .41045 .49193 0 1 
CM's mother died 10969 .22098 .41493 0 1 
Partner's mother died 9135 .22900 .42021 0 1 
Partner's father died 9039 .40150 .49275 0 1 
Table 3.1: Full sample characteristics NCDS wave 6 
Comparing samples reveals that mean education is slightly lower for those parents 
In the selected sub-sample, Table 3.2, than for the full sample, Table 3.1. This is, 
interestingly, also observed in grandparents' education, which is lower for the subsample. 
In other aspects, the subsample and the full sample are surprisingly similar, especially 
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child's education 3918 5.07810 1.65710 1 17 
(censored and uncensored, first born) 
Sex of child 6107 .48911 .49992 0 1 
Grandfather's education 4391 3.70892 1.53229 1 11 
Grandmother's education 4467 3.71566 1.17598 1 11 
Mother's education 5769 3.85994 1.90211 1 19 
Father's education 5467 3.81690 2.20059 1 18 
Proportion of sample divorced 6103 .10732 .30955 0 1 
Log of 2000 CM income 4292 6.69396 .82998 1.46 10.59 
Household size 6103 3.93331 1.18702 1 10 
CM's father died 6019 .41020 .49191 0 1 
CM's mother died 6024 .22626 .41844 0 1 
Partner's mother died 5264 .24620 .42083 0 1 
Partner's father died 5242 .44029 .49646 0 1 
Table 3.2: The children of children sample 
Grandfather Grandmother Mother Father Son Daughter 
Grandfather 1 
(. ) 
1834 
Grandmother .377 1 
(.00) (. ) 
1823 1876 
Mother .134 .127 1 
(.00) (.00) (. ) 
1735 1775 2430 
Father .110 .148 .191 1 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (. ) 
1592 1629 2095 2225 
Son .037 .106 .123 .122 1 
(.34) (.00) (.00) (.00) (. ) 
631 638 834 776 871 
Daugther .007 -.007 .085 .146 1 
(.81) (.82) (.00) (.00) (. ) 
903 925 1184 1075 0 1248 
Table 3.3: Raw correlations of years of education, p-values in parenthesis 
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when it comes to income, divorce or the probability of one of the grandparents having 
died already. The subsample is only composed of the oldest children. There are many 
more variables that we could put up for comparison, but we focused on important 
variables that we will use in the models. 
Table 3.3 of raw correlations in years of education shows an interesting difference 
in the correlation between couples of parents (grandfather-grandmother /father-mother). 
This suggests that the process of finding a "matching" partner has perhaps changed over 
time. However, it seems that the raw correlations in education between the grandpar-
ents/parents and parents/children have not changed drastically. This would underline an 
argument of stable education transmission across generations. Thus older generations 
were not more closely tied to thei r ancestors. 
Interestingly, we observe an effect of grandparents on the grandchildren, although 
only for grandmothers on grandsons. This suggests a gender effect in the transmission 
mechanism. The effect of a grandmother on a grandson is relatively large and quite com-
parable to the effect of the father or the mother. This slightly contradicts the fact that 
generations have become more mobile. It seems that daughters receive comparatively 
more attention from fathers and are less tied to grandparents' education. 
Finally, in Figure 3.1 we plot the education distributions for all three generations 
in the data. It is immediately obvious that a large proportion of individuals leave school 
at the relevant minimum age (14/15 for some grandparents, 15/16 for parents and 
16 for children). One can also distinguish the impact of the reform for grandparents 
and partners, a large proportion of them leaving either at the old or the new minimum 
school leaving age. Conversely, most cohort members leave education at the minimum 
school leaving age 16, compulsory already for the 1958 cohort. We can also observe 
that partners' and cohort members' distributions (and to a small extent grandmothers' 
and grandfathers') exhibit a second hump at around 20 years. The absence of this slight 
bimodality in the education distribution of children underlines the fact of censoring: we 
do not observe highly educated children. Therefore we also estimate probit models of 
the staying-on decision, as explained in the text. 
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Figure 3.1: The education distributions for all three generations 
3.3.1 Some censored regression results 
We use here a censored regression model, assuming exogeneity of all the explanatory 
variables. While aware of potential endogeneity problems, it seems useful for us to 
examine such rich three-generational data in more detail in a first step. 
The censored regression results in Table 3.4 show some evidence, although marginal 
that grandparents' education matters. This is in line with the first summary table in the 
data description section, which indicated a positive effect. Noticeably, the coefficient 
on aggregated parents' education (2) and on mother's education (3) drops when intro-
ducing grandparents, which is indicative of an overestimated coefficient when omitting 
grandparents' characteristics. However, the coefficient on father's education rises, which 
in turn is indicative of a neglected correlation between the newly-introduced grandpar-
ent variables. One standard deviation of the ability factor raises child schooling by 0.27 
years, whereas one standard deviation of the social class factor lowers child education 
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by -0.09 years 3. The social class coefficient is only significant at the 10% level. 
In Table 3.5, we present some more detailed results. These will answer the question 
of what one can do with such detailed data as the NCDS provides, in addition to what one 
could do having only grandparents' education or even only two-generational data. We 
will show the results of some censored regression specifications which indicate significant 
grandparent effects. It is interesting to see through which channels such effects might 
operate. 
The interaction effects portray various channels of grandparental influence. The 
table illustrates the sequential way by which we proceeded. We estimated first a rich 
specification in column (1) for the oldest children. We then excluded non-significant 
variables for grandparents (2),(3). We widened the sample to all children (4)-(7). Also, 
in this sample of all children, we contrasted parents above and below the median income 
(6) and (7). 
Table 3.5 reveals a particular feature of these results: the coefficient on "Substan-
tial help of grandmother while child at school" is negative and significant in the first 
three columns of the eldest child sample, whereas the financial or other help variables 
never seem significant. Also the variable" grandparents gave childcare help" is positive 
and significant in the all children sample. The grandparent help variables might have 
a special meaning in this context, since this variable might well pick up the effect of 
resource-constrained families. This is confirmed in the the last two columns, where 
grandparent help effects disappear as soon as we consider incomes above the median. 
In general, grandparents' inheritances seem important for the wealthier sample, whereas 
having an educated grandmother moderates the negative effect in the lower-income 
group. The results are relatively robust, since we also include cohort member ability 
measures which should capture some of the unobserved heterogeneity. However, the 
variables "Substantial help of grandmother while child at school" and "inheritance" are 
not ideal, since they might select particular groups of grandparents. Notice as well that 
ability effects are absent for the lower-income subsample which suggests a non-linear 
effect of ability. 
3These factors are normalised and have variance 1. The effects of one standard deviation can thus 
be directly read from the coefficient estimates 
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The help variable is certainly the most salient, but also the most controversial. 
It would be interesting to assess the interplay of working mothers and helping grand-
mothers. If the mother works, so the hypothesis goes, the grandmother might help 
out more in the household and have more influence on grandchildren. It seems unlikely 
that the grandmother replaces the mother figure totally, but an increased grandmother 
influence on grandchildren is plausible in this setting. We have tried to assess the work 
substitution motive with NCDS data, including indicators of mother's work, but these 
were only sparsely available and never significant in the reduced sample sizes examined. 
With different data, however, these interaction effects would be very interesting to ex-
amine and might have consequences for childcare arrangements and, as seen here, for 
outcomes, Michael (2005). 
In Tables 3.6 and 3.7 we split the sample of the eldest children between boys and 
girls. In the previous Table 3.4 there seemed to be a sizeable difference between boys 
and girls in means, but in the Tables 3.6 and 3.7 we observe also an overall difference in 
coefficients. Grandparents' influence is not existent for girls, whereas the effect is very 
strong and nearly doubled in the case of boys compared to girls. The main effect seems 
to come from grandfathers' education. Parents' coefficients are significantly lower by the 
introduction of grandparents in the case of aggregate measures, but parents coefficients 
exhibit the same asymmetry as before (fathers' coefficient raises, mothers coefficient 
drops, except when excluding grandmothers). Grandfathers seem to be much more 
important than grandmothers and exert an influence comparable to parents in the case 
of boys. 
Finally, we introduce dummies for grandparents being alive at the time of the 
survey, called "CM's father alive" etc. for "cohort member's father alive". We do 
this only for the aggregated variables, since in the disaggregated ones, the sample sizes 
are too small to include the necessary cohort dummies. This results in some modified 
estimates summarized in Table 3.8. Looking at the first column, and thus at the joint 
sample of boys and girls, we can observe that the effect of having a grandfather or 
grandmother being alive measured by the dummy variables is positive, although only 
significant for cohort member's grandparents. However, when we examine the coefficient 
of the variable "Alive", taking the value one if all of the dummy variables indicate that 
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the grandparents are alive, we can observe a negative interaction effect of this variable 
with education. This means that being alive has a positive effect on the education of 
grandchildren, whereas the effect of education of grandparents is lower or very small 
if they are alive. The effect of grandparents being alive seems similar for girls and 
boys as far as the on-off effects of the dummy variables "(M's father alive" etc. is 
concerned. However, the effect of grandparents education is again stronger for boys, 
and the interaction effect with grandparents being alive is negative for boys and girls, 
but greater for girls. In the case of girls, this negative interaction between being alive 
and human capital is not compensated with a greater coefficient on human capital of 
the grandparents (HKGPAR). In order to control for potential non-randomness of death 
by grandparents we included new controls which proxy the behaviour of grandparents 
towards their health. For example, we included controls for grandparents being heavy 
smokers, which should correlate with mortality. This maintains the strong observed 
effects. Note that this effect seems to be a substitute for the" inheritance effect" , since 
including inheritance dummies now produces no significant effects. 
Thus, it seems presence is important, not only resources. It is nevertheless difficult 
to distinguish this from a strategic model, since grandparents could provide childcare as 
a resource to parents, or financial transfers other than bequests. 
After these censored regression results we have to address the problem of unob-
served variables. The coefficients on education and consequently on all the interactions 
with education might be severely biased due to unobserved heterogeneity. In general, as 
outlined in the literature section, researchers have thought about ability as an important 
omitted variable, but one can also think of parenting attitudes, parenting skills and other 
unobserved characteristics. These effects might additionally be hidden or enhanced by 
measurement error. 
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Dependent variable: Childs' education, first born 
(Years of schooling) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HKPARENTsa .396 .354 
(.04) (.05) 
HKGPAR .098 
(.05) 
Mother's education .429 .397 .373 
(.07) (.07) (.06) 
Father's education .129 .133 .161 
(.04) (.04) (.04) 
Grandmother's education .02 (.07) 
Grandfather's education .054 .092 (.05) (.04) 
Child female dummy .665 .662 .627 .655 .586 
(.10) (.10) (.13) (.13) (.13) 
Number of siblings -.222 -.046 -.273 -.192 -.032 
(.15) (.15) (.20) (.20) (.19) 
Number of siblings (parents) -.035 -.012 
(.02) (.03) 
Ability (factorb) .256 .264 .275 .258 .216 (.06) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.07) 
Socia I class (factorC ) -.092 -.125 
(.05) (.08) 
Constant 16.138 15.626 15.935 15.413 16.581 (.74) (.75) (.98) (1.02) (.396) 
N 1760 1685 1114 1089 1139 
Table 3.4: Censored regression results 
aHKPARENTS is equal to father's education-tmother's education and similarily HKGPAR is equal to 
grandfather's education~grandmother's education. See Section 3.4.1 for more details on the construction and 
reasoning behind these variables 
awe extracted a first principal component from test scores of the cohort member up to age 11, see 
Appendix for details. The social class factor has an inverse scale, higher values reflecting lower social 
class. 
CWe extracted a first principal component from all the social class indicators using the method of 
Tipping and Bishop (1999) to recover missing values, see Appendix for details 
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Dependent variable: child's education 
Oldest children only All childrena 
I ::; med(l) I > med(l) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
HKPARENTS .;n~ .:~~ J .:W9 .:nl .:WI .:Q9 .:174 (or. ) (0;.) (.0;. ) (.01 ) (.(H) ( .(7) (. OS) 
HKGPAR .O~ J .O;{(; -. J O~) .()7~ -.049 . om; -.wn 
(( Hi) (. or.) ( . OK) (.00,) (.07) ( .10) (.](J ) 
Child female dummy .(j7:~ .(j71 Jj7(j J;:~q .617 )nk .446 
(. 10) (. 10) ( . 10) (.OK) (.OK) (.1 1 ) ( .12) 
Number of siblings - .~1(j -.~1J .~1k -.~~)k -.302 -.:~Sk - .267 
(m) (.m) (.m) (OS) (OS) (. Ok) (. Ok) 
Birth order grandmother .()O~ .0007 .mn .00l .0] :~ - .007 .0:12 
( .0:2) ( .0:2) (.0:2) «(J 1 ) CO 1) (.02) (.02 ) 
Mother worked since child at school -.OS9 -.OSI -.W)() -.12~) -.IS7 -.IS7 -.111 
(.11 ) (.11 ) ( .ll) (.m)) ( .(8) (.12 ) (.13) 
Mother little interested in child's education -.19:3 - .21G -.202 -.172 -.1.55 -.097 -.206 
( .14) ( .14) (.Ifi) (.11 ) ( .11) ( .Hi) (.1fi) 
Grandparents any other help -.090 
(.43) 
Grandparents give financial help -.064 
(.43) 
Inheritance> £500 .328 \D ( .12) 
.....-t 
Inheritance information missing -.180 .....-t 
(.33) 
Grandparents' help intensity (derived) .024 
(.05) 
Substantial help of grandparents while child at school -.205 -.201 -.828 -.107 -.659 -.777 -.429 
(.10) (.10) ( .41) (.08) (.35) ( .50) ( .50) 
Grandparents gave childcare help .157 .208 .20 .296 .289 .306 .218 
( .14) (.13) ( .13) (.11) (.11 ) (.15) ( .16) 
Ability(factor) .210 .231 .212 .183 .162 .109 .205 
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.07) 
Social class (factor) -.108 -.100 -.091 -.077 -.071 -.126 -.022 
(.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.07) (.06) 
HKGAR X HELP .172 .151 .125 .142 
(.11) (.09) (.13) (.13) 
HKGPAR X INHERIT .092 .084 .045 .124 
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.03) 
Constant 16.79 16.768 17.286 16.458 16.94 16.665 17.381 
(.71) (.70) (.75) (.62) (.66) ( .81) (1.181) 
N 1707 1707 1707 2297 2297 1129 1168 
aThis means all children above sixteen years in the sample, there can be more than one child per family. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. Significance levels are +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * *p < 0.001. Additionally, we included variables 
measuring inter-sibling birth intervals, grandparents' cohort dummies. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering in the all 
children sample 
Table 3.5: Censored regression results and interactions 
Dependent variable: Childs' education (girls) 
HKPARENTS .385 .384 
(.08) (.08) 
HKGPAR 
-.01 
(.09) 
Mother's education 
.461 .506 .388 (.12) (.12) (.10) 
Father's education 
.12 .119 .171 (.06) (.06) (.06) 
Grandmother's education 
-.026 
(.10) 
Grandfather's education 
-.072 -.063 
(.08) (.07) 
Number of siblings -.474 -.395 -.789 -.711 -.579 
(.26) (.26) (.33) (.34) (.32) 
Ability(factor) .344 .345 .418 .407 .40 (.09) (.10) ( .13) (.13) (.12) 
Socia I class (factor) -.104 -.118 -.102 -.140 -.201 
(.09) (.09) (.15) (.15) (.14) 
Constant 18.067 16.787 18.545 18.056 18.147 (.62) (1.341) (.883) (.95) (.62) 
N 801 790 511 497 534 
Table 3.6: Censored regression results for girls only 
Dependent variable: Childs' education (boys) 
HKPARENTS .378 .337 
(.06) (.05) 
HKGPAR .224 
(.07) 
Mother's education .335 .244 .341 
(.08) (.08) (.08) 
Father's education .133 .144 .179 
(.05) (.05) (.05) 
Grandmother's education .094 (.09) 
Grandfather's education .21 .21 (.06) (.05) 
Number of siblings .05 .197 .183 .361 .263 
(.18) ( .19) (.24) (.24) (.24) 
Ability(factor) .182 .208 .193 .201 .121 (.07) (.07) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Socia I class (factor) -.064 -.074 -.089 -.082 -.174 
(.06) (.07) (.09) (.10) (.10) 
Constant 16.268 15.062 15.595 13.859 15.964 (.84) (.89) (1.00) (1.09) (.49) 
N 915 920 585 575 620 
Table 3.7: Censored regression results for boys only 
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Dependent variable: Childs' education 
Boys and girls Girls Boys 
HKPARENTS .369 .430 .325 
(.05) (.09) (.05) 
HKGPAR .176 .100 .272 
(.06) (.11) (.09) 
Alive x HKGPAR -.156 -.193 -.137 
(.05) (.09) (.07) 
CM's father alive .498 .545 .509 
( .19) (.33) (.24) 
CM's mother alive .337 .421 .268 
(.16) (.27) (.20) 
CM's partner's father alive -.108 -.134 -.087 
(.10) (.17) (.13) 
CM's partner's mother alive .092 .027 .188 
(.11) (.20) (.14) 
Child female .687 (.10) 
Number of siblings -.079 -.465 .221 
(.15) (.26) (.19) 
Ability (factor) .279 .359 .218 (.06) (.10) (.07) 
Social class (factor) -.098 -.157 -.047 
(.05) (.09) (.06) 
Constant 15.121 16.179 14.652 (.78) (1.3576) (.95) 
N 1643 771 872 
Table 3.8: Censored regression results for examining the influence of grandparents being 
alive 
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3.4 Identification strategy 
The identification strategy seeks to establish whether there exists a causal link between 
parents, grandparents and child education in a regression context. As outlined in the 
previous section, a researcher might suspect that some of the covariates might be en-
dogeneous, i.e. correlated with the unobserved components of this equation. Let the 
outcome of interest be denoted as E for education. Partition the set of covariates X 
into exogeneous components, X, and endogeneous components xe. Suppose that we 
dispose of instruments Z, correlated with the endogeneous regressors but not with the 
u nobserva bles. 
The model to be estimated is a reduced form equation for education in the spirit 
of Oreopoulos et al. (2006). The instruments used will be described below. We proceed 
initially as if we had only two-generational data. 
(3.1) 
Expressing the equation in the previous notation: 
(3.2) 
where EfH is child education, Er a matrix of mother's and father's education 
and these are the potentially endogeneous variables X e , Xi a matrix of other family 
characteristics. 
In general, estimation of an equation such as (3.2) presents several problems. 
First of all, as mentioned, education of the parent might be correlated with unobserved 
factors, contained in the error of the equation. Related to this, we might exclude from 
the education equation other important influence factors, such as income or family 
characteristics which are all summarized in the same error term. 
Supplementing the above equation with income variables requires the use of addi-
tional instrumental variables, which are not available for this dataset. We will therefore 
assume that education is a good proxy for other, favorable outcomes later in life, and 
thus we shall not need to account for income. Higher income can therefore be seen as 
another manifestation of (higher) education levels. 
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The data of the NCDS survey allows us to extend the above equation by includ-
ing the education of grandparents. Additionally, one can instrument both variables by 
available schooling reforms. As mentioned before, we have observations on schooling 
attainment of the child, of the cohort member (parent), and naturally on the cohort 
member's parents. Notice that this gives data on three generations, as the cohort mem-
ber's parents are two of the four possible grandparents to the cohort member's children. 
Thus the equation of interest becomes: 
(3.3) 
This makes estimation more complex, since we have in our data four possible 
education variables (mother's education, father's education, grandmothers' and grand-
fathers' education, Er, EYP) which are now in the matrix of endogeneous variables 
X e . As will be mentioned below, the NCDS data has very limited information on the 
partners' variables. Thus, a split in mothers and fathers is only feasible in a subsample 
of the NCDS, as we will explain below. 
This data, we feel, provides us with excellent instruments and therefore a great 
opportunity. The majority of these instrumental variables have the advantage that they 
can be seen as natural experiments. 
A school leaving age reform which affects grandmothers and grandfathers equally 
can be used to instrument for grandparents' education. This reform, the raising of 
the minimum school leaving age in 1947, was unanticipated, and lengthened schooling 
for one year for all pupils aged 14 or under. It provides the necessary exogeneous 
variation, since it is unrelated to ability or parenting skills. The law was well enforced, 
and implemented simultaneously within the UK. There is wide ranging evidence that 
the average years of schooling rose by up to 0.5 years comparing pre- and post reform 
cohorts, with the effects being permanent. 
At the parent generation level, another similar school leaving reform, the 1973 
raising of the minimum school leaving age. This affected the partners of the NCDS 
cohort members. The school leaving age reform implemented in 1973 is similar and had 
a comparable effect on the education NCDS cohort member's partners to that on the 
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grandparents, although the effect is somewhat lower. Some of these reforms have been 
successfully used by Chevalier et al. (2005) and Harmon and Walker (2000). 
Recall that the age of NCDS cohort members is constant within surveys, since 
they were born between March 3 and March 9 1958: thus, we will not be able to use 
this particular reform instrument for the cohort members. Partners' age however varies 
and we can thus use the 1973 reform to instrument partners' education. 
We present in Table 3.9 the proportion of partners subject to the reform by gender. 
One can observe that there are potentially more female than male partners who were 
affected by the reform. This is natural, since we observe that male cohort members tend 
to have rather younger partners. This means that female partners represent very little 
variation with respect to the reform since a majority of them has been subject to the 
reform and a minority has not been exposed to the reform. Thus the reform effect is 
not well identified for female partners. Since this is a potential problem of identification, 
in one sample4 we drop all male cohort members and retain only male partners (for 
which the reform is well identified). This also has the advantage that we can exploit the 
detailed information on the cohort member to attempt to identify mothers' effect.5 
Reform Male Partners Female Partners Total 
Subject to reform 
Not subject to reform 
ROSLA== 1 
ROSLA== 0 
803 
1,399 
1,203 
232 
Table 3.9: Partners by gender and reform impact 
2006 
1631 
We use birth order as the instrument for the NCDS cohort members. Clearly, a 
person's birth order should not be correlated with his or her unobserved or innate factors, 
since a childs' position in their family's birth order is an event of chance. Previous 
studies which examined birth order effects, Black et al. (2005) or used birth order as an 
instrument, Gary-Bobo et al. (2006), put forward certain criticisms as to the use of birth 
order as a valid instrument. For example, a higher birth order necessarily implies also a 
4Th is will be called sample 2 and will be described below 
5The remaining cohort members are mothers after dropping male cohort members and the associated 
female partners. Notice that we keep only stable unions and marriages in order not to co~found ~he 
effects of partner changes with the effect of interest. The effect of divorce would be another interesting 
question to examine 
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larger family. There is a sizeable literature on the (potentially negative) effects of family 
size on outcomes. We include a measure of mother's family size in all equations in order 
to avoid a confounding effect. Secondly, there might be cohort effects in education for 
the mother, and later-born mothers might be in different cohorts for educational reasons. 
In the NCDS, all mothers belong to the same cohort, and thus we cannot include cohort 
effects. A third criticism is that a researcher should also include mother's age at first 
birth, since the mothers of first-born children are likely to be younger than the mothers 
of later-born children. We respond to this criticism by including a proxy age at first 
birth, so that we can capture such differences in age at first birth 6 
Unfortunately, we cannot use the partner's birthorder or grandfather's birth order 
as instruments since they are not available in the data. The NCDS was first conceived 
as a one-shot peri-natal mortality survey (PMS) in 1958, and detailed information was 
collected on the mother (the granmother in our perspective) and on the child (the cohort 
member in our perspective). Information on the father (garndfather in our perspective) 
was collected sparsely through the mother in the PMS. Information on the partner was 
first collected in 1981, and is also very limited unfortunately. 
3.4.1 Implementation 
As mentioned before, the education variable is observed for cohort members and part-
ners, which does not correspond to the natural division into mothers and fathers. Our 
instruments need to be applied to partners and cohort members, and have less power to 
identify father's and mother's effects. This has essentially to do with the age structure 
of partners as will be shown below. We propose thus two strategies: 
1. Aggregate father's and mother's education into a single variable, called parental 
human capital (HKPARENTS). We have checked that the weight in parents' education 
does not influence the results significantly and we have thus allocated a weight of ~ to 
fathers and a weight of ~ to mothers education. This corresponds to a hypothesis of 
equal importance and estimate a modified version of (3.2) or (3.3). Previous studies 
such as Plug and Vijverberg (2005), Oreopoulos et al. (2006) and Duflo (2000) have 
6We regressed age on the number of children so as to obtain a proxy for age at first birth. Including 
this measure did not change the results for birth-order in any way 
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found mothers to be of greater importance than fathers. Thus one may think that this 
is also the case in this study. As we have no guidance how to aggregate the variables 
in a weighted way, we decided to adopt an agnostic point of view and allocated equal 
weights. The results are not very sensitive to the equal weights assumption, as can be 
seen further below in Figure 3.2. 
EfH = '"Yo + '"Yl HKPARENTS + AXi + Ei. (3.4) 
CH Ei = '"Yo + II HKPARENTS + '"Y2HKGPAR + AXi + Ei. (3.5) 
Aggregating allows us also to reduce measurement error in the education variable, 
and it ensures that the variable behaves similarly to a continuous variable. For grand-
parents, we make the same distinction, and if we estimated an aggregated model for 
the parents we used also the aggregated measure for the grandparents (HKGPAR). 
2. Drop all cohort members who are male, and estimate father's and mother's 
effects as implied by Equations (3.2) and (3.3). 
Note also that we are leaving out a grandparent couple, since we have only detailed 
information on the grandparents of the cohort member. Thus any effect found could well 
be larger or smaller, taking into account as well the influence of partners' grandparents. 
We use a large set of background controls, including grandparents' cohort effects, 
inter-sibling birth space indicators, survey year dummies and parent and child character-
istics. We do not use age of the children, since this is directly related to the censoring 
mechanism. A higher age implies a much higher probability of being censored and this 
might bias our results. For convenience we extract a single principal component from the 
test scores up to age eleven of the cohort member, so we can include a single measure 
which we coin" ability" in all equations. Clearly this measure might suffer from endo-
geneity bias and might be correlated to the control function we are trying to estimate 
and include in the regressions. However, when we exclude ability, the coefficients on the 
control function are larger and more precisely estimated as well as the effects on fathers 
education, but our main conclusions do not change significantly. See the Appendix of 
this chapter for more details. We also show there the same regressions including age 
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effects. There is also no significant change 
We propose then the following steps, which will appear below In the Results 
section. 
The aggregated human capital and mother's/father's human capital will be in-
strumented by the 1973 school leaving reform that affected the 1957 birth cohort in the 
UK, and mothers birth order. We try also a wider definition of the reform (dummies for 
years around the date) and the presence of older male siblings as additional instruments. 
To implement these instrumental variable techniques in a censored variables context, we 
will estimate a first stage equation of the following type: 
HKPARENTS i = ex + PI ROSLA73 + P2 BIRTH ORDER + AXi + 'f]i. (3.6) 
As explained above, HKPARENTS denotes parents' combined stock of education. 
ROSLA73 is a dummy variable taking value one if the individual was subject to 
the raising of the school minimum leaving age. BIRTH ORDER reflects the birth order 
position of the mother. We construct the control functions from these first stage regres-
sions. We compute the standardized residuals as described in the two-step methodology 
in the next subsection. 
For grandparents, we estimate a similar first stage equation, and construct control 
functions analogously. For example, for grandfathers we would estimate 
EPF = ex + 'l/JI ROSLA47F + AXi + 'f]i· (3.7) 
Here ROSLA47F is a dummy variable taking the value one if the grandfather had 
been subject to the raising of the minimum school leaving age in 1947 (analogously 
ROSLA45M and grandmother's birth-order as an additional instrument for grandmoth-
ers). 
Introducing control functions for parents and grandparents into equation (3.5) 
allows us then to control for endogeneity of parent's and grandparent's education. This 
three-generational approach to education transmission is new and allows us for the first 
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time to disentangle causal effects outside a two-generation framework. 
The proposed steps of estimation are detailed in Table 6 in the Results section. 
We test the validity of all instruments and first stage equations following the 
methodology discussed in Murray (2005). We assess the explanatory power using a 
Stock-Yogo test. Additionally, we can also estimate a two-generational transmission 
model using grandparents and parents only, and test the overidentifying restrictions 
implied by having one additional instrument for the grandmother7 . We also present 
various robustness checks in the last section which reinforce the confidence in the stability 
of the obtained results. 
3.4.2 A censored normal regression model with endogeneous variables 
using control functions 
In the NCDS, child education is not fully observed, but is censored for some children 
as they had not yet completed their education at the time of the survey. Thus we 
need to develop a framework in which to analyse this censoring (which can be seen as 
a so-called top-coding problem), and incorporate endogeneity concerns regarding the 
education transmission. We cannot use the OLS Instrumental variable estimator since it 
would not be able to account for censoring. Another intuitive approach is to model the 
unobservables directly and include them as an explanatory variable in the equation. This 
is the method of control functions. The method of control functions has the advantage 
that the reasoning can be applied similarly to the semi-parametric case. 
Denote the outcome of interest as y. Suppose 
y* 'Yo + AX + U, 
xe IIZ+v. 
Suppose observations are censored at a threshold Ci, different for each individual. 
Thus 
71n this case grandmother's birth-order and the ROSLA-schooling reform affecting grandmothers 
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y y* if y* < Ci, 
Y Ci otherwise. 
A convenient assumption is to give u and v a joint normal distribution. This will 
be used for para metric identification. The error terms (u, v) are distributed bivariate 
normal with mean 0 and variance-covariance matrix ~, in which element ~11 is given 
by O"uu and element ~12 is given by O"uv etc. Let {3 = ("Y1, A) in the case of a two 
generationa I tra nsm ission model. 
Then we can write the conditional expectation of y* as 
E(y* I X, Z) = "Yo + {3X + E(u I X, Z). 
by the independence of u and X given v, the key assumption of all control function 
methods. 
E(y* I X, Z) = "Yo + {3X + E(u I v, Z). 
Similarly, the variance is given by 
V(y* I X, z) = V(y* I v, Z). 
Then 
O"uv 
E(u I v,Z) = -2 V. 
O"V 
which follows from simple OLS considerations. This can be decomposed as 
O"uv O"u 
=---v. 
(Jv(Ju O"v 
and we can define 
Then 
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Thus y* I X, Z is normally distributed with mean 
10 + f3X + p (Ju v , 
(Jv 
and variance as above. 
3.4.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
We can express the conditional density of the model as a product of two densities 
changing the conditioning set. 
f(Y, X I Z) = f(Y I X, Z)f(X I Z). 
Take logarithms of this expression 
log f(Y, X I Z) = log(f(Y I X, Z)) + log(f(X I Z)). 
We can motivate this formula in three parts as follows. The variable di is the 
censoring indicator, di = l(y* < Ci). The first part of the likelihood represents the 
contribution of the uncensored observations. They contribute with a standard normal 
density, augmented by a control function element Vi. The second part is the contribution 
of the censored observations, modeled as the probability complement of the normal 
distribution. This relates to the feature of our data that we observe children reaching 
"at least" this level of education. The third term models the error distribution, depending 
on the estimated covariates, or can also be seen as the usual first stage regression, where 
v = X e - II'Z 
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3.4.4 A two-step approach 
First we estimate a model of the reduced form. This can be done via simple OLS to 
obtain: 
• STEP 1 
xe = II'Z + v. 
and recover IT and ;~. 
Then calculate 
i) = X e - ITZ, 
and the standardised error, where 
A 
V 
E = -A. (Jl' 
• STEP 2 
Do Tobit (or censored regression) for Y on a constant, X and E. This way we 
obtain consistent estimates of i'o, (3 and i = peru 
From there we can identify and calculate 
Now we can recover the original parameters of the model. We know that the 
variance we have calculated here is 
V(u I v, Z) = (J~(1 - p2), 
ca II it 
Then after some manipulation and using the fact that 
we can recover 
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then we can calculate 
3.4.5 Censored regression quantiles with endogeneous regressors 
Another approach to deal with endogeneity in the presence of censored observations 
would be the method proposed by Blundell and Powell (2004). The authors extend 
ideas proposed by Chen and Khan (2001) to the case where the first-stage control 
functions are explicitly estimated. Other related models are the ones of Das et al. 
(2003), Powell and Honore (2005) and an appealing approach of Chernozhoukov and 
Hong (2002). These methods leave the error distribution unspecified and can thus be 
seen as semi-parametric or non-parametric methods. 
The identification of endogeneous regressors stems from a distributional exclusion 
restriction on the unobservable errors. One could refer to this as a quantile variant of the 
control function approach. Blundell and Powell (2004) propose a two-step approach. 
In a first stage, the control variable is estimated non-parametrically, as well as the 
conditional quantiles, given regressors and control functions. In a second stage the 
(weighted) difference between the estimated quantiles is calculated, with weights being 
non-zero only if (i) both estimated quantiles are below the censoring threshold Ci and (ii) 
the difference in control variables of any pair of observations is small. Thus, intuitively, 
we take differences of the estimated quantiles of two individuals who have the same or 
at least similar unobservables. An intuitive comparison would be a classical matching 
estimator and here we would match on the estimated unobservables. More formally (see 
Blundell and Powell (2004)), assume our model is 
Suppose now that, as before, some regressors are endogeneous, named xi and we have 
instruments for these, Zi. The x e are generated by the reduced form 
The function 7r is some possibly non-parametric function of the instruments. A 
129 
condition implied by the usual independence assumption of 71, v is the distributional 
exclusion restriction, which can be formulated as a quantile restriction. All conditional 
quantiles of the error distribution Ei, given Xi, Zi, are functions only of the control 
variable L'i. This approach does not impose any distribution on the error terms, but it is 
also somehow restrictive since the conditions below must hold for every quantile of the 
distribution. Thus 
w.p.l. 
where the Qo lUi I Xi, zd is the a conditional quantile of 71i, given Xi and Zi, and under 
the restriction above it can be shown that 
qi Qo [Yi I xi,zd, 
Qo [min{ x~,8o + Ei, cd I Xi, ZiJ ' 
min{x~,Bo + Qo [Ei I Xi, Zi]}, 
min{x~,Bo + Ao(Vi)}· 
where the term Ao:(Vi) represents the control function. 
Now we estimate these conditional quantiles and construct differences in observa-
tions of individuals with identical control variables. This will difference out the control 
function. Suppose 
and 
then it follows that 
which indentifies ,Bo· 
According to Blundell and Powell (2004), the control function is to be estimated 
by non-parametric methods, either kernel or local polynomial regression, to guarantee the 
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desired asymptotic behaviour of the estimator. We fit a local-linear estimator by using 
the lodit package, developed by Loader (1997) in R (2005). Usually, the method uses 
a backfitting algorithm to determine a suitable first-step bandwidth. We, however, use 
only bandwidths falling into the theoretically prespecified bands, since (i) the estimator 
is sensitive to the choice of bandwidth and (ii) the generalised cross-validation criterion 
leads to a different bandwidth from the prespecified, theoretical one. After having 
estimated the error distribution we then compare the estimated quantiles for those 
individuals with similar control functions in the spirit of Blundell and Powell (2004): 
that is constructing the weighed least squares estimator 
G= 
Kv is a kernel function that ensures that our estimates of the control functions of 
the two individuals are close, hn is a sequence of scalar bandwidth terms which tend to 
zero at an appropriate rate with the sample size and fi is a trimming term that cuts off 
observations unless the estimated quantiles are positive and the Vi fall in a compact set 
S. Note that we can take only the sum over observations i < j, otherwise the resulting 
matrix would be singular. Note as well the asymmetric way in which (compared to a 
standard GLS estimator) the weights enter this estimator. 
This method is computationally more demanding, but the main advantage remains 
that it does not assume any particular error distribution. 
3.5 Results 
As the data structure of three generations is very challenging, we will extend the model 
step by step. We outline two generational results first and present thereafter three 
generational results. We will then try to assess to what extent the transmission process 
between generations is non-linear in the observables and unobservables 8. Finally we 
8Additional probit results on staying on in school can be found in the Appendix 
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Samples used 
Sample 1 Sample 2 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Estimation framework 
used 
Censored regression Iva 
Probit IV 
Clustered Probit IV 
Censored regression IV 
Censored regression IV 
How to treat 
grandparents' variables? 
no grandparent education 
variables 
grandparents exogeneous 
grandparents endogeneous 
Table 3.10: Details of the estimated models 
alnstrumental variables 
are going to relax the bivariate joint normality assumption and we will implement for 
the first time a distribution-free approach to the censored regression context under 
endogeneity. We will argue all through the results section that the estimated effects 
reveal that the previously presented censored regression transmission coefficients can be 
seen as upper bounds. We argue as well that parametric and non-parametric approaches 
provide complementary information. 
Throughout the Results section we will be using two samples. Sample 1 uses an 
aggregate measure of human capital of the parents and also an aggregated measure 
of the human capital of grandparents. Sample 2 drops all mothers who are not cohort 
members. This avoids any identification problem which might arise because instruments 
apply to the cohort members and partners seperately, which is not equivalent to the split 
between mothers and fathers. This sample 2 allows us to present effects for mothers 
and fathers separately. 
We introduce control function estimates into censored regressions to control for 
endogeneity. The way of proceeding is illustrated in Table 3.10. We compare the IV 
results with the previously obtained censored regression results. 
After having examined these results, we show then that the estimated control 
functions are likely to violate the normality assumption. Therefore we estimate a non-
parametric quantile regression model to account for this. 
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3.5.1 First step: Estimating the control functions 
Table 3.11 presents the estimated control functions. These are equivalent to the tradi-
tional first-stage estimates of an IV model. We opted for parametric first stage regression 
to establish the parametric model as a benchmark case. 
Dependent variables in parametric control functions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HKPARENTS Mother's Father's HKPARENTS Mother's 
education education education 
Mother' 5 position birthorder -.051 -.073 -.031 -.057 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Affected by 1973 reform .237 .412 .201 
(.05) (.09) (.05) 
Number of siblings -.133 -.113 -.150 -.044 -.006 
(.08) (.09) (.14) (.09) (.10) 
Ability (factor) .393 .438 .455 .319 .373 
(.02) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.03) 
Number of siblings (parents) .014 .032 .023 
(.01) (.02) (.02) 
Child female dummy -.012 .064 .096 -.029 .014 
(.05) (.06) (.09) (.05) (.06) 
Joint grandparents' human capital .355 (.03) 
Grandmother's education .248 (.03) 
Grandfather's education .129 (.03) 
Constant 3.225 3.795 2.579 -2.159 -2.049 (.38) (.42) (.72) (.66) (.76) 
R-squared .11 .11 .07 .16 .18 
N 2348 1790 1509 1836 1394 
F-test on IV's 12.56 I 17.19 6.43 I 7.22 I 5.75 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.0166) 
Table 3.11: First stage estimation for parents' endogeneous variables to construct the 
control functions 
When reading this table, remember from Table 3.10 that we used aggregated 
human capital of the parents (HKPARENTS) and separate variables (Mothers/Fathers). 
The first three columns report the estimates excluding grandparents. The last three 
columns include grandparents as exogeneous variables. 
We aggregated the parents' variables, giving equal weight to mother's education 
and to father's. A priori, and as outlined in the Implementation section, there is reason 
to believe that mother's weight might be higher, but the results are robust even if we 
vary the father's weight, see Figure 3.2. There are various reasons why one can argue 
for and against aggregating or separating parent's education variables. An argument 
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(6) 
Father's 
education 
.356 
(.11) 
.003 
(.17) 
.356 
(.06) 
.087 
(.11) 
.218 
(.05) 
.203 
(.05) 
-4.009 
(1.254) 
.11 
1177 
9.83 
(0.002) 
for aggregating is that the aggregated variables provide a more continuous measure of 
education than the single measures. Also, they might reduce measurement error by 
averaging. In contrast, it seems interesting to be able to isolate mothers' and fathers' 
effects. 
The control function estimations indicate that we have good instruments. The 
F-test on the instruments is given in the last line of the table. These all are well above 
the Stock-Yogo critical values (which in this case boils down to a simple F-test) for 
all sets of variables, and we can thus reject the hypothesis of weak instruments for all, 
Murray (2005). However, when grandparents enter the first stages, the F-values weaken 
slightly. We obtain reasonable values of R-squared, explaining some of the variation in 
the endogeneous variables. Having been subject to the raising of the minimum school 
leaving age raises schooling by 0.20 to 0.4 years, whereas each step up in mother's birth 
order lowers schooling by -0.07 to -0.10 years of education. Note that we need to double 
the coefficients of birth order to calculate the effect on education since the variable 
HKPARENTS was aggregated from mother's and father's education with a weight of 
! respectively. The two coefficients are highly significant in all specifications, except in 
(4) where identification might be threatened. Note that the coefficient on ability falls, 
once we control for grandparents' education in these control function estimates. 9 
In Table 3.12, we present the estimated control functions for grandparents. We 
used the two aforementioned schooling reforms as well as grandmother's birth order. 
Note that this is an overidentified equation, a fact we will use later to conduct a robust-
ness check. 
As one can see from the table, the effects of the reform are statistically and 
economically significant, raising schooling between 0.2-0.6 years on average in the reform 
group. Especially for grandmothers, the effect is large, visible in the aggregate and the 
separate equations. Grandmothers gain on average more than half a year of schooling. 
This seems to be a substantial effect, whereas grandfathers seem to gain only 0.4 years. 
This is still above the effect for parents, the reform thus having a larger impact on 
the grandparent generation than on the parents' generation. We can again statistically 
9The estimation was also done without the ability component, which induces a more precisely esti-
mated control function part. Results can be obtained from the author 
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Dependent variables of 
grandparents' parametric control functions 
(1) (2) (3) 
Aggregated GP Grandfather's Grandmother's 
educationa education education 
(HKGPAR) (FEDUC) (MEDUC) 
Grandfather subject to 1947 reform .175 .431 
(.07) (.09) 
Grandmother subject to 1947 reform .30 .620 
(.06) (.07) 
Birth order grandmother -.049 -.067 
(.008) (.009) 
Number of siblings -.078 -.087 -.054 
(.07) (.06) (.069) 
Ability (factor) .20 .216 .20 
(.02) (.02) (.02) 
Number of siblings (parents) -.015 -.038 -.017 
(.01) (.01) (.01) 
Child female dummy .018 -.031 .046 (.03) (.04) (.04) 
Constant 15.626 15.68 15.557 (.25) (.33) (.29) 
(.2544) (.33582) (.29214) 
R-squared .12 .07 .15 
N 2150 2298 2199 
F-test on IV's 24.18 81.86 67.91 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
aThese equations include cohort and inter-siblings birth space indicators. 
Table 3.12: First stage estimation for grandparents' endogeneous variables to construct 
the control functions 
reject the hypothesis of weak instruments. 
3.5.2 Results for the parametric models 
In Table 3.13, we present the results of the second stage estimation for all models as if 
we did not have information on the grandparents. This amounts to saying that we treat 
the problem of endogeneous education transmission in this table as a two-generational 
transmission. This has been the standard approach in the literature, which we now try 
to extend. 
One can notice that the assumption of an endogeneous effect of parents seems 
to yield negative point estimates for parent's effects in the aggregated measures. These 
are imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant. In the separate sample, the 
effect of mothers is lower than censored regression and positive, whereas father's effect 
is negative and marginally significant. Thus, these results relate to the twin literature, 
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), where mother's coefficients turned out negative. Here 
we find that fathers have a negative effect - an awkward finding and difficult to reconcile 
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with economic theory. This casts the first shadow of doubt on identification and thus 
one cannot pretend to have isolated causal effects. It also points out another potential 
issue of this analysis: measurement error in the dependent variable. We refine our 
instrumental variable by having a larger effect around the reform date and also by 
including an additional potential instrument, in this case if the mother had any older 
brother. The results for this specification are given in the last two columns. The 
coefficients change little, although mothers coefficient drops slightly. 
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I--' 
W 
........ 
Parents' joint human capital 
Mother's education 
Father's education 
Number of siblings 
Ability( factor) 
Number of siblings (parents) 
Child female dummy 
Control fu nction (aggregated) 
Control function mother 
Control function father 
(extended IV set) 
Control function mother 
(extended IV set) 
Control function father 
Constant 
N 
Dependent variable: child's education 
Censored reg. IV Censored reg. IV Censored reg. 
(control function) (control function) 
.,uG -.·l(il 
(.04 ) (.:1,» 
.:W1 ./170 ./JO~ 
(.07) ( 7H) ( .07) 
.IH9 -.559 .1 HH 
( .(11) (:l1) ( .0-1) 
-.IIS -.riG9 -.574 -.707 -.5fi5 
( .14) (.14) ( .18) (.21) ( . Iii) 
.239 .591 .261 .560 .261 
(.05) ( .14) (.07) (.37) (.07) 
-.mR -.051 -.034 -.018 -.029 
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
.617 .607 .619 .696 .635 
(.09) (.O'J) (.12) (.14) ( .12) 
1.149 
(.45) 
-.11 
( 1.03) 
1.372 
( .578) 
16.407 19.347 16.533 18.358 ]6.487 
(.67) (1.338) (. <J 1) (3.07) (.91) 
(.67111) (1.3383) (.91829) (3.0703) (.91602) 
2182 2182 1328 1328 1325 
Table 3.13: Second stage for the censored normal regression model 
IV 
(control function) 
.T,n 
(.G4) 
-.ti4 
(.30) 
-.Tn 
( .20) 
.fir; 7 
( .31) 
-.013 
(.03) 
.733 
(.14) 
.093 
(.84) 
1.5223 
(.55) 
19.126 
(2.621) 
(2.6214) 
1325 
Dependent variable: parents' education 
OLS IV OLS IV 
Grandparents' joint education (HKGPAR) 
.356 -.40 
Grandfather's education 
(.03) (.25) 
.142 
-.026 (.02) (.24) 
Grandmother's education 
.190 -.191 
(.03) (.14) 
Ability (factor) 
.412 .513 .324 .480 (.03) (.06) (.03) (.06) 
Cohort member female 
-.108 -.148 
-.164 (.06) (.06) (.07) 
~ Siblings parents 
-.015 -.013 
-.008 -.008 (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
~ Siblings (grandmother) 
-.006 -.039 
-.012 -.051 
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.02) 
Constant 11.287 19.905 -2.550 9.392 (.65) ( 4.34) (.66) (3.98) 
R-squared 
.14 .04 .11 .05 
N 2142 2117 1875 1851 
F-test (IV first stage) separate aggregated 
measures measures 
ROSLA Father 25.01 
ROSLA Mother, Birthorder 38.13 
ROSLA Father,Birthorder,ROSLA Mother 14.25 
Overidentifiaction 
Sargan (SR2) 0.479 X2 (1) 0.953 X2(1) 
p= 0.488 P = 0.328 
Table 3.14: Grandparents two-generational effect on parents 
In general, father's unobservables enter the equation significantly. One can only 
speculate that this might reflect the missing proxy for ability. For mothers, we have 
included the ability factor, whereas for fathers (as partners) there is not such a measure 
in the data. The effect on fathers is relatively independent of the weight attached to 
father's education in the "joint human capital" variable as the next figure illustrates. 
However Figure (3.2) illustrates that the unobservable effect comes exclusively from the 
father. As the weight on the father becomes lower, at about < 0.2 the control function 
is imprecisely estimated. 
We repeat now the steps above for the pair grandparents-parents (two-generational). 
As we can use grandmother's birthorder as an additional instrument, we can test the 
overidentifying restrictions implied by having more instruments than endogeneous vari-
ables 10. As can be seen, the results for the pair grandparents-parents are very similar 
to the pair parents-children. 
lOWe correct STATA's output slightly, since STATA erroneously assumes that the aggregated variable 
H KGPAR is only one variable. However, we need two instruments to identify the effects and thus the 
correct degrees of freedom for the Chi-square test is always 1 (more restrictive) 
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Figure 3.2: Estimates of the control function varying fathers' weight 
The grandparents-parents generation equation might be less prone to measure-
ment error, since we observe people who have already completed their education. This 
test is thus useful not only to assess the instruments but also to establish that the results 
are most likely not due to measurement error and/or censoring. 
In summary, the censored regression estimates appear to be an upper bound on the 
true coefficients in the two cases presented. This result would be compatible with related 
work by Dearden et al. (1997) which assumed such a relationship. Unobserved factors 
as measured in the control function are significantly and positively related to outcomes. 
This would not be obvious in the standard IV model, since we would not estimate these 
control function components. However, these control functions do not tell us much 
about unobserved heterogeneity except for a summary measure of relatedness. We have 
to assume that there is a whole vector of unobserved characteristics subsumed into 
the univariate error. Thus, it seems that only on average are unobserved characteristics 
positively and significantly influencing outcomes. As far as the results compare to similar 
studies, Oreopoulos et al. (2006) came to a different conclusion, as they find that the 
OLS coefficients on an equation relating parental education to a child's grade progression 
are underestimates for the true transmission coefficients. In our data, two potential 
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explanations exist why our effects are different. First of all we select a particular sample 
of children and parents, since our observations are still censored. Thus we also implicitly 
select only a subgroup of grandparents. Thus our estimates apply only to a subgroup of 
families who had children early and are relatively uneducated. Thus, we would expect 
our results to be different. Still, the results are in line with those of Black et al. (2003), 
who also find overestimated coefficients in their administrative and representative data. 
A second explanation of finding negative and sometimes insignificant results could be the 
parametric specification and in some cases the heavy censoring of the outcome variable. 
If we compare coefficients in the censored regressions with what other researchers have 
found in non-censored samples, we realise that our coefficients indicate large effects. 
Therefore, we should favour the results of the censored quantile regression estimator, 
which indicates small but positive transmission coefficients, in accordance with much of 
the twin and adoptees literature,Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Plug and Vijverberg 
(2005) . 
3.5.3 Censored regression results introducing grandparents 
As shown in Table 3.10, a first step is to construct a model into which grandparents 
enter exogeneously. As explained in the literature section, this has been the cornerstone 
of some identification work which even used grandparents as an instrument for parents, 
assuming that they were not related to the child's generation. The second step is then 
to instrument for grandparents using the outlined IV strategy. 
Table 3.15 summarizes all the results obtained for this proceedure. The table 
might be difficult to read, but we have presented the aggregated results (grandpar-
ents' and parents' education in two variables called HKPARENTS and HKGPAR in 
Columns (1) and (2)) and then separated out the effects by mother/father and grand-
mother/grandfather in columns (3) and (4). The results document some effect of grand-
parents' education, as already seen in the OLS results. However, using grandparents 
in this estimation changes mother's coefficients drastically and makes the coefficients 
remain at the same level approximately as in the censored regression model without 
considering endogeneity. This is rather worrying, since it would cast doubt on the pre-
vious results which seemed to suggest that OLS estimates are upper bounds. However, 
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the coefficient on mother's education is never statistically different from zero. We ob-
serve consistently that the strong correlation with ability disappears after instrumenting 
mother's education and this could well be picked up by the education coefficient. Oth-
erwise, we see again fathers' coefficients negative and significant in some IV results 
(grandparents exogeneous), but fathers' unobservables entering significantly positively 
in all IV specifications 
In the aggregated grandparents' control funtion, we observe that grandparents 
unobservables enter significantly and with a large coefficient into the transmission equa-
tion. This would tell the same story as the previous two-generational results, but now 
having grandparents is the important contributor in terms of unobservables. In the 
disaggregated results, we can see that grandfather's control function is marginally sig-
nificant. 
How can we reconcile these findings? It seems extremely difficult to estimate the 
education transmission effect with precision, since the process carries a great deal of 
noise. Our moderate sample sizes do not allow us to improve on this. 
All results, whether three or two generational, point however to no statistically 
significant effect for parents' or grandparents' education, but a large effect of unob-
servables. All comparisons between censored regression and IV estimates seem to point 
to an upper bound argument. Consistently, we seem to find a large effect of father's 
control function on outcomes. 
The Appendix reports estimates for repeating the above setup for two and three 
generations, using probit specifications. These probit specifications measure the effect of 
parents' characteristics on the "staying on decision" of children, by which we mean the 
decision to stay on in education after the minimum legal age. The effects of education 
are weaker in these specifications, but the unobservables turn out nevertheless again 
important on the fathers' side. We will now turn briefly to the full MLE model, since 
this is the most efficient (parametric) estimation method. 
3.5.4 Results from full Maximum Likelihood estimation 
This short section presents the results of implementing the full maximum likelihood, 
Table 3.16. The main advantage of this method is the simultaneous estimation of all 
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equations and the more precise estimation of the control function parts in the regression. 
The MLE results confirm the previously established censored OLS results, only 
that the unobservable components are more precisely estimated, as well as the effect of 
education of grandparents and parents appears to have fewer negative point estimates. 
In addition, we notice that the first stage regressions are less precisely estimated in this 
simultaneous set-up. The fact of negative point estimates here and earlier leads us to 
consider that the parametric approach might be partially invalid due to the restrictive 
distributional assumptions. It is therefore reasonable to examine also the results of the 
non-parametric approach detailed below. 
3.5.5 Results for the censored quantile regression model 
Figure 3.3 depicts why the censored quantile regression model might be a preferred 
model. The parametrically estimated control functions seem not to satisfy the normal-
ity assumption. We plot here the estimated density of the control function from the 
aggregated parental education variable (residuals from a regression of HKPARENTS on 
instruments and controls) 
We have tried only two specifications relating to the censored regression results: 
using aggregate parents and grandparents, and controlling for their endogeneity. The 
method is computationally intensive, especially for the construction of artificially differ-
enced datasets of size N = ~(n - 1). 
Table 3.17 presents the results assuming parents' education is endogeneous and 
Table 3.18 presents the results assuming parents' and grandparents' education are en-
dogeneous. 
Note that the results are sensitive to the bandwidth used. The first step bandwidth 
was not chosen by minimising a generalised criterion (see Appendix) since this led to 
a relatively large bandwidth (2.2), having a window width including about 23% of the 
sample at each point. We relied on the theoretical ranges derived by Blundell and 
Powell (2004). The choice of both first step and second step bandwidths influences the 
coefficients and this is certainly a drawback of this estimator: the results are specific 
to these bandwidth choices. To illustrate the sensitivity of the results, consider Table 
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Estimated control function VS. normal distribution 
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Figure 3.3: The estimated control function and the normal distribution of the same 
variance 
3.17. Here we varied the first and second step bandwidth. One can see that coefficients 
are relatively stable, but standard errors are estimated less and less precisely, from 
column (1) to column (4), and again from (5) to (7). This suggests that precision is 
decreasing with decreasing bandwidths. On the other hand, it seems that precision can 
be artificially increased by increasing the bandwidth. A t-ratio on the female dummy 
of about 21 seems unacceptable in column (I), for example. Increasing the bandwidth 
includes more observations in the final sample and lowers thus the estimated sample 
variance. As a guide to which bandwidth might be appropriate (given that it does not 
affect the estimated coefficients as much as the first step bandwidth) we calibrate it in 
such way that the standard errors are about the size of the M LE estimated standard 
errors. This would imply hn = 0.001. 
The first impression is that, although imprecisely estimated, the effect of parents' 
human capital on the median is much lower than the effect in the censored OLS case. It 
is however positive and above the parametric IV results. It is also in line with estimates 
of the twins' literature of 0.05-0.10. As we calibrated the standard errors to match the 
MLE performance in column 6 for example, we can also note that the coefficients on 
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HKPARENTS is not more precisely estimated as under the MLE approach and that the 
variance ratios among the coefficients are the same as in the MLE estimation. However, 
as mentionned, we always obtain positive and small point estimates. 
Including now the grandparents as an additional endogeneous variable lowers the 
parents coefficient slightly, but we still have a small positive parents' coefficient. The 
grandparents' coefficient on the other hand becomes slightly negative. This is consis-
tent with a story of indirect influence through the education variable but direct influence 
through unobserved factors (compared to the censored regression case, where grandpar-
ents point estimate on education was negative, but their unobservables were positively 
related to grandchildrens' education). 
The quantile estimator concludes the results section. The interested reader is 
referred to the Appendix, where additional probit results and some explanations of 
the methods used are available. In the next section we explore the robustness of the 
estimates, establishing various categories of potential worries, which are formulated as 
questions. 
3.6 Alternative estimation method and sensitivity checks 
Is censoring an important issue in the data? Accounting for censoring is cru-
cial, since Table 3.19 shows that ignoring censoring would yield much lower coefficient 
estimates. The results indicate that estimated coefficients are all very different in magni-
tude, especially the coefficient relating to human capital of parents. In the pure censored 
regression model, without censoring, this coefficient appears about four times smaller 
than in the censored case. Note that the number of siblings measure even turns from 
a positive effect into a negative one. The signs of the other estimated coefficients are 
mostly in line with the signs of the censored regression model and have, as expected, 
smaller magnitudes. 
Do the results vary with the set of instruments used? We do not have credible 
additional instruments to test the parents' first stages. Interestingly, we can test an 
over-identification restriction in the two-generational setting of grandparents' effects on 
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parents. For grandparents, we have the reform dummies but we can also use grand-
mother's birth-order. This gives an over-identified grandmother and joint human capital 
equation. The acceptance of the test increases confidence in the validity of the IV 
results. 
Do the instruments have explanatory power? Simple F-testing of the first stage 
equations for one endogeneous variable reveals that we reject the null hypothesis of weak 
instruments with a comfortable margin. The critical values for the so-called Stock-Yogo 
test Murray (2005) are the simple F-test, since we have only one troublesome variable 
in the model with an aggregated parents measure. The test statistic is a modified F-test 
when we use another endogeneous variable or more of them. We are able to reject the 
null hypothesis for these since the values of the test are slightly lower than the F-test in 
the case of two endogeneous variables. 
In the case grandparents are introduced as exogeneous variables, we reject easily 
the hypothesis that grandparents' instruments are weak, and parents' instruments pass 
the test with a smaller margin (simple F-test) 
All first stage equations have the expected signs and also generate sufficient iden-
tifying variation. The control functions are not estimated with great precision, but the 
control functions of the father indicate that unobservables enter significantly into the 
equation. Although we are not primarily interested in these results, the t-test on the co-
efficient of the control function could be interpreted as a test of exogeneity, Wooldridge 
(2002), which we cannot reject in all cases. This confirms the view that the education 
transmission mechanism does suffer (at least in this data context) from bias through 
endogeneity. 
Are the instruments valid? The validity of the reform instruments seems hardly 
contestable since the reforms were truly unanticipated and implemented across the UK. 
These instruments are natural or quasi-natural experiments, which enables us to believe 
in their orthogonality. The grandparents' instruments were used by previous studies and 
appropriate checks to their relevance as well as validity precede this study. Nevertheless, 
we should perhaps examine some features of the reform at greater depth. 
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The instrument of grandparents selects grandparents less than or equal to 24 years 
of age, since these were subject to the 1947 reform. Mothers below and mothers above 
24 years might be different in observed and unobserved characteristics. Therefore we 
will check what one could call, in reference to the treatment effect literature, "Covariate 
balance". We will run a simple probit model on the reform dummy to see if there are 
any statistically and economically significant differences for (grand-) mothers subject to 
the 1947 reform or those who have not been affected by the reform, (Table 3.20). 
As one can see, most of the significant differences can be attributed to cohort ef-
fects. The only significant variable is grandmothers weight. But the effects are negligibly 
small, compared to the effect of the (grandfather's) cohort dummies on these variables. 
Note the increase in R-squared by almost 0.26 when including cohort dummies. 
We can in addition only imperfectly control for cohort dummies by using the 
grandfather's (husbands) cohort dummies. Grandmothers' cohort dummies would be 
perfectly collinear with the reform dummy. If we could directly introduce mother's 
cohort dummies, any effect would most likely disappear in this probit equation. A 
significant variable such as grandmother's weight, which is possibly totally unrelated to 
the outcome of child education is certainly due to such effects. We can thus conclude 
that the instrument is valid once we control for cohort effects. 
Do the parametric assumptions influence the results? Finally, the reader might 
be worrying about the parametric assumptions we made. This concerns especially the 
joint normality assumption in the censored normal regression model, which identifies our 
model. As we have explicitly estimated a non-parametric model, these worries should 
be addressed. Indeed, one can see that negative coefficient estimates for the effect of 
parental education under the joint normal distributed models seem implausible. They 
disappear in the non-parametric case, which indeed suggests that the parametric as-
sumptions influence the results to some degree. All the other coefficients, with the 
exceptions of the number of siblings variable, have the same sign and value as in the 
censored normal case. It seems that the distribution of the endogeneous variable, edu-
cation, is mostly affected by the parametric assumptions. Note finally that the full MLE 
estimates less extreme coefficients with a higher precision, which seems to weaken the 
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criticisms of the jointly normally distributed model. 
3.7 Conclusions 
This paper has analysed intergenerational educational transmission across three gen-
erations. It has reviewed and applied several econometric techniques for dealing with 
censoring and endogeneity in various settings which are interesting in their own right. 
Grandparents' education enters in many censored regression specifications as sig-
nificantly positively related to grandchildrens' outcomes, especially for grandfathers in 
relation to male grandchildren. In the context of exogeneity, we find some evidence 
for a strategic role, in the form of bequests or presence of grandparents. The censored 
regression results support the interpretation of a positive effect of grandparents two 
generations ahead. 
Endogeneity emerges as an important concern In the transmission mechanism. 
We found a significant effect of unobservables in the transmission equations and much 
lower education transmission coefficients than the censored regression results would sug-
gest. Certainly, the IV results point to an omnipresent measurement problem. Finding 
however similar effects in a two-generational grandparent to parent setting, where such 
measurement problems are much less important, seems to confirm the hypothesis of 
unobserved factors such as, in a hypothetical suggestion innate ability, to be of prime 
importance. Also, without necessarily interpreting them as causal effects, the IV re-
sults help to accumulate evidence that censored regression effects are overestimating 
the true effects of education on the next generation's educational attainment. The 
non-parametric model and the parametric model seem to confirm this interpretation. 
Both approaches are complementary, as the parametric approach allows us to "observe 
the unobservable" under restrictive assumptions, whereas the non-parametric approach 
differences out the unobservable, but needs no distributional assumptions. 
The importance of unobserved factors suggests from a policy point of view that 
increasing educational attainment of a cohort might have modest effects on the ed-
ucation of their descendants. It would certainly be interesting to learn more about 
these important but unobservable influence factors and if or how policy can affect them. 
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These challenging questions could be a program of future research in this area. The next 
chapter will explore how the design of the education system might affect educational 
and labour market outcomes. By providing a new evaluation of the policy of compre-
hensive schooling, it provides a complementary analysis on how educational outcomes 
of children are affected by the school system additionally to parental background and 
education transmission within the family. 
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Dependent variable: child's education in years 
Grandparents assumed exogeneous Grandparents assumed endogeneous 
Aggregated education Mothers/Fathers Aggr. Mothers/Fathers 
Cens. reg. IV Cens. reg. IV IV IV 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parents' joint education (HKPARENTS) .:~GG -.:H.ri -.:Wfi 
(.05) (.,1(; ) (.:lH) 
Grandparents' joint education (HKGPAR) ,172 .1119 -,SO;! 
(.07) ( .1R) (.:11 ) 
Mother's education .:)U 1 .41:) .:)8:) 
(.07) (.81) I.in) 
Father's education .122 -.853 -.571 
(.04) (.40) p,,; ) 
Grandmother's education -.008 .188 -.459 
(,08) (.23) (.28) 
Grandfather's education .189 .288 .104 
(.07) (.15) (.55) 
Child female dummy, l=female .659 .642 .642 .736 .661 .755 
(.10) (.10) (.13) ( .14) (.10) (.15) 
# Siblings -.191 -.224 -.221 -.254 -.326 -.470 
(.15) (.IG) (.20) (.20) (.lG) (.24) 
Ability (factor) .265 .480 .269 .586 .618 .687 
(.06) (.16) (.08) (.:~4) (.17) (.40) 
# Siblings (CM) -.054 -.009 
(.03) (.04) 
CF (aggregated) .84 
(,57) 
Parents' control function .714 
(.49) 
Grandparents' control function .634 
(.28) 
CF Father 1.848 1.254 
(.75) (.64) 
CF Mother -.064 -.003 
(1.03) (LlO) 
CF Grandfather .14952 
(.71) 
CF Grandmother .481 
(.30) 
Constant 13.388 11.814 12.998 9.391 25.905 23.480 
(1.35) (1. 73) (1.85) (3.04) (5.00) (9.23) 
N 1711 1711 1075 1075 1680 1015 
Table 3.15: The second stage estimation of grandparents' effects assuming both exogeneity (Columns 1-4) and endogeneity (Columns 
5-6) for grandparents 
Dependent variable: Child's education 
HKPARENTS 
HKGPAR 
Number of siblings 
Child gender 
Ability (factor) 
PI 
P2 
Constant 
First stages 
Parents 
ROSLA73 
Birth order mother 
Grandparents 
ROSLA45F 
ROSLA45M 
Grandmothers' birth order 
0.367 
(.05) 
-.107 
(.15) 
.645 
(.10) 
.300 
(.06) 
3.414 
(.16) 
=O(imposed) 
16.077 
(.72) 
-.222 
(.40) 
-.114 
(.16) 
.688 
(.11) 
.525 
(.16) 
5.189 
(2.44) 
5.081 
(.17) 
.587 
(.26) 
17.895 
(1.46) 
.232 
(.05) 
-.059 
(.02) 
Table 3.16: Results for the full MLE 
-.037 
(.57) 
-.634 
(.45) 
-.386 
(.25) 
.764 
( .17) 
.694 
(.25) 
10.431 
(3.85) 
2.541 
(.12) 
.336 
(.15) 
.228 
(.25) 
.336 
(.15) 
27.753 
(7.30) 
.231 
(.07) 
-.060 
(.03) 
.192 
(.10) 
.359 
(.09) 
-.046 
(.01) 
Dependent variable: Estimated mediansa 
(1) (2) (3) (4) I (5) (6) (7) 
HKPARENTS .088 .085 .080 .076 0.061 .059 .056 
(.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (0.05) (.11) ( .34) 
# Siblings .776 .763 .763 .768 .764 .764 .776 
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.13) ( .3'J) 
Child female dummy .613 .605 .595 .577 .624 .625 .600 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.06) (.06) (.04) (.28) 
Ability (factor) .072 .079 .086 .100 .068 .068 .069 
(.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.06) (.15) 
First step quantile weighing Kernel On including all observations 
First step bandwidth On 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Second step bandwidth hn 0.6 0.2 0.05 0.001 0.6 0.2 0.001 
Real (N) 700000 529990 341553 92960 145829 36802 768 
effective (n) 1183 1030 826 432 541 271 40 
aControls such as cohort dummies, inter-sibling birth spacing and other variables included which also appear in 
the censored OLS specifications 
Table 3.17: Second step estimation of the censored quantile regression model for increasing bandwidths 
HKPARENTS 
Number of siblings 
Child female dummy 
Ability 
HKGPAR 
Sample size 
Real (N) 
Effective (n ) (for asym ptotic results) 
Bandwidth 
First step quantile weighing Kernel On 
First step non-parametric control function On 
2nd step Kernel (h n ) 
Dependent variable: Estimated mediansa 
grandparents aggregated 
.046 
(.15) 
0.613 
(.18) 
.586 
(.11) 
.134 
(.07) 
-.038 
(.20) 
73616 
429 
0.01 
0.6 
.045 
(.32) 
.651 
(.38) 
.591 
(.24) 
.132 
(.14) 
-.045 
(.44) 
7507 
137 
.029 
(.96) 
.689 
(1. 25) 
.610 
(.74) 
.104 
(.45) 
-.074 
(1.26) 
1166 
54 
including all observations 
0.01 0.01 
0.2 0.05 
aControls such as cohort dummies, inter-sibling birth spacing and other variables included 
Table 3.18: Second step estimation of the censored quantile regression model, assumimg 
grandparents endogeneous 
Dep. Variable: Childs' education 
o LS Censored regression 
HKPARENTS .103 .434 (.02) (.04) 
Ability (factor) .065 .238 (.03) (.05) 
Number of siblings .258 -.429 (.09) ( .13) 
Number of siblings (parents) -.003 -.035 
(.01) (.02) 
Child female dummy, 1=female .346 .620 (.06) (.09) 
Cohort 1910 Grandfather .038 -.089 (.17) (.26) 
Cohort 1920 Grandfather .101 .137 (.18) (.28) 
Cohort 1930 Grandfather .149 .033 (.22) (.33) 
Cohort 1910 Grandmother 1.022 1.568 (.47) (.64) 
Cohort 1920 Grandmother 1.086 1.438 (.47) (.64) 
Cohort 1930 Grandmother 1.033 1.376 (.48) (.65) 
Constant 15.888 16.403 (.48) (.48) 
R-squared .08481 0.0382 
N 2200 2200 
Table 3.19: Aggregated model, estimated with and without considering the censoring 
of the education distribution 
Grandmother has worked since child at school 
Grandmother smoking prior to pregnancy 
Substantial help of parents while child at school 
Grandmother's weight in stones, 1958 
Birth order-all mother's siblings 
Grandmother reads to her child 
Cohort 1910 Grandfather 
Cohort 1920 Grandfather 
Cohort 1930 Grandfather 
Constant 
R-squared 
N 
Dependent Variable: 
Grandmothers reform dummya 
.226 
(.05) 
-.012 
(.05) 
-.055 
(.05) 
.039 
(.007) 
-.023 
(.01) 
.015 
(.02) 
-.555 
(.12) 
0.0367 
2501 
.124 
(.06) 
.005 
(.01) 
-.073 
(.06) 
.028 
(.009) 
-.027 
(.02) 
.011 
(.04) 
.699 
(.40) 
2.315 
(.39) 
4.319 
(.44) 
-2.296 
(.532) 
0.29 
2197 
aRegional dummie s, as well as (fathers) cohort effects are included in the second column. Significance 
levels are + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 
Table 3.20: Checking for covariate balance 

Chapter 4 
Accounting for Unobservables in 
Comparing Selective and 
Comprehensive Schooling 
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4.1 Introduction 
Today, despite the fact that 116 Labour 
MP's benefited from a grammar school 
education, Labour remains ideologically 
blinkered about the contribution grammar 
schools make to our education system .... 
Under the Conservatives, grammar schools 
will survive and thrive. 
Michael Howard MP; leader of the Conser-
vative Party, 2004 
If it's the last thing I am going to do, I'm 
going to destroy every [ ... J grammar school 
in England. And Wales. And Northern Ire-
land. 
Anthony Crosland, 1965, then Education 
Secretary 
In this chapter, we compare the effects of selective and non-selective education on 
various educational and labor market outcomes, using data from the National Child 
Development Study (NCDS). The recent history of British secondary education has been 
characterized by the shift from a selective towards a non-selective or "comprehensive" 
system. After the Second World War, and starting with the Butler Education act (1945) 
the education system in the U.K. was mostly selective. Namely, children were assigned 
to two different types of schools depending on their results to a test score at age 11, 
called the 11-plus exam. Successful children went to grammar schools, while the others 
attended less demanding secondary modern schools. Then, an important change was 
initiated in 1965 by the Crosland Circular, by which a possibility of comprehensivisation 
was introduced, creating schools where children of different ability levels were pooled 
together. As the circular did not force schools to be comprehensive, the timing of the 
shift towards comprehensive schools has been heterogeneous. Still in 1965, less than 
5% of all public schools were comprehensive. By 1975 this proportion had reached 60%. 
In the period when the children of the NCDS, all born in 1958, were at school, the two 
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systems coexisted. This makes these data a potential laboratory for comparing the two 
systems. 
There have been several recent attempts at measuring the effect of pupils' selec-
tion on outcomes using the NCDS data. In an early study, Kerckhoff (1986) measures 
the effects of school type on later educational outcomes. He finds that attending a 
grammar or secondary modern school is associated with higher and lower educational 
attainment, respectively, than attending a comprehensive school. Dearden et al. (2002) 
define "selective schools" as either grammar or private schools. Using propensity score 
matching techniques to control for a large set of covariates, they find that attending 
either of the two types is associated with better outcomes. More recently, Galindo-
Rueda and Vignoles (2005) focus on the differences between school systems: selective 
(either grammar or secondary modern) and comprehensive. They find that attending a 
selective school yields better educational outcomes. Moreover, the gain is found to be 
concentrated on high-ability pupils. 
In an important methodological criticism to these findings, Manning and Pischke 
(2006) question the exogeneity of the comprehensivisation reform. They measure the 
effect of attending a selective school on test scores at age 11, that is before entering 
a secondary school. They find positive effects, of similar magnitude or larger than the 
effects on subsequent outcomes. They interpret this exercise as a falsification test, which 
suggests that attending a selective school is likely to be affected by unobservables that 
in turn affect later outcomes. They conclude that "we don't know very much about the 
effects of comprehensive schooling in Britain" (p.19). 
The point raised by Manning and Pischke (2006) is the main motivation of this 
chapter. We start by focusing on the differences between the selective and compre-
hensive schooling systems. Attending a comprehensive school is the determinant, or 
"treatment", of interest. Given the non exogeneity of the treatment, consistent estima-
tion of treatment effects on the mean and variance of outcomes is a difficult task. Our 
strategy is inspired from recent advances in the education production function literature. 
We build a model, where test scores depend on parental and school inputs, as well as 
on the child's endowment, as in Todd and Wolpin (2003, 2004). The endowment is 
unobserved to the econometrician, and can be multidimensional. We embed this model 
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into Rubin's (1974) framework, where we do not simultaneously observe the two po-
tential post-treatment outcomes. We assume that the same unobserved endowment 
affects both pre- and post-treatment outcomes as well as the probability of attending a 
selective or comprehensive school. 
In the presence of selection-on-unobservables, usual matching estimators are bi-
ased. To correct the matching estimand for the bias created by the presence of the 
endowment, we develop a quasi-differencing approach inspired from the "within" ap-
proach to eliminate fixed effects in linear panel data models (e.g. Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1998)). For this purpose, we make use of the availability of several test scores at age 
11 (maths, reading, verbal), which are also affected by the endowment. Then, estimat-
ing the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) in our model is simple and transparent. Under 
the main assumption that pre-treatment outcomes are not affected by the treatment 
other than through the child's endowment, we obtain that the bias of the matching 
estimand on post-treatment outcomes is proportional to the difference in pre-treatment 
test scores between the two schooling systems. Moreover, the coefficient of proportion-
ality can be estimated by using other test scores (such as the reading score at age 11) 
as alternative measures of the endowment. 
Following this strategy one is able to consistently estimate the ATE, as well as 
other treatment effects (AT for the Treated, ATE and ATT on variances). It is to be 
noted that we do not assume anything on the correlation between the endowment and 
observed covariates, such as parental inputs. This fixed effects approach is especially 
appealing in the education production function perspective, where parents take decisions 
based on their child's ability. Moreover, the model implies testable restrictions on the 
data. This property is important in order to check if the assumed structure is correct. 
Our identification strategy is closely linked to a class of models introduced by 
James Heckman and coauthors. Starting with Carneiro et al. (2003) and Hansen et al. 
(2004), these authors use factor models to restrict the correlation between measurements 
and achieve identification. Compared to the recent models in this literature (e.g. Cunha 
and Heckman (2006), and Cunha et al. (2006)) our framework is more restrictive as the 
identifying content of the model is limited. In particular, we are only able to identify 
effects of the treatment on the mean and the variance, as we make no distributional 
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assumptions (such as independence) on the errors. Another restriction compared to 
recent advances in that literature is the linear way the endowment enters the model. 
One virtue of our approach is that it does not restrict the correlation between the 
endowment and the covariates, and that it yields easily testable implications. 
Applying our methodology to the NCDS data, we find evidence of a bi-dimensional 
endowment. We find that, correcting for the differences in endowment at age 11, 
attending a comprehensive rather than a selective school has a negative effect on means 
of outcomes, but small and insignificant in many cases. Stronger are the results we obtain 
for variances, as the selective system is found to present significantly more dispersion 
than the comprehensive one. We then focus on the variance within the selective system. 
We argue that one important part of this variance comes from the differences between 
achievements at grammar and secondary modern schools. In a tentative attempt to 
measure the premium associated to the fact of passing the ii-plus exam, we find strong 
and often significant effects. We interpret these results as a potential explanation of 
risk-averse parents being likely to have pushed towards comprehensivisation. 
The effects of pupils' selection and "ability tracking" on outcomes are currently 
attracting interest ouside the U.K. too. In the U.S., there is already a large literature on 
the subject, with mixed evidence (see Figlio and Page (2002), and references therein). 
Comparable to the British case, one of the main features of the Swedish reform that took 
place in the 1950's was to abolish selection by ability into academic and non-academic 
streams. Meghir and Palme (2005) exploit the fact that the reform was preceded by 
a social experiment to estimate its effects on educational and labor market outcomes. 
They find positive effects, concentrated on children with lower parental background. 
Using country-level data and a difference-in-difference methodology, Woessmann and 
Hanushek (2006) find little evidence of positive effects of ability tracking on mean 
outcomes. However, they also find that the variance of educational attainment is larger 
in countries with selective education (but see also Waldinger (2006)). Maurin and 
McNally (2006) study the effects of a shift in the admission criteria in grammar schools 
in Northern Ireland. They find that the probability of attending a grammar school and 
of achieving higher educational qualifications both strongly increased after the reform. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2 we present the NCDS data 
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and compute some preliminary estimates of the effect of selection on various outcomes. 
We also present some evidence that the treatment consisting in attending a comprehen-
sive school is not exogenous, building on Manning and Pischke (2006). We present our 
model in Section 4.3 and list and motivate the assumptions we make. Section 4.4 is 
devoted to the identification of causal parameters, starting with the ATE. In that sec-
tion we also provide estimators of the parameters of interest, and derive some testable 
implications of the model. In Section 4.5 we apply our methodology to the NCDS data, 
and compare and contrast the two schooling systems. In Section 4.6 we focus on the 
differences that exist within the selective system, between school types. Lastly, Section 
4.7 concludes. 
4.2 A first look at the data 
The NCDS is an ongoing longitudinal survey of a British birth cohort born between 
March 3 and March 9 of 1958. The initial sample consisted of 17,634 individuals which 
were resurveyed on six further occasions in order to monitor their changing health, 
education, social and economic circumstances. Attrition has led the sample size to 
shrink in the subsequent waves: 1 in 1965 at age 7, 1969 at age 11, 1974 at age 16, 
1981 at age 23, 1991 at age 33, and 1999/2000 when the cohort had reached the age of 
42. We will be looking at schooling achievements of the NCDS cohort members and will 
use information from all five waves. The NCDS children received secondary schooling 
between 1969 and 1974, and thus lived through the change of the British education 
system. 
Sample selection. We are interested in the relative effects of selective and compre-
hensive schooling on outcomes. We use a NCDS variable that gives the type of the 
school attended by the child at age 16, when finishing secondary education. We do 
not use observations for which this variable is missing. We also exclude other types of 
schools, such as technical or public (i.e. private) schools. These schools are likely to be 
IThere has been a large amount of attrition in the NCDS. Current practice has treated attrition as 
exogenous. Conolly et al. (1992) show that attrition is somewhat stronger among children from lower 
parental background. Dearden et al. (2002) argue that the results are not necessarily biased, as they 
dispose of many indicators of parental characteristics, as we also do. 
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very different from the ones we consider. Moreover, they represent a small percentage 
of all schools (less than 10%). Note that the school type variable also indicates which 
kind of selective school, grammar or secondary modern, the child was attending at age 
16. We will use this information in Section 4.6. 
For the purpose of comparing children that went through fully selective or fully 
comprehensive secondary education, we keep children who stayed during five years in 
the same schooling system. This avoids re-organisation effects in our data, as we would 
expect there to be a large re-organisation effect once a school changes type, say from 
grammar to comprehensive, within the five year period we observe. To select the sample, 
we use a variable which indicates the time stayed in the same school. We select only 
pupils that stayed for five years in the same school. We obtain a sample of 6870 
observations in the sample, 3865 (56%) of which are comprehensive. We also use other 
samples for the purpose of replicating samples in the literature and also to compare 
pupils in grammar and comprehensive schools. One sample takes only purely selective 
and purely comprehensive schools, that is schools in local education areas which have 
either fully introduced comprehensive schools and areas which are still entirely in the 
previous, selective system. Another sample takes only pupils in grammar and secondary 
modern schools in order to compare differences between these schools. See the data 
Appendix for details about sample construction and all the samples used. 
Variables. We are interested in the effect of the schooling system on several educa-
tional outcomes. We shall consider one outcome at age 16: the maths score given by 
the NCDS staff. It is important to notice that, unlike the math test, the reading test 
was the same at age 11 and age 16. For this reason, the distribution of the reading score 
at 16 is concentrated at high values and we do not take it as an outcome. In addition, 
we will look at later outcomes: age when the child left school, vocational and academic 
qualifications obtained by the child, as well as wages. 
We will also use indicators of educational level before secondary schooling. In 
particular, we will use the results of NCDS test scores at 7 and 11, before the ll-p/us 
examination took place. Maths and reading tests were administered at ages 7 and 11, 
and an additional verbal test was administered at age 11 only. 
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We will also use parental background, such as the social class and education levels 
of the parents measured when the child was 7 or 11 years old, and school characteristics, 
such as class size variables, at age 7, 11 and 16. The complete list of these variables 
is given in the Appendix. Finally, we complement the data by constructing a set of 
local controls. For this purpose, we merge the 1971 Census statistics to the NCDS 
data. We then obtain characteristics of the enumeration district in which the child lives. 
In addition, we construct a political variables set. As the education reform was first 
implemented on a voluntary basis, political control of the Local Authority, e.g. City 
or County Borough Council seems an important variable to explain the shift towards 
comprehensive schooling. We aggregated the results of the 1970 general election for 
each constituency. Furthermore, we used local authority level information on school 
resources to complement our analysis. See the Appendix of this chapter for a more 
precise description of all data sets involved. 
Descriptive statistics. Table 4.1 shows some descriptive statistics for the two groups 
of children in the sample, attending a comprehensive or a selective system. Educational 
outcomes are higher for children attending selective schools, who score on average 1.9 
points higher in mathematics and 1.3 points in reading than children at comprehensive 
schools, about 25% of one standard deviation in each case. Moreover, they leave school 
on average 0.4 years later, and obtain more academic and vocational qualifications. 
There is a small difference in weekly wages. The two groups are also very different 
in terms of intake, as children at selective schools score better at all tests at age 7 
and 11. For instance, they score 3 points higher in mathematics at age 11, 30% of 
one standard deviation. We find similar discrepancies for the dispersion of test scores, 
selective schools showing higher variance of pre-treatment variables at age 11, and post-
treatment outcomes except the reading score at 16. 
Another way to illustrate the differences pre-secondary education is to summarize 
the information contained in the test scores previous to the ll-plus examination into 
one scalar indicator. It is common practice to compute the first principal component of 
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Figure 4.1: The "ability" and "parental background" principal components for pupils 
attending comprehensive (dash-dotted line) and selective schools (solid line). 
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Comprehensive Selective 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. N I Mean Std. Dev. N 
Maths score (Age 16) 11.921 6.294 3600 13.826 7.135 2872 
Reading score (Age 16) 25.164 6.603 3614 26.471 6.382 2882 
Maths score (Age 11) 15.693 9.65 3434 18.673 10.371 2636 
Reading score (Age 11) 15.672 5.912 3434 17.119 6.045 2636 
Verbal score (Age 11) 21.596 8.996 3436 24.246 9.076 2636 
BSAG score (Age 11) 8.152 8.692 3439 7.325 8.015 2636 
Maths score (Age 7) 5.091 2.389 3431 5.443 2.442 2701 
Reading score (Age 7) 23.091 6.890 3437 24.385 6.359 2717 
Age left full time education 17.136 2.085 2701 17.513 2.403 2165 
Qualifications 2004 2.246 1.35 3168 2.494 1.361 2513 
Academic qualifications (2004) 1.781 1.304 2059 2.043 1.384 2507 
Vocational qualifications (2004) 1.511 1.497 3063 1.642 1.556 2437 
1981 log weekly net wage 4.208 0.369 2059 4.213 0.347 1653 
1991 log weekly net wage 4.409 0.704 1682 4.445 0.742 1354 
2000 log weekly net wage 4.466 0.793 1928 4.513 0.78 1556 
2004 log weekly net wage 4.741 0.65 1708 4.784 0.715 1364 
Table 4.1: Comparing outcomes in selective and comprehensive schools; sample 1. 
the 7 and 11 test scores and to label it as "ability" (e.g. Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles 
(2005)). Drawing the densities of the "ability" variable for the two groups shows strong 
differences, as the top panel of Figure 4.1 illustrates. On the bottom panel, we draw 
the density of a "parental background" variable, similarly computed as the first principal 
component of the many NCDS variables related to the social class of parents or their 
education. Figure 4.1 shows that there are less marked but still noticeable differences 
between the two groups, children in the selective system coming from better background 
on average. 
Raw effects. Next, we regress the maths score at age 16 on the indicator of com-
prehensive schooling, with various controls. Table 4.2 presents the results. The un-
conditional effect reported in column (1) is negative. In columns (2)-(5), we adopt a 
value-added specification and use as controls lagged test scores, at age 11 and 7. Such 
specifications have been widely used in the education production function literature. 
The results show a consistently negative effect of attending a comprehensive school on 
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the math score. The introduction of lagged test scores as controls lowers the effect 
measured by the coefficient of the comprehensive reform dummy, C, by a large amount. 
Still, the effect, although not especially large (about 6% of one standard deviation) is 
significant at the 5% level in all the specifications. Lastly, in column (6), we replace the 
lagged test scores by their first principal component (the "ability" variable). Columns 
(5) and (6), comparable in terms of other included covariates, are very similar, with a 
slightly lower R-squared in column (6). 
Outcome: Mathematics score at 16 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C (in comprehensive school) -1.904 -1.540 -1.8119 -1.660 -.464 -.556 
(.167) (.155) (.205) (.185 ) (.121) (.133) 
Child female -1.327 -1.328 -1.266 -1.125 -1.652 
(.154) (.154) (.192) (.112) (.127) 
Father's education .354 .352 .288 0.135 0.175 
(.058) (.058) (.073) (0.043) (0.050) 
Mother's education .619 .622 .602 0.244 0.251 
(.072) (.072) (.091) (.054) (.061) 
Maths score 11 .473 (.006) 
Ability (factor) 2.492 (.037) 
Constant 13.825 -11.090 -11.09 6.760 3.028 11.539 
(.124) (61.146) (61.16) (1.328) (.813) (.91870) 
R-squared .019 .1626 .185 .198 .597 .559 
N 6472 6472 6472 4279 5738 5226 
Controls 
Individual no yes yes yes yes yes 
Parental background no yes yes yes yes yes 
School and loca I no no yes yes yes no 
LEA dummies no no no yes no no 
Ability no no no no no yes 
Table 4.2: The effect of attending a comprehensive school on the math score at 16, 
conditional on increasing sets of covariates. 
We present propensity-score matching estimates in Table 4.3. We use the inverse 
probability weighting of Hirano et al. (2003) to compute the effects of comprehensivi-
sation on the various outcomes. Details on the estimation will be given in the next 
sections. In the first row of the table, we use as controls the parental, school and local 
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covariates used in column (6) of Table 4.2. We find negative and significant effects of 
attending a comprehensive school on all outcomes. These effects remain negative when 
we include the "ability" factor as a covariate, but they turn mostly insignificant. 
Years educ. Academic Vocational Weekly Average of 
educ. qual. qual. wage 2004 weekly wagesa 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Controls 
(3) b 
-.292 -.197 -.099 -.053 -.036 
(.061 ) (.034) ( .042) ( .022) ( .023) 
(3) + LEA dummies -.397 -.237 -.188 -.077 -.071 
( .078) (.044) (.054) (.028) ( .030) 
(3) + Ability -.131 -.048 .006 -.010 -0.003 
(.064) (.034) (.047) ( .023) (.025) 
Table 4.3: The effect of attending a comprehensive school on other outcomes, using the 
same specification (3) of Table 4.2 and the indicated additional variables 
aSimple average over wages in 1991, 2000 and 2004 
bparental school and local controls used 
To summarize, results conditional on school, parental and local covariates suggest 
that attending a comprehensive school is associated with lower educational achievement. 
Controlling for lagged test scores, or alternatively for their first principal component, 
yields also negative estimates, though insignificant except for the math score at 16. 
However, the "value-added" strategy, which consists in directly controlling for lagged 
test scores in the outcome equations, is not without problems. Todd and Wolpin (2003) 
show that value-added specifications impose strong restrictions on the parameters of 
the production function of education outcomes. In a more general model, later test 
scores do not depend directly on lagged ones, but on the child's endowment that is 
unobserved to the econometrician. In this perspective, the test scores used in the value-
added specification can be seen as informal proxies for the child's endowment at age I!. 
If the restrictions that this specification imposes are not satisfied, it is not clear what 
we are estimating by controlling for these variables as we did in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
"Falsification test". Moreover, even within the logic of value-added specifications, 
there are reasons not to believe the above estimates of the effect of attending a compre-
hensive school. To see why, we follow Manning and Pischke (2006), and estimate the 
effect of attending a comprehensive school between age 11 and 16 on outcomes prior to 
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entering secondary education. Table 4.4 shows the results of the regressions of the test 
scores at age 11, controlling for an increasing number of covariates. 2 We find strong 
effects, indeed even stronger than on outcomes at age 16. For instance, the effect on 
the math score is never lower than 1.4 in absolute value, that is 14% of one standard 
deviation. Estimates obtained using propensity score matching give a similar picture. 
Outcome: Mathematics score at 11 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C (in comprehensive school) -2.979 -2.403 -2.387 -2.785 -1.801 -1.461 
(.258) (.244) (.250) (.321) (.225) (.208) 
Child female -.667 -.630 .437 .202 -1.006 
(.240) (.240) (.300) ( .216) (.203) 
Father's education .521 .509 .761 .457 .412 
(.092) (.091) (.114) (.085) (.079) 
Mother's education .902 .772 .761 0.574 0.454 
(.115) (.114) (.143) (.105) (.097) 
Maths score 7 2.014 1.324 (.045) (.047) 
Reading score at 7 .552 (.017) 
Constant .194 9.401 5.487 6.342 -2.765 -9.215 
(18.672) (1.034) (1.674) (2.127) (1.536) (1.432) 
R-squared .021 .14 .174 .188 .392 .484 
N 6070 6070 6070 3936 5537 5521 
Controls 
Individual no yes yes yes yes yes 
Parental background no yes yes yes yes no 
School and local no no yes yes yes yes 
LEA dummies no no no yes no no 
Math7 no no no no yes yes 
Read7 no no no no no yes 
Table 4.4: The effect of attending a comprehensive school on the math score at 11, 
conditional on increasing sets of covariates. 
This evidence casts serious doubts on the exogeneity of the school system variable 
in outcome equations. Of course, this "falsification test" needs very special conditions 
in order to be a proper test of exogeneity. For the effect on age 11 test scores to 
be zero, one would in particular need a stationarity condition to be satisfied, Imbens 
2Column (1) corresponds to the case without controls. Then we add: (2) the maths score at 7; (3) 
the reading score at 7; (4) individual and family characteristics until 1969; and (5) regional controls. 
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(2004), requiring that the effect of age 7 test scores on scores at age 11 be the same 
as the effect of age 11 test scores on subsequent outcomes. In our data this condition 
is not satisfied, as is clear from the difference in R2 between Tables 4.2 and 4.4. In any 
case, this results point at the presence of unobserved variables that cannot be properly 
controlled for by the many covariates present in the NCDS data. 
Alternative strategies. In this paper, we explicitly address the concern, raised by 
Table 4.4, that attending a selective or comprehensive school may be endogenous in 
test score equations. Our approach is motivated by the failure of standard methods to 
provide credible inference on the parameters of interest. A natural approach would be to 
find an instrument for the schooling system. Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) propose 
to use the political colour of the LEA for this purpose. Indeed, in the period schools in 
Labour dominated LEA's are more predominantly comprehensive than conservative ones. 
Although a natural idea, using political colour as an instrument fails to remove the bias 
as Manning and Pischke (2006) show. This is because Labour dominated LEA's have 
on average children of lower ability and parental background. Using the IV strategy in 
the age 11 test scores equations yields a large effect of attending a selective school (see 
Table C.7 in Appendix). Another approach would be to derive bounds for the effect of 
comprehensive schooling, as the effect obtained by OLS or matching can be interpreted 
as an upper bound (in absolute value). To find a lower bound, we would need to find 
a variable that influences positively the probability of attending a selective school, yet 
is negatively correlated with the unobservables in the outcome equations. One example 
of this strategy is the use of the affirmative action legislation in Rothstein and Yoon 
(2006). In our case, it is not clear that such a variable exists. 
Lastly, one might want to check the sensitivity of the results to departures from 
exogeneity. Commonly used techniques assume the existence of an unobserved "con-
founding" regressor, conditional on the treatment, here the type of school attended, 
being randomly assigned. See e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Imbens (2003), and 
recently Ichino et al. (2006). In this approach, one checks the sensitivity of treatment 
effect estimates under various assumptions on the unobserved confounder. One weak-
ness of the approach is that it is not always clear how to calibrate the magnitude of the 
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sensitivity check. Altonji et al. (2005) propose to use observed covariates as a guide to 
calibrate the sensitivity parameters. However, in our case, the central role played by the 
child's ability, that is unobserved to the analyst, makes this method difficult to apply.3 
Our strategy is close in spirit to the sensitivity approach. We also assume that 
there exists an unobserved confounder. In addition, we use information on the test scores 
prior to secondary education to remove the bias created by the presence of the confounder 
on the treatment effect estimate. The structure we assume has the advantage of being 
in line with the recent literature on the education production function. We now formally 
present our approach. 
4.3 A model accounting for selection on unobservables 
We start with the Rubin (1974) framework. Attending a comprehensive school is the 
treatment the effects of which we want to study. We denote by T = 0 the fact of 
attending a selective schooling system, while the comprehensive alternative is denoted 
by T = 1. We consider an outcome that has two potential values, in the presence 
(Yd and the absence (Yo) of treatment. To fix ideas, we think of the outcome as the 
math test score at age 16. We shall also use other outcomes, namely the age when left 
school, the educational qualifications obtained and weekly wages. The two potential 
outcomes are not simultaneously observed by the econometrician, only the combination 
Y = TY1 + (1 - T) Yo· 
In addition, we consider two outcome variables, Wand Z, that we think of as 
pre-treatment outcomes. For instance, W is the math score at age 11 and Z is another 
test score (e.g. reading or verbal) at the same age. These variables are not causally 
affected by the treatment and are always observed. 
31f one does not include lagged test scores in the set of covariates, then the estimates seem very 
robust. But if we include them, then they become close to zero. One source of the problem could be 
that the child's ability is a very special regressor, unfit for the framework in Altonji et al. (2005), where 
observed and unobserved variables are assumed to be randomly drawn from the same pool of covariates. 
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Our modelling of the four outcomes variables reads as follows: 
10 fo(X) + O'.oTJ + EO, 
1"1 h (X) + O'.l"J + E1, 
IF g(X) + f37J + U, 
(4.1) 
Z h(X) + fTJ + V. 
In this model, X are covariates that include children's characteristics as well as 
parental and school inputs. Their effect on the outcomes is modelled by the unknown 
functions fa, h, 9 and h. Then, 7J is an unobserved variable that represents the child's 
endowment at the time the treatment is received, that is at age 11. The endowment, 
that includes child and school unobserved characteristics, has a distinct effect on the 
various outcomes, through the parameters 0'.0, 0'.1, f3 and f. 
We make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1 (selection on unobservables) 
IE (EoIX, T) = IE (EoIX); IE (E1IX, T) = IE (E1IX). 
Assumption 1 is reminiscent of the "selection-on-observables" assumption often 
used in policy evaluation, where the treatment is independent of the potential outcomes 
conditional on observed covariates: 
(4.2) 
where ". -"-.1 " represents conditional independence. A weaker assumption requires 
that treatment and outcomes be independent conditional on observed and unobserved 
covariates: 
(Yo, Yd -"- TI X, TJ· (4.3) 
Assumption (4.3) is typically made when checking the sensitivity of treatment effects 
estimates to departure from exogeneity, as in Imbens (2003). In that approach, one 
calibrates the contribution of TJ to the model and check by how much the estimates 
vary. 
Assumption 1 is slightly weaker than (4.3). In particular, mean independence is 
assumed instead of full independence. 
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Assumption 2 (pre-treatment outcome) 
IE (UIX, T) = IE (UIX) . 
Assumption 2 requires that ~V be not affected by the treatment. Hence differences 
between IE(H "IT = 1, ~\:") and IE(WIT = 0, X) simply reflect composition effects, as the 
composition in terms of TJ is different in the treated and non treated groups. We have 
in mind pre-treatment variables, that are often used in order to test for the selection-
on-observables assumption (4.2). 
Assumption 3 (additivity) 
TJ ..1 (co, Cl, U, V) I X, T, 
Assumption 3 emphasizes the additive structure of the model. In the assumption, 
the notation " . ..1.1 ." stands for conditional uncorrelatedness. A sufficient condition 
for this assumption to hold is: 
IE (coIX, TJ, T) = IE (clIX, TJ, T) = IE (UIX, TJ, T) = IE (VIX, TJ, T) = 0. 
Note that these assumptions do not assume any structure for the correlation between TJ 
and X. TJ is analogous to a "fixed" effect in a linear panel data model of the form: 
Yit = X~te + TJi + Uit, 
where COV(TJi' Uit) = ° for all t, but COV(TJi' Xit) is not restricted. 
Assumption 4 (instrument) 
V ..1 (co, Cl, U) I X, T, 
Assumption 4 requires that Z be an "instrument" in the following sense. We 
assume that Z is uncorrelated with the residuals of the other outcome variables, condi-
tional on observed and unobserved variables. Of course, the presence of the unobserved 
TJ creates a correlation between the variable Z and the potential outcomes Yo and Yl . 
Hence, Z cannot be used directly, as a proper instrumental variable. 
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Assumption 5 (rank conditions) 
Var (TJIX, T) =1= o. 
Lastly, Assumption 5 requires that TJ presents variation conditional on X and T 
and has an effect on the pre-treatment outcome and the instrument. It means that W 
and Z have an unobservable in common. 
As presented here, the model allows for a one-dimensional endowment. It can 
immediately be extended in order to allow for a multivariate endowment TJ E ~K, and 
vectors of pre-treatment outcomes and instruments Wand Z. The model is presented 
in this general version in the Appendix. We require the same assumptions, except that 
Assumption 5 is replaced by the condition that (3, '"'( and Var (TJIX, T), that are now 
matrices, have all rank K, the number of dimensions of the endowment. In particular, 
we need at least K pre-treatment outcomes and K instruments for this assumption to 
be satisfied. As is intuitive, data requirements increase if we want to account for a 
multivariate structure of unobservables. 
The model is in line with recent models of the education production function 
literature, as in Todd and Wolpin (2004, 2003). In that literature, test scores are mod-
elled as combinations of present and past parental and school inputs, and of the child's 
endowment. We allow that parental and school decisions be based on the endowment, 
as the correlation between TJ and X is left unrestricted. Moreover, the residuals of the 
test score equations, co and Cl, can include unobserved parental and school inputs, as 
they ca n a Iso be correlated with X. 
In the model, the child's endowment at age 11, which may include individual 
and school effects, can be correlated to attending a selective system. The endowment 
TJ is the only variable that correlates the treatment with the outcomes. In particular 
the residuals (U, co, cl) are mean independent of the treatment. In contrast, they can 
be freely correlated with each other. This correlation can represent a special ability 
that the child posseses for maths, compared to other subjects. This special ability is 
imposed not to influence the treatment, the endogeneity of the latter coming only from 
the endowment. 
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As emphasized by Todd and Wolpin (2003), it is important that 1] be possibly 
correlated to the parental and school variables. Two common strategies to cancel out 
the child's endowment are the use of data on siblings, and the use of time series of test 
scores. In both cases, a "within" estimator provides consistent estimates of the model's 
parameters. We do not have information on siblings, and the time series we have are 
rather short (age 7, 11 and 16). Moreover, it is not clear how to adopt a "within" 
approach in the presence of a treatment that can be correlated to the endowment. 
Lastly, approaches such as the ones advocated by Todd and Wolpin (2003) are not 
applicable if the endowment is multidimensional. 
4.4 Identification of policy parameters 
In this section, we show how to identify and estimate several treatment effects of interest 
if Assumptions 1-5 hold. The discussion is conducted in the case of the model in its 
simplest form, where the endowment 1] is scalar. A treatment of the multidimensional 
endowment case is provided in the Appendix, as well as a proof of all statements appear-
ing in this section. Let us start with the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) parameter: 
~ = IE (Y1 - Yo). We have: 
~ = IE [IE (Y1IX) - IE (YoIX)]. 
In contrast with the case where there is no selection on unobservables (e.g.Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983)), this quantity has no direct counterpart in the data. Formally, for 
j = 0, 1 we have: 
IE (Yj IX) =1= IE (Yj IX, T = j) . 
To illustrate how our method works, consider the case where aj = {3 = 1. Then 
it follows immediately from Assumptions 1 and 2 that: 
IE (Yj - WIX) = IE (Yj - WIX, T = j) . 
The selection on the differenced outcomes is only driven by the covariates X. We can 
thus estimate the effect of the treatment on Y - W, as the endowment 1] has been 
differenced out. This strategy, inspired from the "within" estimation of linear panel 
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data models with fixed effects, is used in studies where data on siblings is available 
Altonji and Dunn (1996) . 
In our case, we have several test scores taken at different years, but the individual 
time series is rather short (three dates), and we see no a priori reason to assume that the 
weight of the ability is the same in every of them. We propose a generalization of the 
"within" approach, which is based on the following property, that is also immediately 
based on Assumptions 1 and 2. 
1E(1j- ';fWIX) =1E(lj - ';flV1X,T=j). (4.4) 
A first interpretation of (4.4) is obtained by remarking that we have, equivalently: 
lE (} j IX, T = j) - lE (Yj IX) = i [lE (WIX, T = j) - lE (WIX)]. (4.5) 
The term on the left-hand side of (4.5) can be interpreted as one of the two parts 
of the bias of the matching estimand, for given covariates X. If the selection-on-
observables assumption holds, then this bias term is zero and the ATE parameter is 
equal to the matching estimand. If not, then the bias is proportional to the difference 
in pre-treatment outcomes W between the treated and non-treated. Hence, under the 
model's assumptions, "falsification tests" a la Manning and Pischke (2006) are useful, as 
they indicate if matching on X will provide a consistent estimate of the ATE parameter. 
A second interpretation of (4.4) is related to the panel data literature. Indeed, 
our approach can be seen as a "quasi-differencing" approach, close to the method used 
by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1998) to estimate panel data models with interactive fixed effects 
of the form: 
Yit = X~t () + O'.t 'f]i + Uit, 
where O'.t are time-varying parameters. 
Our approach requires the identification of the ratios O'.j / /3, for j = 0, 1. The nec-
essary information for that purpose is provided by the availability of other pre-treatment 
outcomes Z ("instruments"). We show in the Appendix that, if the model's assumptions 
hold then this ratio is given by: 
lE [COy (Z, YIX, T = j) IT = j] 
lE [COy (Z, WIX, T = j) IT = j]' 
COy [Z - lE (ZIX, T = j) , Y - lE (YIX, T = j) IT = j] 
COy [Z - lE (ZIX, T = j) , W - lE (WIX, T = j) IT = j]' 
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(4.6) 
(4.7) 
It follows from equation (4.6), or alternatively (4.7), that the weight of the endow-
ment in post-treatment relative to pre-treatment outcomes can be consistently estimated 
from the data. It can be interpreted as the IV estimand in the quasi-differenced equation. 
A first implication of this result is that the ratio a1/ao can also be estimated from the 
data. This is especially interesting in the case of selective schooling, as the literature 
has shown interest in the different returns to the child's ability in the two education 
systems. 
A second implication of the identification of Qj/ f3 concerns the estimation of 
policy parameters. Indeed, from (4.4) the ATE on Y - 7frv can be estimated by 
matching. It follows that the ATE on Y is also identified, as: 
~ = IE [IE (Y - ~lVlx,T = 1) - IE (Y - ~WIX,T = 0)] + a1 ~ aoIE(W). 
(4.8) 
See the Appendix for a straightforward derivation of (4.8). 
Extending this approach, we can also identify the Average Treatment Effect for 
the Treated (ATT): /:::.TT = IE (Y1 - YolT = 1). We show in the Appendix that the 
following identity holds: 
fj.TT = IE [YIT = ll-IE [IE(Y- ~WIX,T=O) IT=l] - ~IE(WIT=l). 
(4.9) 
In Section 4.6 we will be interested in the AT on the Non Treated (ATNT), that is 
obtained in a similar way. 
A last parameter we are interested in is the ATE on variances: 
/:::. v = Var(Y1) - Var(Yo). 
Comparing the variances of (potential) outcomes in the two schooling systems is inter-
esting, as it reflects within-system dispersion and inequality in educational performance. 
In order to achieve identification we augment Assumptions 1 and 2 with the two following 
assumptions. 
Assumption 6 (selection on unobservables, variances) 
Var (colT = 1,X) = Var (coIX); Var (C1IT = 1,X) = Var (c1IX). 
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Assumption 7 (pre-treatment outcomes, variances) 
Var (UIT = 1, X) = Var (UIX). 
Assumptions 6-7 rule out effects of the treatment on the variances of pre- and 
post-treatment outcomes. Under Assumptions 1-7 we show in Appendix that 
Var(Y-IT = j, .X) - Var(Yj IX) ( ~1 ) 2 [Var(WIT = j, X) _ Var(WIX)) . 
(4.10) 
Here also, as in equation (4.5), the bias of the matching estimand (on the variance) of 
the post-treatment outcome is proportional to the difference in pre-treatment variable 
between the two groups. We thus obtain the within-X variance. The between-X 
variance is easily obtained using the results for the ATE case. Likewise we can also 
derive the expression of the ATT on variances ~ v = Var(Y1IT = 1) - Var(YoiT = 1). 
See the Appendix for details. 
In this paper, we shall focus on the above parameters: ATE and ATT on means 
and variances. One could be interested in many other policy-relevant effects of selective 
schooling. Their identification would require more assumptions, such as ones of condi-
tional independence between the residuals. Carneiro et al. (2003) show how to identify 
Marginal Treatment Effects using a flexible independent factor analytic structure for the 
unobserved variables. 
Multidimensional endowment. Allowing for multivariate TJ does not complicate the 
analysis very much. To simplify the presentation, we select K linearly independent rows 
of f3 and K linearly independent rows of 'Y. This is possible as the two matrices have 
rank K. With abuse of notation, we still call the resulting vectors of pre-treatment 
outcomes Wand instruments Z as Wand Z, respectively, and similarly still denote 
the matrices of coefficients as f3 and 'Y. Note that these are now K x K non singular 
matrices. 
With this notation we show in the Appendix that the ratio of the return to en-
176 
dowment in post-treatment and pre-treatment outcomes, respectively, is given by: 
JE [COy p', ZIX-, T = j)] {JE [COy (W, ZIX, T = j)]} -1 , (4.11) 
COy [}' -JE (}'IX, T = j), Z -JE (ZIX, T = j) IT = j] 
x {COy [lV - JE (H-IX, T = j), Z -JE (ZIX, T = j) IT = j]}r4.12) 
Quasi-differencing approach yields: 
(4.13) 
and we immediately obtain the identification of the ATE parameter, as well as the ATT 
and the ATE on variances. An important difference with the univariate endowment case, 
however, is that the relative returns to the various components of T] for the treated and 
non treated children (O;j / j3 in the univariate case) are not identified if K > 1. 
Practical issues. Given an i.i.d. sample {Yi, n'i, Zi, Xd, i = 1, ... , N, we proceed in 
two steps for the estimation of the ATE, ATT and ATE on variances parameters. In the 
first step, we estimate the ratio 0;1/ j3 by replacing expectations by empirical means in 
(4.7). This is straightforward to do if there are few discrete covariates. In our model of 
schooling, we want to condition on many covariates, discrete and continuous, as parental 
and school characteristics. One option is to adopt a flexible form for the conditional 
expectations, using for instance series estimators. We go half way in that direction, and 
adopt a linear specification. In practice, this amounts to first computing residuals of Y, 
Z and W on covariates X, and then estimating the covariances of these residuals, for 
the treated or non treated individuals. Including interaction terms had little effect on 
the results, suggesting that the linear specification is somewhat satisfying. 
Note that in the estimation we have as many overidentifying restrictions as in-
struments. We use these restrictions for specification testing. Let T be the vector of 
two-by-two equalities of the ratios given by (4.7). Under the model's assumptions T is 
zero. The statistic we consider is 7' (diag 0) -1 7, where 7 is an analog estimator of 
T and 0 is a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of 7. We take the 
diagonal as in Altonji and Segal (1996) . We estimate 0 by nonparametric bootstrap. 
We compute critical values from the bootstrap distribution of :;:' ( diag 0) -1 7. 
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We also use the overidentifying restrictions in order to improve the efficiency of 
the estimator. To do so, we weight the various estimates of aj / (3 by the inverse of their 
bootstra p varia nce. 
Then, given first stage estimates, say 7t and " we estimate the ATE by matching 
on the propensity score. We use the inverse probability weighting of Hirano et al. (2003), 
and remark that: 
where I:"(~\) = P (T = IJX) is the propensity score with respect to X. Note that it 
is not possible to match on 7r(X) directly to estimate the ATE on levels Y. For this, 
knowledge of the propensity score with respect to X and TJ would be necessary. However, 
matching on 7r(X) is feasible to estimate the ATE on quasi-differences Yj - (aj/{3)W. 
We plug our estimates ~, , and 7?(X) into (4.14), and replace the (uncondi-
tional) expectations by empirical means. To estimate the propensity score we use Logit 
ML, which can be seen as a first approximation to the series Logit estimator proposed by 
Hirano et al. (2003). Again, including interaction terms had little effect on the results. 
Lastly, note that, for (4.14) to be valid, we need that 7r(X) be strictly comprised between 
o and 1. In practice, we compute the expectation ouside of the tails of the propensity 
score distribution, selecting the portion between the 5th and 95th percentiles.4 
We proceed similarly to estimate the ATT parameter. Estimation of the ATE on 
variances is slightly different. Details on the estimation, including the case where TJ is 
multidimensional, are provided in the Appendix. Lastly, standard errors are computed 
by 500 bootstrap iterations. 
4.5 Mean and variance of educational outcomes 
We present in Table 4.5 the correlation matrix of the various test scores at age 7 and 
II, for children attending selective and comprehensive schools. The estimates are all 
significant, and remain so when we include covariates (not shown). This suggests that 
4We also restricted the estimation to the "thick support" (percentiles 33rd and 67th) as an informal 
check of robustness of the effect to the presence of other unobservables (see Black and Smith (2004)). 
Doing so had some effects on the results, but did not modify the qualitative conclusions below. 
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II Math 11 Read 11 Verbal 11 Math 7 Read 7 
Comprehensive 
Math 11 1.00 
Read 11 .69 1.00 
Verbal 11 .74 .71 1.00 
Math 7 .52 .41 .45 1.00 
Read 7 .55 .56 .62 .49 1.00 
Selective 
Math 11 1.00 
Read 11 .74 1.00 
Verbal 11 .78 .74 1.00 
Math 7 .55 .46 .48 1.00 
Read 7 .60 .60 .66 .48 1.00 
Table 4.5: Correlation matrices of pre-treatment outcomes, by schooling system. 
Assumption 5, which requires intuitively that the pre-treatment variables have at least 
one observable in common, is satisfied. Moreover, correlations between test scores are 
higher in selective schools, with the exception of the age 7 math and reading scores. 
Most of these differences are significant at 5%, and also robust to the inclusion of 
covariates. This is consistent with children at selective schools having a greater initial 
endowment, which in turn affects positively all educational outcomes. 
In Table 4.6 we report the ATE estimates of the effect of attending a comprehen-
sive school on the six outcomes of interest: the math and test scores at 16, age when 
the child left school, the number of vocational and academic qualifications, the weekly 
log wage in 2004 and the log of the average weekly wage of 1991, 2000 and 2004. We 
present the original ATE estimate and then the corrected estimate with its standard 
error. The corrected estimate is obtained by the quasi-differencing method assuming 
a single scalar endowment 1]. As a pre-treatment variable W, we have chosen the age 
11 math score for all outcomes. The math age 11 score offers the best basis for a 
pre-treatment variable, as it is highly correlated with the outcomes and is, by definition, 
not affected by the treatment. The variables Z used as "instruments" are all the other 
pre-treatment outcomes. Conditional on observed and unobserved factors, the errors of 
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the instrument equation, l", are assumed to be independent of the remaining error terms 
of the structural model. Note that the error terms fa, fl and U can be freely correlated 
between each other. This correlation might represent a special ability, say for example 
for mathematical reasoning. We require however that V be uncorrelated to EO, EI and 
[T. If we would believe in such a correlation between EO, EI and U representing a special 
ability, we would need an instrument which does not contain this factor after condition-
ing on the unobservable 7]. For example, the reading score at age 7 might satisfy this 
assumption particular well, as no special mathematics ability might be measured with 
it. A priori, it is however an important task to choose the Z variables. Fortunately, 
as we will see from our Sargan test, using different instruments leads us essentially to 
the same parameter estimates which indicates that there is, if any, very little residual 
correlation between the error terms of the instrument which indicates that we may use 
the other test score as Z. 
The estimates of exj I {3 were weighted In Inverse proportion to their bootstrap 
variance. For the uncorrected and corrected estimates, the three columns correspond to 
(1) no covariates, (2) parental controls, and (3) a large set of parental, school and local 
controls. 
We find that accounting for selection on unobservables matters, as it leads to 
a five to ten-fold reduction of the ATE estimates. The corrected ATE is still mostly 
negative. The effect is marginally significant for the math score at 16 in column (1), but 
insignificantly different from zero for the other outcomes. The effects on qualifications 
are positive in column (1), but also statistically insignificant. 
In Table 4.7 we report the estimates of the returns to the endowment r], In 
the post-treatment relative to the pre-treatment outcomes. The variables Z used as 
"instruments" are ordered as in Table 4.5: Read 11, Verbal 11, Math 7 and Read 
7. The age 11 maths score is used as W throughout, analogously to the previous 
specifications. For instance, the first figure in the first column of Table 4.7 refers to 
the age 11 math score used as Wand the the age 11 reading score used as Z. The 
fourth figure in the same column corresponds to W being the age 11 math, and Z being 
the age 7 reading test scores. In the upper part of the table, we present the estimates 
of exll {3, the relative return in the comprehensive system. In the lower part we report 
180 
ATE ATE (corrected) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Math 16 -1.83 .20 -1.73 -.339 -.341 -.285 
(.19) (-1.76) (.30) (.12) (.15) (.21) 
Years of education -.667 -.784 -.490 -.172 -.499 -.138 
(.26) (.30) (.44) (.26) (.30) (.46) 
Academic qual. -.207 -.226 -2.65 .018 -.015 -.033 
(.04) (.04) (.06) (.03) (.03) (.04) 
Vocational qual. . - 131 -.130 -.223 .008 -.022 -.099 
(.04) (.05) (.07) (.04) (.05) (.06) 
Weekly log wage 2004 -.084 -.176 -.086 .021 -.133 -.044 
(.13) (.15) (.21) (.14) (.15) (.20) 
Average log wage -.048 -.12 -.198 .03 -.094 -.146 
(.18) (.24) (.26) (.18) (.24) (.285) 
Table 4.6: ATE and bias corrected ATE for various specifications of covariates; one-
dimensional "1. 
0.0/ 13 , the relative return in the selective one. We also report the weighted means of 
the estimates, that we used in order to estimate the corrected ATE in Table 4.6. Lastly, 
the included covariates correspond to specification (3) of Table 4.6. 
Several interesting insights can be obtained from Table 4.7. First, the magnitude 
of the effects is informative. The endowment at age 11, "1, has a lower effect on 
later outcomes than on the age 16 test score. Finding coefficients very different from 
one for the other outcomes motivates our quasi-differencing approach, which allows 
for different returns for various test scores. Second, for the math score at 16 and the 
years of education, we find some evidence that the return to "1 is higher in the selective 
system. However, the differences are statistically only weakly significant: for instance, 
the p-value of the difference of the weighted means estimates is .18 for the math score, 
and .20 for the years of education measure. In any cases the differences are small, also 
from a point of view of orders of magnitude. This result challenges the intuition that 
there is a higher reward to "ability" in selective schools, if we are ready to interpret the 
unobservable "1 as ability. At the same time, this result is in line with the results of Table 
4.6, which show only few differences between the two schooling systems. 
Under the null that the model's assumption are satisfied for one single "1, the 
estimands obtained using different variables as instruments should be equal. Indeed, 
the estimates reported in Table 4.7 are of the same order of magnitude, suggesting 
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Maths Years Academic Vocational Log wage Average 
16 education qual. qual. 2004 log wage 
Comprehensive .52 .094 .089 .038 .018 .016 (.01) (.006) (.003) (.005) ( .002) ( .002) 
.50 .069 .076 .035 .014 .011 
(.01) (.005) (.004) (.004) ( .002) (.002) 
.53 .067 .083 .028 .017 .011 
(.02) (.009) (.004) ( .006) ( .003) (.002) 
.53 .067 .083 .028 .017 .013 
(.02) (.009) (.004) ( .006) (.003) (.002) 
weighted mean .51 .074 .077 .036 .016 .012 
(.01) (.004) ( .003) (.004) ( .002) ( .002) 
Selective .56 .116 .088 .037 .016 .016 
(.01) (.006) (.004) (.005) ( .003) ( .002) 
.55 .089 .075 .031 .014 .013 
(.01) ( .006) ( .003) (.004) ( .002) ( .002) 
.58 .084 .073 .035 .017 .013 
(.01) ( .008) (.004) (.007) (.004) (.002) 
.57 .093 .080 .040 .011 .011 
(.02) (.007) (.004) (.006) (.004) ( .003) 
weighted mean .56 .097 .079 .035 .015 .013 
(.01) (.006) ( .003) (.004) ( .003) ( .002) 
Table 4.7: Relative returns to the endowment; one-dimensional TJ; specification (3) of 
Table 4.6. 
Maths Years Academic Vocational Log wage Average 
16 education qual. qual. 2004 log wage 
One-dimensional TJ 
Com prehensive .07 .00 .00 .18 .19 .16 
Selective .34 .00 .00 .31 .28 .19 
Two-dimensional TJ 
Com prehensive .98 .31 .25 .47 .35 .35 
Selective .12 .92 .57 .29 .61 .36 
Table 4.8: P-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions, K = 1 and 2; specification 
(3) of Table 4.6. 
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that a single-1] structure is a reasonable assumption, less so in the case of years of 
education and the number qualifications obtained. To check the statistical validity of 
this assumption, we then report in Table 4.8 the p-values of the tests that all returns are 
equal. In the first two rows, equalities of the estimates a1/ (3 (comprehensive) and ao/ f3 
(selective), for different variables used as "instruments", are tested. Included covariates 
are the same as in the previous table. At conventional levels, the tests do not reject the 
equality in the case of the age 16 math score, vocational qualifications and wages, but 
they do reject it for the two other outcomes. We interpret this rejection as evidence 
that, though not a bad first-order approximation (see Table 4.7), a uni-dimensional 1] 
fails to capture a statistically significant part of the endowments of children. We then 
investigate if a bi-dimensional 7] would do better. The two last rows of Table 4.8 shows 
that it does, with much higher p-values. 
For this reason, we then report the results using the quasi-differencing approach 
able to deal with a bi-dimensional1]. In Table 4.9, we report the corrected ATE estimates, 
where selection on a bivariate unobservable is accounted for. The results indicate a 
similar picture as in Table (4.6). For all outcomes but the wages in column (1) , 
attending a comprehensive school is associated with slightly lower later outcomes. The 
effects are very smilar in magnitude to those in the case of one single 1]. Only the 
significance of the results is marginally affected. 
ATE AT E (corrected) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Math 16 -1.83 -1.76 -1.73 -.316 -.324 -.233 
(.19) (.20) (.30) (.13) (.14) (.28) 
Years of education -.667 -.784 -.490 -.206 -.532 -.175 
(.26) (.30) (.44) (.29) (.27) (.44) 
Academic qual. -.207 -.226 -2.65 -.003 -.030 -.061 
(.04) (.04) (.06) (.03) (.04) (.05) 
Vocational qual. . - 131 -.130 -.223 -.013 -.019 -.106 
(.04) (.05) (.07) (.05) (.05) (.06) 
Weekly log wage 2004 -.084 -.176 -.086 .032 -.137 -.055 
(.13) (.15) (.21) (.15) (.14) (.19) 
Average log wage -.048 -.12 -.198 .042 -.103 -.163 
(.18) (.24) (.26) (.21) (.24) (.30) 
Table 4.9: Uncorrected ATE (equivalent to table 1) and bias corrected ATE for various 
specifications of covariates; bi-dimensional 1]. 
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We then report the estimates of the ATE on variances. The results we obtain 
In Table 4.10 are much more clear-cut than in the case of the ATE on means. We 
find that, even controlling for a bivariate unobserved endowment, selective schools are 
associated with a larger variance. This is true in the case of the math score, for which 
the difference in variance between the two systems is about 10 percent. This is even 
more true in the case of later educational outcomes, where the difference in variances is 
about 25 percent. The variance is also higher in the case of educational qualifications 
and wages, and often significantly so. 
ATE on variances ATE on variances (corrected) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Math 16 -10.102 -9.677 -9.528 -6.311 -5.953 -3.068 
(1.35) ( 1.43) (1.74) (1.87) (1.47) (2.39) 
Years of education , -1.180 -1.343 -1.815 -1.108 -1.286 -1.672 
(.33) (.292) (.457) (.34) (.29) (.447) 
Academic qual. -.172 -.222 -.198 -.117 -.18 -.11 
(.05) (.05) (.07) (.067) (.06) (.07) 
Vocational qual. -.141 -.179 -.240 -.132 -.183 -.227 
(.04) (.05) (.08) (.05) (.05) (.09) 
Weekly log wage 2004 -.08 -.073 -.083 -.08 -.071 -.074 
(.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.04) 
Average log wage -.058 -.060 -.054 -.058 -.059 -.053 
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.027) (.03) 
Table 4.10: ATE and bias corrected ATE on variances for various specifications of 
covariates; bi-dimensional T). 
The results in Table 4.9 and 4.10 suggest that comprehensive shoals do differ 
from selective schools. Moreover, differences appear not to be so much related to the 
average achievement of children, but to their dispersion. As an implication, children at 
selective schools have slightly better educational results, but they face more inequality. 
We view this result as a candidate to explain the push towards comprehensivisation. In 
the next section, we shall investigate this issue more thoroughly. 
We also performed a series of robustness checks. We estimated the effects of 
attending a comprehensive school, restricting the sample to purely selective and purely 
comprehensive LEA's, as proposed by Manning and Pischke (2006). Indeed, if for 
example grammar schools coexist alongside comprehensive schools, they might attract 
the best students (the "cream-skimming" effect). By excluding not fully selective LEA's, 
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we might expect to lower the differences in the age 11 test scores. In that smaller sample 
(638 children in the comprehensive system, 729 in the selective one), we were unable 
to allow for the presence of a bi-dimensional unobserved endowment, as we obtained 
very imprecise estimates. Using one factor, the results are in line with the previous 
ones, though less precisely estimated. Lastly, we estimated the effect of attending 
a comprehensive school for a sample of children that were directly affected by the 
comprehensivisation reform. We found a somewhat more negative effect, suggesting that 
there might have been a short-run impact of the reform (caused e.g. by reorganization 
costs at the school level). These additional results are available from the authors. 
4.6 The two sides of selective schooling 
Selective schools can be of two types, either grammar or secondary modern. By con-
struction, these two types of schools are very different in many respects. In this section, 
we modify the previous analysis in order to account for these differences. 
In Table 4.11, we report the mean outcomes for children attending grammar and 
secondary modern schools. We see that differences within the selective system are 
much stronger than between the selective and comprehensive systems. Indeed, children 
at grammar school score on average 10.1 points more than the ones at secondary schools 
at mathematics at age 16. Differences previous to entry are also enormous, as children 
at selective schools score on average 15.2 points more at maths at age II. 
Consider the following modification of Model (4.1), where the potential outcome 
in the selective system is replaced by two potential outcomes: 
{ 
YOG = fOG(X) + QOG7] + COG, 
Yos = fos(X) + QoS7] + cos· 
In the model, YOG is realized if the child belongs to the selective system (T = 0), and 
if she is assigned to a grammar school (that we denote as G = 1). In turn, Yos is 
realized if T = 0 and the child is assigned to a secondary modern school (G = 0). The 
assumptions of Model (4.1) are readily extended to this model. 
In the context where grammar and secondary modern schools are different, the 
treatment effects calculated in the previous section have no simple interpretation. In-
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Grammar Secondary Modern 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. N I Mean Std. Dev. N 
Female dummy 0.543 0.498 1016 0.485 0.5 1989 
Mathematics score 16 20.482 5.223 985 10.351 5.295 1887 
Reading score 16 31.22 2.98 988 23.994 6.281 1894 
Mathematics score 11 28.538 6.361 913 13.445 8.013 1723 
Reading score 11 22.138 4.412 913 14.459 5.017 1723 
Verbal score 11 31.946 4.827 913 20.165 8.099 1723 
BSAG score 11 4.055 5.297 915 9.064 8.648 1721 
Math score 7 6.884 2.075 936 4.679 2.272 1765 
Reading score 7 28.621 2.244 939 22.147 6.683 1778 
Average wage 4.897 0.559 297 4.54 0.607 428 
1981 log weekly net wage 4.264 0.286 603 4.184 0.375 1050 
1991 log weekly net wage 4.621 0.699 520 4.336 0.746 834 
2000 log weekly net wage 4.727 0.754 566 4.39 0.768 990 
2004 log weekly net wage 4.972 0.716 532 4.665 0.689 832 
age left full-time education 19.072 2.829 739 16.705 1.647 1426 
Academic qualifications 2.947 1.234 881 1.553 1.203 1626 
Vocational qualifications 1.876 1.658 855 1.516 1.483 1582 
All qualifications 3.232 1.047 881 2.096 1.344 1632 
Table 4.11: Comparing outcomes in grammar and secondary modern schools 
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deed, it is difficult to give a precise meaning to Yo, the potential outcome in the selective 
system. One possibility would be to define Yo = G*YOG + (1 - G*)Yos, and define G* 
as a latent assignment to a grammar school for children attending the comprehensive 
system, while G* = G for the ones in the selective system. However, taking this route 
does not appear straightforward given our lack of data on pupils' ability and the precise 
nature of the assignment process. 
Instead, we report in Tables 4.12-4.13 the estimates of the treatment effects of 
the fact of attending a comprehensive school on the outcomes, calculated for children 
attending a selective school. The effects reported in Table 4.12 are formally Average 
Treatment effects for the Non Treated (ATNT): 
6.TNT = IE (Yl - YIT = 0). 
The effects given in Table 4.13 are ATNT on the variances: 
6. V,TNT = Var (YIlT = 0) - Var (YIT = 0). 
ATNT AT NT (corrected) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Math 16 -1.874 -1.876 -1.611 -.236 -.331 .081 
(.16) (.15) (.20) (.14) (.15) (.294) 
Years of education -.521 -.514 -.428 -.105 -.475 .04 
(.14) (.15) (.27) (.18) (.19) (.51) 
Academic qual. -.240 -.251 -.254 -.03 -.066 -.062 
(.03) (.04) (.05) (.03) (.03) (.05) 
Vocational qual. -.12 -.128 -.182 -.032 -.035 -.106 
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.07) 
Weekly log wage 2004 -.056 -.109 .006 .051 -.160 .114 
(.05) (.06) (.ll) (.07) (.079) (.18) 
Average log wage -.052 -.100 -.021 .022 -.152 .117 
(.08) (.09) (.18) (.09) (.13) (.27) 
Table 4.12: ATNT and bias corrected ATNT for various specifications of covariates; 
bi-dimensional TJ. 
The results strengthen the ones obtained in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. For the math 
score, we find negative effects on mean outcomes, for example in column (2). These 
effects are smaller than in Table 4.9 and become insignificant when controlling for 
parental characteristics and LEA characteristics. Overall, the table offers the same 
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picture as Table 4.9. However, effects on variances are still large and significant, only 
the wage variables seem statistically weakly significant. 
ATNT on variances ATNT on variances (corrected) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Math 16 -10.101 -9.692 -10.385 -6.189 -5.260 -2.695 
(1.26) (1.35) (1.68) (1.32) (1.66) (2.29) 
Years of education -1.101 -1.408 -1.564 -1.01 -1.315 -1.428 
(.35) (.34) (.41) (.35) (.37) (.43) 
Academic qual. -.170 -.232 -.221 -.115 -.181 -.125 
(.06) (.05) (.08) (.06) (.06) (.09) 
Vocational qual. -.134 -.186 -.246 -.134 -.188 -.246 
(.05) (.06) (.09) (.05) (.07) (.10) 
Weekly log wage 2004 -.091 -.072 -.070 -.087 -.066 -.058 
(.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) 
Average log wage -.053 -.059 -.041 -.050 -.056 -.038 
(.03) (.02) (.04) (.03) (.02) (.04) 
Table 4.13: ATNT and corrected ATNT on variances for various specifications of co-
variates; bi-dimensional Tj. 
As in the previous section, the strongest result we obtain is the fact that selective 
schools show more dispersion in educational outcomes than comprehensive ones. The 
effect on means, when significant, is of a smaller order of magnitude. In the rest of this 
section, we intend to better understand the sources of this greater dispersion. 
One source of the higher variance shown by the selective sytem is the variance 
between grammar and secondary schools. To investigate if these differences are robust 
to the inclusion of covariates we would ideally like to estimate the ATE parameter: 
~GS = IE (YOG - YoslT = 0). 
Still, this overall average is meaningless as, by construction, there are very few children 
in grammar schools with a low Tj, say in the lower quartile of the distribution. The 
low-Tj children in secondary modern schools have no counterparts in grammar schools 
to whom they could be compared. Note that the lack of overlap occurs because of the 
unobserved regressor Tj, for which we have no direct measure. In Figure 4.2 we draw 
the densities of the "ability" and "parental background" components in grammar and 
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Figure 4.2: The "ability" and "parental background" principal components for pupils 
attending secondary modern (dash-dotted line) and grammar schools (solid line). 
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secondary modern schools. The upper panel, which represents "ability", illustrates what 
is likely to be the case of the distribution of Tj, showing little room for comparison. 
For this reason, we choose to compute averages on children that have an interme-
diate level of the "ability" factor, between the percentiles .40 and .80. These children 
have significant probabilities of attending the two school types. We report in Table 4.14 
the corrected ATE estimate, which allows for a uni-dimensional Tj. We find strong some 
strong positive effects of the fact of attending a grammar school on all outcomes. When 
corrected by the quasi-differencing method allowing for one scalar endowment, the ef-
fects are much reduced but still strongly significant for the math scores and the wages. 
The effect on the years of education and academic qualifications obtained is insignifi-
cantly different from zero. Lastly, the effect on the number of vocational qualification 
levels obtained is negative and insignificant. 
ATE AT E (corrected) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Math 16 10.645 9.991 10.664 2.705 2.385 2.678 
(.96) (.92) (1.03) (.87) (.76) (.78) 
Years of education 1.366 3.057 4.170 1.124 1.264 2.152 
(1.56) (1.285) (1.51) (1.24) (1.16) (1.19) 
Academic qual. 1.210 1.226 1.377 .16 .08 .14 
(.19) (.17) (.23) (.17) (.18) (.25) 
Vocational qual. .35 .369 .444 -.132 -.127 -.26 
(.19) (.17) (.21) (.24) (.21) (.26) 
Weekly log wage 2004 1.358 1.071 1.807 .875 .589 1.109 
(.53) (.50) (.618) (.50) (.52) (.49) 
Average log wage 1.687 1.620 3.006 1.113 .991 2.206 
(.70) (.69) (.84) (.59) (.56) (.88) 
Table 4.14: Bias corrected ATE of attending a grammar rather than a secondary modern 
school. for various specifications of covariates; uni-dimensional Tj. 
These results shed some light on the differences between selective and compre-
hensive secondary schooling. Comparing the orders of magnitude in Tables 4.12 and 
4.14 shows that there are few differences in means between the two systems, but there 
are strong differences between the two school types of the selective system. This has 
interesting implications for the understanding of the schooling reform in Britain. As 
any test, the ll-plus exam involves several factors: the ability of the child, her specific 
preparation and, importantly, a certain amount of luck. By comparing children with 
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similar ability who ended up at a grammar or a secondary modern school, we measure 
the "premium" that is associated with being sucessful at the exam. The estimates 
we obtain suggest that this premium is large, and explains a part of the variance in 
outcomes in the selective system. The conclusions of this exercise are related to the 
findings of Maurin and McNally (2006), who show that relaxing the admission criteria to 
grammar schools in Northern Ireland has led to an increase in total educational attain-
ment. However, to our knowledge no such reform was undertaken in Britain. From the 
perspective of parents, the variance between school types represents a risk associated 
with the probability of failing the ll-plus exam. As we find small differences in means 
between the two schooling systems, it may have been rational for risk-averse parents to 
support the push towards comprehensivisation. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Several recent papers in the literature insist on the fact that it is difficult to separate the 
effect of school type on educational outcomes from other factors, most importantly the 
child's ability. Possible answers to this problem are to use "natural experiments" (Meghir 
and Palme (2005), and Maurin and McNally (2006)), or to exploit cross-country and 
time variation (Woessmann and Hanushek (2006)). The absence of such data motivates 
our quasi-differencing method, that uses the availability of various test scores previous 
to secondary schooling. 
It is often thought that when choosing between selective and comprehensive ed-
ucation one faces a trade-off between efficiency and equity. We find little evidence of 
such a trade-off. The raw data from the NCDS, as well as regressions using a large 
set of covariates, suggest that children attending selective schools have better results 
on average. We show that this is mainly the result of composition effects in terms of 
unobservables, selective schools having a better intake. When we difference the unob-
servables out, the effect of attending a selective school is still positive, but small and 
most often insignificantly different from zero. In contrast, the difference in variance 
remains, at least for the maths and years of education outcomes. In addition, we give 
some evidence on the sources of the higher variance in the selective system, showing 
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that there is a large premium to passing the admission exam and attending a grammar 
school. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis has examined the economics of child labour and child education. It has pro-
vided a new theoretical model of the commitment problem of child labour in developing 
countries and it has empirically assessed the intergenerational transmission of education 
across three generations and evaluated the impact of a schooling system reform in the 
United Kingdom. 
The thesis focused first on developing countries. Here economic motivations for 
parents to chose child labour instead of child education are very strong if parents are 
poor and if, additionally, commitment problems prevent efficient educational investment. 
In a theoretical model, this thesis showed that the informational requirement of an ob-
servable history of play is crucial to equilibria proposed so far in the literature. Without 
this observability, additional sanctions or bequests are needed to enforce first-best in-
tergenerational contracts. We also derived an important role for grandparents in this 
model, as they save over a longer horizon, can more credibly commit to bequests than 
parents and observe the game for a longer time-span. Bequest sanctions act in this 
model as a punishment, but also as a costly signal. The implications of this analysis 
were that families might have difficulties implementing intergenerational contracts. This 
gives room for public policy, which needs to address not only the poverty problem, but 
needs to provide a solution to the intergenerational dynamic commitment problem. 
In chapter three we tried, to some extent, to test the influence of grandparents on 
grandchildren. In censored regressions, and without taking into account the potential 
endogeneity of education, we find strong effects for grandparents bequests, education 
and the presence of grandparents on grandchildren's education. As soon as we address 
the endogeneity using IV techniques, the strong effect of education disappears. We then 
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observe, however, a significant impact of unobservable factors of parents and grandpar-
ents on grandchildren's education. This is of considerable interest to policy and agrees 
with other studies in this area. It is not education itself, but rather other important 
factors that determine the education choice. This could be ability, parenting skills or 
attention dedicated to the child. A closer examination of these unobservable factors is a 
challenging starting point for future research. Policy could try to affect these variables 
in order to increase educational attainment of generations. 
Finally, chapter four evaluates another aspect of educational choice, a schooling 
reform within England and Wales. There has been a large discussion on the effects 
of this reform. Previous studies, who evaluated this reform, are potentially biased due 
to so called composition effect, i.e. the fact that comprehensive schools have a much 
worse intake of students than selective schools. This last chapter addresses this bias by 
developing an original econometric technique of quasi-differencing. We use test scores 
prior to pupils' enrolment in the comprehensive school to estimate one or more unknown 
factors, such as ability, in the data. The analysis is then conducted by matching on the 
difference between pre-and post reform outcomes. The bias is removed by differencing 
out the unobservable component from the matching estimand. Using this technique, 
we find that comprehensive school pupils do, on average, no worse than a child in the 
selective system. We find, however, a higher variance in outcomes for those pupils 
attending schools within the selective system. This is indicative, in our interpretation, 
of a higher risk associated with the selective system. Indeed, we show that once pupils 
pass the selection exam to enter grammar school, there is a large premium associated 
with attending a grammar school rather than a secondary modern school. Thus, if a 
pupil belongs to the middle range of a hypothetical ability scale, there is a non-ignorable 
probability of failing the admission exam, due to factors outside of control of the child 
or the parent (i.e. "having a bad day" during the exam). This might influence the 
schooling choices of the child in a negative way. Thus parent might have been aware 
of this risk and initiated a movement for the establishment of comprehensive schools, 
which as documented by sociologists, was a "grass-roots" initiative. 
In summary, this thesis presents some original theoretical and empirical work which 
links with debates in the literature on the economics of child labour and child education 
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and provides new results. The thesis aims to become a reference work in this area, but 
also a basis for interesting future work. This would include a more thorough investiga-
tion of the role of grandparents in association with intergenerational transfers, a closer 
scrutiny of unobservable factors in the data which influence educational attainment and 
a re-evaluation of the influence of the school system on outcomes using more recent 
data. 
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Appendix A 
Chapter 2 
A.I Symmetry of equilibrium in two generational cyclic games 
A useful property of cyclic games can be derived if we elaborate on the similarities 
between two-generation cyclic OG games and a general class of symmetric games. 
The proceeding will be as follows. We first define cyclic two-generation OG games. 
Then we define symmetric games. We then show that a cyclic two-generation OG game 
has a finite symmetric normal form representation for every player t interacting with 
t + 1. From this, we can invoke Theorem 2 of Nash (1951), which asserts that any finite 
symmetric game must have a symmetric equilibrium point. This is thus also special 
property of cyclic two-generation OG games, which simplifies the search for equilibria 
considera bly. 
Definition 5 A cyclic two-generation OG game is characterised by 
(i) a (possibly) infinite set of players tEN, 
(ii) a finite set 5, composed of k pure strategies, each player t chosing Stk E 5, 5 
being the same for all players tEN, 
(iii) a payoff function W which depends exclusively on the strategies played by player 
t and player t + I, thus 
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(iv) an associated normal form representation as a matrix M of dimension k x k, each 
element being a two-element row vector, denoting the payoffs to player t and t+ 1. 
Example: Prisonners Dilemma Consider the famous prisonners' dilemma game, 
played as a cyclic two generation OG game. Player t is in the game, player t + 1 
enters the game. Player t plays against player t + 1, and then player t exits. Player 
t + 1 is then already in the game and player t + 2 will enter. Thereafter, player t + 1 
plays against player t + 2, and then player t + 1 exits ... et cetera. The player set can thus 
clearly be infinte. 
Furthermore, the strategy set of player t is the same as for player t + 1 and so 
forth and equal to confess, C, or not confess, NC, thus S = {NC, C}. How can we 
obtain a normal form representation? The game is forward looking, i.e. we don't know 
what player t + 1 will do against player t + 2, since this will occur in the next step of 
the game. We can however use an equivalence: As the strategies of player t + 2 are 
the same as those of player t, we can, label a player t equivalently as a player t + 2 and 
construct our payoff matrix. 
Payoffs to player t only given actions of t + 1 can be expressed in the following 
matrix, Ct. 
Player t+1 
NC 
C 
Player t 
NC C 
1 -1 
2 1 
Similarily, we can do exactly the same for player t + 1 and obtain Ct+1: 
Player t+2 
NC 
C 
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Player t+1 
NC C 
1 -1 
2 1 
which is trivially equivalent. To reconsider the problem mentionned above, player 
t only has the following information about the normal form representation in period, a 
2 x 2 matrix, Alt with vector valued entries: 
Player t+1 
Player t 
NC C 
NC I (l,a) 1(-I,b)1 
C I (2, c) I (0, d) I 
We ignore what player t + 1 payoffs against player t will be: Player t + 1 moves 
against player t + 2, and not against t. Thus we wrote abitrary values a, b, c, d into the 
matrix for the moment. Choices of player t + 1 affect player t. And we know player 
t + 2 has the same strategies than both players player t and t + 1 and furthermore the 
same payoff function. 
In Alt player t + 1 is a column player. In the (individual) payoff matrix for player 
t + 1, he is a row player. To know what player t + 1 chose against t + 2 as a column 
player, I will have to transpose matrix Gt+1. Now use the fact that player t's strategies 
are equivalent to those of player t + 2. Let the matrix Gt be renamed P with a typical 
element being Pij. Denote the transpose of Gt+1 as Q. Denote a typical element of Q 
as qij. Then we can form the following normal form representation, M: 
Player t+1 
Where clearly 
Player t 
NC C 
NC I (Pl1, ql1)I(P12, q12)1 
C I(P21, Q21)I(P22, Q22)1 
Then in the Prisonners Dilemma cyclic OG game, the normal form representation 
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is given by 
Player t+1 
Player t 
NC C 
NC 1 (1,1) 1(-1,2)1 
C 1(2, -1)1 (0,0) I 
From this example, it is now obvious that there is some for of symmetry in cyclic 
games, since players have the same strategies in every period, and we assumed here that 
they receive the same payoff. In order to deepen our understanding of symmetry, let us 
state the symmetry definition of Nash (1951). 
Definition 6 (Symmetry. Nash (1951» 
Suppose there are n players. An automorphism or symmetry of a game will be a 
permutation of its pure strategies which satisfies certain conditions on the permutation 
of players. Let ¢ be a permutation of the pure strategies. ¢ induces a permutation 'If; of 
the players. Let X denote the permutation of the pure strategies induced. Each n-tuple 
of pure strategies is therefore permuted into another n-tuple of pure strategies. Let ~ 
be one such n-tuple of pure strategies. Let Wi(~) denote the payoff to player i when 
such an n-tuple is employed. It is required that if 
j = i1/J, 
Example We require only the two player case, whereas Nash (1951) considered the 
n-player setup. Consider the general matrix representation of a two-player, two-strategy 
game. The strategies here are x and y. Payoffs to each player are denoted by W, 
subscripted by strategies played by the row player (first subscript) and by the column 
player (second subscript) and superscripted by the player index. 
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Player t 
x y 
Player t+1 
x I (W;Xl W;x) I (W;Yl W;y) I 
y (~V~Xl W;x) (W~Yl W;y) 
If players are now permuted by the rule j = 'i1/J, player 2 is interchanged with 
player 1 and vice-versa. According to Nash (1951), it should be true that if players are 
permuted, and they play strategies permuted in the same manner, payoffs should be 
equal. More formally, 
Here the player index was permuted, 11/J -----+ 2, 21/J -----+ 1. In the simple two player case, 
this implies interchange of players, thus their strategies should also be interchanged. 
Similarily it must hold, 
and of course 
These four conditions encompass all the pure strategy combinations in the two 
player case. 
If one examines now player l's payoffs only, collected in a matrix A, we have 
Similarily, collect all the payoffs of player B in a matrix 
The four conditions on pure strategies will only be true if 
A' =B. 
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Proposition 6 A cyclic 2-generation OG game with identical payoffs for each time 
period has a finite symmetric normal form representation. 
Proof The payoffs to player t + 1 facing player t + 2, playing strategies St+1 and 
St+~ respectively are the same as the payoffs to player t facing player t + 1, playing 
strategies St and St+1. This follows from the identical payoff functions for each time 
period, H't+1(St+1' St+2) = wt(St, St+1) whenever St+1 = St and St+1 = St+2· 
A k x k payoff matrix for player t may be formed as follows. Playing against player 
t + 1, player t will receive the following payoffs. 
wi1 wi2 Wkk 
W~l W~2 W~k 
Player t's k strategies are the rows of this matrix, whereas player t+ 1 's k strategies 
are the columns of this matrix. A typical element of P is given by Pij· 
Player t + 1 then plays against t + 2. Thus player t + 1 has a payoff matrix of the 
following form. 
P= 
wit1 wit1 
W~t1 W~t1 
W~t1 
W t+1 Wt+1 W t+1 k1 k2· . . kk 
Player t + l's k strategies are the rows of the same matrix P, whereas player 
t + 2's k strategies are the columns of this same matrix P. The matrices are identical 
since, W t = W t+1 whenever St+1 = St and St+1 = St+2· 
In the game of player t + 1 against player t + 2, the strategy of player t + 2 is equal 
to the strategy of player t. The strategy set of player t + 2 is equal to the strategy set of 
player t. This follows from the definition of a cyclic 2-generation OG game. Transposing 
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the matrix P to yield pI = Q, relabelling player t + 2 player t and forming a new matrix 
by joining P and Q, we obtain a new k x k matrix normal form representation M with 
each entry consisting of a vector, mij = (pij, qij). 
The payoff to player t is given in the first entry of m'ij and the payoff to player 
t + 1 in the second entry of 'mij. Nash's (1951) symmetry condition requires 
wt( . . ) = W t+1 ( . . ) ~,) ), ~ , 
and thus 
Pij = %i· 
Consider player t playing strategy i and player t + 1 playing strategy j. This yields 
mij = (pij, qij) and hence payoff Pij to player t. Player t + 1 playing strategy i and 
player t playing strategy j (interchange of strategies) yields mji = (pji, qji) and hence 
payoff qji to player t + 1. 
It follows that Pij = qji since qji is obtained from entry Pij of the original matrix 
by the usual rule of transposition. Since qij = Pij, player t + 1 earns the same payoff as 
player t when interchanging strategies, which completes the proof of symmetry in the 
sense of Nash (1951) D 
Proposition 7 A cyclic 2-generation OG game with time invariant payoffs has a sym-
metric equilibrium point 
Proof Since the cyclic 2-generation OG game with time invariant payoffs has a finite 
symmetric normal form representation, it follows immediately by Theorem 2 in Nash 
(1951) that it has a symmetric equilibrium point. D 
The above proposition simplifies the search for equilibria, since only symmetric 
equilibrium points can be candidates for a long run solution. However, another twist 
occurs in our game, which we need to account for. Every period, payoff to members of 
a given generation increases by a proportional factor because of wage growth g. Thus, 
suppose we have the payoffs received in the payoff points as Wi,t, the payoff received 
in payoff point VI at time t. Because of wage growth g, we have Wi,t = PI W 1,t+l, 
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llT2.t = P2 11 '2,t+1. ... , llT16,t = P16 V 16,t+l in our particular game. How does this affect 
the equilibrium? 
Proposition 8 (i) A unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in a 2-player normal form 
game is not affected by a transformation that multiplies all the payoffs of one player 
by the same constant. (ii) It is also not affected by a transformation that multiplies 
every payoff of that player by a different constant, but keeps the original ranking of the 
payoffs. 
Proof A Nash equilibrium point in pure strategies is characterised by each player 
chosing a pure strategy Si, such that 
Wi(S*) = max Wi(s~i' Si). 
Si 
If the ordering of the payoffs is unchanged for player i, the condition will still hold 
true. Suppose W: = pWi for all payoffs of player i. Then it will still be true that 
(ii) Suppose the payoffs of player i are ranked in the following way using the 
abbreviation notation 
Wj = Wi(s~i' Sj) and W k = Wi(s~i' Sk). Suppose the payoffs of the best re-
sponse are ranked before the transformation as Wj > Wi > Wk. Thus, maxSi Wi(s~i' Si) = 
TTlj in this case. Now suppose we multiply each of these best response payoffs by the 
constant of the corresponding index, the constants satisfying Pj > Pl > Pk, thus multi-
plying each payoff by a different constant, but keeping the original ordering of payoffs. 
Consequently Wj is still the maximum of the best response payoffs. D 
Of course, the previous proposition does not hold for multiple equilibria, and not 
generally for a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. In a multiple equilibria setting, a player 
must be indifferent between at least two strategies in the support of his mixed strategy 
- implied by the linearity of expected payoffs in probabilities. Thus, changing one payoff 
by a greater factor than the other will not preserve the ordering (!) and hence only fully 
proportional transformations preserve the ordering in a multiple equilibria setting. 
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Example Prisonners dilemma 
We have: 
Player t+l 
NC 
C 
Player t 
NC C 
(ITC,ITC) (ITD,ITP) 
(ITP,ITD) (ITN,ITN) 
The ranking of the payoffs is as usual, ITD > ITC > ITN > ITp. 
The equilibrium point here is (IT N, ITN), since each player prefers to play D, since 
7":D > ITc· A transformation, multiplying P > 1 into each of the payoffs of player 2 
(column player) only, does not change his payoff ordering and thus not his strategy. 
Even if a tra nsformation, wh ich preserves the orderi ng, is a II owed for PI IT D > P2IT C > 
P3 711Y > P4ITp, the pure strategies of player 2 will not be affected. 
A.2 Choice of the first-best contract 
It is not without implications how to solve the joint maximisation problem. We assume 
first that the individuals utility function is strictly concave in the transfer a - i.e. there 
exists a transfer that improves total family utility. Furthermore, the child labour wage 
is always smaller than or equal to the adult uneducated wage - i.e. no unrealistic corner 
solutions with respect to l exist. 
In this situation, the first best outcome is reached, if an individual first maximises 
his lifetime utility with respect to a* and then parents chose the appropriate level of 
human capital investment l*. This can be shown as follows. We denote the scenario 
when parents chose first l and then children chose a as maximisation problem I, with 
h as optimal solution and we denote the maximisation problem where children choose 
a first and then parents l as scenario 2, with solution l2· 
Given parents maximise the first order with respect to h, the first order condition 
for II is given by 
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WCH 
-h'(lt) =-. 
a (A.l) 
Given children chose first the optimal a* and parents choose l2, we can show, using the 
result 
0* = h(l2) - /\J'(g)h(l2) - M'(g)gI2 w fH 
M'(g)gh(l2) + h(l2) , 
that this implies parents maximising the following FOC over l2: 
which has the solution 
(A.2) 
Note that for the above a* to be positive, we need the concavity condition of the 
utility function in a and this implies 9 > 1. 
Now, one can show that for human capital to be greater under scenario 1, the 
amount of child labour is lower for a E [0,1]. The amount of child labour is implicitly 
indicated by the derivative function h' (l), which is decreasing in its argument. Applying 
again an inverse function, h'-l, we obtain that the solution l must be increasing in the 
argument. Thus we can compare the two right hand sides of Equation (A.l) and (A.2). 
Child labour in scenario 1 can only be lower if 
WCH wCH /\1'(g) 
--;- < (1 + M'(g)) , 
·f (I+M'(g 1 
or I a > (M'(g) > . 
Since a E [0,1]' this implies that h > l2. 
Now, an argument from the optimal first oder conditions on a shows that any 
I > l2 must yield a lower utility. 
The optimal first order conditions on al imply 
(A.3) 
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for an interior solution for (Y. Now suppose h(ld(l- ad) with it > l2, then if CY.1 = CY.2, 
the first part of the utility function satisfies 
If 01 > 0:2, the above condition is still satisfied, and we obtain the result immedi-
ately: the FOe equality, Equation (A.3) or simplified W'(.) = gW'(.), implies that the 
second part of the utility function satisfies: 
It follows that both arguments of the utility function under maximisation problem 2 are 
also greater, by the properties of marginal utilities, namely if W'(a) > W'(b) ---+ a < b. 
If 01 < 02, then there can be no solution, since a reduction in CY.2 below CY.1 entails 
an utility loss of (1 - g)W'O, which is negative for 9 > 1. Thus total utility will fall 
further from the situation where CY.2 = CY.1 where equal. 
Illustration Figure A.1 illustrates the above result. The total utility with transfer CY. 
is depicted under the two maximisation schemes. One can see that both functions are 
concave in CY., but that the function for maximisation problem 1 stays strictly within the 
enveloppe formed by the function from maximisation problem 2. 
3 
.20.40.60.8 1 1.21.4 
alpha 
Max procedure 1 
Max procedure 2 
Figure A.1: Example of the two maximisation procedures 
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A.3 The relation between cyclic OG games, the normal form 
and overlapping generations games 
Cyclic OG games have not been intensively studied in the literature. However, they 
possess interesting properties. This appendix is designed to highlight specificities and 
similarities of cyclic OG games. Let us start with the similarities by arguing that a 
cyclic OG game has the same (pure or mixed) equilibria as the normal form static game. 
Suppose we have the following normal form representation of a game for players 1 and 
2, G1 : 
Player 1 
NC C 
NC (1,1) (-1,2) 
Player 2 
C (2, -1) (0,0) 
Player 1 plays rows and player 2 columns. How can we obtain the cyclical game 
representation of this normal form game? Cyclic games are dynamic games, thus they 
have to be written in extensive form. Also, we have to take into account that player 
1 enters the game at his entry point, makes a decision and then exits the game while 
he is overlapping with player 2. Since player 1 has an entry and an exit point, we can 
always cut the game at those two points. This will leave us with a finite, acyclic graph. 
In the case of Prisonners' dilemma as above, we would have the graph of figure A.2 for 
player 1: 
As in the main text, the player enters at his first decision point and exits at the 
exit point marked Vi. From this tree we can quickly derive the equilibrium solution 
looking, for example, at behavioural strategies. Each player randomises his choices. 
Player 1 plays C with probability p and D with probability 1 - p, Player 2 plays C with 
probability q and D with probability 1 - q. One can easily check that player 1 should 
play with probability p* = ° and Player 2 should play with probability q* = 0, thus the 
only equilibrium in this game is the usual, namely p* = q* = 0, and thus (0,0) in pure 
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'\1 Lv 
(' -_. • P2 D 
/'\1 
• PI 
-- '\1 -- c 
" .~: 
D 
Figure A.2: A finite graph from the Prisonners dilemma game, assuming player 1 moves 
first. 
strategies. 
As the other normal form games, also cyclic games have at least one equilibrium. 
Consider this example which is a game that cannot be solved by applying pure strategies 
or for example iteratively eliminating dominated strategies. 
Player 2 
Player 1 
NC C 
NC I (4,0) I (0,4) I 
C I (1,2) I (2,1) I 
Applying the same methodology as above, one can determine that player 1 should 
play p* = ~ player 2 should play q* = *. Since cyclic overlapping generation games use 
as the main building blocks of finite extensive form games and these can be converted 
to normal form, the Nash (1950) result applies as well here: every finite normal form 
game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus also every cyclic OG game must 
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have at least one (pure or mixed) strategy equilibrium. 
Cyclic OG games behave as normal form games. However, they are dynamic 
games with players that enter and exit all along the game. They do not have an end 
and are thus infinite. If we look at approaches in the literature that come close to such a 
setup, we could think of comparing repeated play of a stage game in normal form with a 
cyclic game. The usual infinite repeated stage game has two players playing repeatedly 
against themselves a simultaneous move game. In this traditional setup players stay 
the same. Therefore, a better comparison would be to consider play of stage games 
by overlapping players, (Smith (1992), Bhaskar (1998), Yoon (2001), Kandori (1992)). 
We will illustrate the differences of these games with respect to cyclic games with the 
example of Prisonners' dilemma as this was almost exclusively used in the literature. 
The first major difference is obviously, that cyclic games have a dynamic structure 
where players do not move simultaneously. This is crucial for the equilibrium strategy 
proposed within the cyclic game. 
Two types of setups will be compared. First the repeated play of Prisonners' 
dilemma is studied with players that overlap for one period and play the game twice. 
In the jargon of the literature on overlapping generation games, players will playa first 
time when they are young and a second time when they are old. Thus in the young 
generation the player plays C or D against a player of the old generation. Then the 
young player takes the place of the old player. The old player plays then against the 
next young player, chosing C or D. Which equilibria can be implemented? 
As Bhaskar (1998) states, these players can implement two types of strategies con-
sidered by the literature, they can play GRIM or RESILIENT. I will paraphrase Bhaskar 
(1998) in the following two sections. Both of the strategies GRIM and RESILIENT 
suppose knowledge of the history of play. Consider strategy GRIM: A young agent plays 
D while the older agent (with whom he overlaps) plays C. Thus a young agent makes 
a transfer to the older player of -1. Each subsequent player does so if all the history of 
play has been (C,D). An old player receives thus 2 always and a young player -1, thus 
each a lifetime payoff of 7r = -1 + 62. As long as 6 > ~ such an equilibrium is possible. 
If the young agent would play D and fail to make a transfer, all other agents would 
revert to play D since this is the NE of the game, and thus a best response. Knowledge 
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of the entire history of play is necessary, and we will explain this in more detail below. 
Consider strategy RESILIENT: In this set-up, only deviants will be punished: If 
a young person deviates from the above equilibrium, he will be punished by playing 
D in the next young generation, when the deviator is old. This yields the deviator a 
lifetime payoff of o. The next young are identified as "police man" and can still expect 
a transfer when they enter the old stage. Again, knowledge of the entire history of play 
is necessary, since otherwise a player cannot distinguish between individuals who are 
"police men" or who are deviators. 
Bhaskar (1998) and Yoon (2001) give the same, relevant example concerning 
observability of the history of play. Consider the strategy RESILIENT or GRIM: Suppose 
every player can only remember what the previous generation did. So a player in period 
t can only remember what players in peridod t - 1 did. Player t must give a transfer 
to t - 1 when he is young. If he fails to do so, then he must be punished by player 
t + 1. However, when player t + 1 initiates the punishment sequence, player t + 2 cannot 
distinguish if the agent justifiably initiated a punishment or if that agent simply deviated. 
Player t + 2 cannot verify what player t did because he does not observe the history of 
play. Thus, agent t + 1 will also be punished in any case, since this is the best reply. 
Thus agent t + 1 has an incentive to conceal player t's deviation and do as if nothing 
happened. Clearly then player t plays a deviation - thus there is no other equilibrium 
than the non-cooperative Nash solution in this context. This has been referred to as 
the "Anti-Folk Theorem", Bhaskar (1998). Cyclic games push this logic to an extreme, 
since in cyclic games, there is absolutely no memory. Some other equilibria are possible 
in an extension of the Prisonners' Dilemma, because cyclic games feature sequential 
moves. 
I will show now how an equilibrium can be sustained in a cyclic game, when there 
is no memory but sequential moves and a conditional transfer or a bequest. 
Let us stay in the prisonners dilemma example, but let us adopt the more general 
matrix formulation where 7rG is the cooperative payoff, 7r D is the payoff of playing D 
when the other player plays C and thus the deviation payoff and 7r P is the payoff when 
the player plays C when the other play D. Clearly 7r D > 7rG > 7rN E > 7r p . Let a II 
payoffs be normalised so that the Nash-Equilibrium payoff, 7rNE = o. 
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Player 2 
NC 
C 
NC 
Player 1 
C 
(0,0) 
Suppose as in the main text, that some part of the old generations' consumption 
can be earmarked as a bequest. This implies that this resource is now only available to be 
left to the next generation at the end of the players life. The old player cannot consume 
the bequest, but he can disinherit. Every old player proposes thus the following contract: 
respond with cooperation to my cooperative move (dynamic). I will then bequest to 
you b*. What are the decisions of the young player? Suppose the young player decides 
to cooperate, his payoff will be 
if he applies the contract to his an the next generations. 
If he does not cooperate he can at most obtain 
trying to deviate and implement the contract with the next generation. Thus in order 
for him to accept the contract, it must hold that 
and thus simply the bequest needs to be the difference in payoffs, b* = 7rD - 7rG . By 
construction, it must hold that for positive bequests, b* < 7rG , implying 7rD < 27rG for 
this equilibrium to exist. 
Does an old player need to worry that a young player will deviate? No, since 
the young player (by subgame perfection) will always choose to play the contract if the 
above condition holds. Let us impose first the fact that parents will never bequest to 
a deviator and always bequest to a cooperating young. Thus, given the same payoff, 
parents weakly prefer the cooperation outcome. This can be seen as "revenge thinking" 
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in a more moderate setting. Once the bequest is earmarked, parents forego it willingly. 
Therefore their best response to deviation of the children is to disinherit. Indeed, parents 
utility is not affected by the destination of the resource they cannot consume. Thus 
their best response to deviation of children (payoff reducing pay) is not to bequest and 
their best response to cooperation is to bequest. The following game structure (figure 
6) illustrates entering, choices and exit of players and the game tree which cuts at the 
entry and exit point of the child take this best response into account. 
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Figure A.3: The simplified overlapping Prisonners dilemma game, eliminating parents 
weakly dominated bequest strategies. 
We depict a child (PI) in generation t + 1 and all his possible choices given his 
parents t and his future children's choices Plt+2. In order not to overcharge the picture, 
we only depict the first four exit points, although they are in total 16 exit points. Notice 
that the game is dynamic and thus not the usual simultaneous move game. The own 
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choices of player t + 1 are underlined. The payoffs for the players at the exit points are 
displayed in the next table. 
Given parents played C 
children playing C children playing D 
Move Payoff Move Payoff 
CCC ;-;-l' + b* + 8(7rc - b*) DCC 7r D + 8(7rc - b*) 
CC D 7rc + b* + 87r P DC D 7rD + 87rP 
CDC 7rc + b* + 87rD D DC 7rD + 87rD 
C DD 7rc + b* + 87r NE DDD 7rD + 87r NE 
Given parents played D 
children playing C children playing D 
Move Payoff Move Payoff 
CCC 7rP + 8(7rc - b*) DCC 7rNE + 8(7rc - b*) 
CC D 7rP + 87r P DCD 7rNE + 87rP 
CDC 7rP + 87rD D DC 1TN E + 81T D 
CDD 7r P + 87r NE DDD 7rNE + 87rNE 
As the game is dynamic, we can eliminate strategies which are not subgame 
perfect. Looking at the second part of the table, given parents played D, we note that 
children must always play D in this case. All the payoffs are indeed higher responding 
with D, which is of course also the Nash-best reponse in the original game. Based on 
this fact, we can then eliminate from the top part of the table the strategies CDC and 
DDC respectively, given parents played C. This is simply because D should be followed 
by D, and because children observe parents' move. Since by definition of our bequest 
1TC + b* > 1TD , we can see that all other payoffs are lower than CCC, thus children will 
always play C given that parents play C and can commit to such a contract. 
The equilibrium in this game rests strongly on the ability to commit to a bequest 
and being able to disinherit. Thus there is a natural tension between commiting to 
reserve an amount of money and then perhaps not giving it. This tension is resolved by 
the fact that by our definition of bequest resources, these are impossible to consume. 
It is therefore not possible for parents to renege on their choices since they cannot gain 
by refusing the bequestl. 
There are two interesting and interdependent extensions of this model. Suppose a 
random cooperation payoff, i.e. a risky environment. Then sometimes, the parents would 
IThis simple set-up does not work in the game proposed in the main text because of the wage growth 
over generations: bequests also need to grow at the same rate. 
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not be able to commit to a bequest because of lack of income. A certain threshold needs 
indeed to be crossed for bequests to be applicable. Thus children will play cooperation 
and deviation with mixed strategies and some child labour may exist in equilibrium. A 
related issue to randomness is the following: Suppose income was low in the past and no 
family could apply the contract because no bequest resources were available. But there is 
now a durable increase in parents income to sustain a bequest. Then we can explain the 
emergence of cooperative equilibrium play. However, the counterpart of this assumption 
is that all generations must be convinced that future incomes will be high enough, 
otherwise the contract will also break down, or some fraction of non-cooperative moves 
may exist in a new equilibrium. Using mixed strategies, cyclic games can unfold their full 
potential, since they can be used to derive stationary mixed strategy equilibria. Because 
of constraints in space an time, we have not elaborated on this interesting property of 
cyclic games, but this will constitute an interesting point on a future research agenda. 
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Appendix B 
Chapter 3 
B.1 Results for the probit specification 
This section explores the relationship between the NCDS grandchildren staying on at 
school after the minimum leaving age (16 years) or leaving school, given that we observe 
that they are already 16 years or older. In this set-up, there is no censoring. We can 
still use the control function approach in the probit case, but do not have to account 
for censoring. This provides also an additional robustness check on the results. We 
constructed a dummy variable equal to one for children staying on at school, and present 
some further evidence on the education transmission effects. 
The results for the probit model presented in Table B.1 are different from the 
estimates of the censored normal model. This is also to be expected, as the decision to 
stay on in school after the minimum leaving age might be different from the decision to 
take more education. Note the relatively small effect of parents, and note that mother's 
education seems barely significant in the staying-on decision of children. Notice as well 
that the aggregate measure of human capital displays a negative effect on the staying-on 
decision, although not significant. This negative influence is difficult to interpret, but it is 
consistent with some of the results in the tables in the main text. Also the father's control 
function is again significant, indicating that unobserved factors enter these relationships. 
Notice that mother's education does play statistically and economically a marginal role 
in the staying-on decision, but ability measures of the mother are strongly correlated 
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Dependent variable is a dummy variable: 
child stays on at school after age 16 
Sample: oldest siblings only 
Probit Probit IV (control fu nction) I Probit Probit IV (c.f.) 
Joint education (HKPARENTS) .030 -.284 
(.03) (.30) 
Mother's education .085 -.146 
(.05) (.63) 
Father's education .037 -.396 
(.03) (.24) 
# Siblings .022 -.023 .0006 -.114 (.11 ) (.11) (.14) (.16) 
Ability (factor) .183 .307 .177 .480 
(.04) ( .12) (.05) (.30) 
# Siblings (CM's family) -.033 -.037 -.035 -.026 
(.01) (.02) (.02) (.03) 
Child female dummy, l=female -.434 -.439 -.363 -.308 
(.08) (.08) (.10) (.11) 
CF aggregate .403 (.38) 
CF Mother .301 (.83) 
CF Father .801 (.45) 
Constant 1.237 2.256 1.195 3.245 (.46) (1.08) (.66) (2.46) 
N 2325 2325 1434 1434 
Table B.1: Second stage of the probit model using only the sample of older siblings: 
marginal effects 
with children staying on. This seems to confirm our conjecture that it is not education 
itself but other factors, such as innate parental ability and perhaps parents parenting 
skills, that induce their children to stay longer in school. 
We can compare the "oldest-sibling" results with the "all-siblings" sample, which 
are presented in Table B.2. We pick up very similar effects to the censored normal 
regression model, except again a very small coefficient on mother's education. Also, 
father's negative effect, as well as the positive impact of unobservables, seems only to 
count for one third of the original coefficient. Thus, later-born children seem to be less 
attached to fathers than earlier-born ones. 
The results confirm that the decision to stay on at school might be different from 
the decision to continue to A-Levels or university. We also tried an ordered probit model 
of these decision levels, but the results did not change. 
The IV control function approach seems to tell a consistent story when we look 
at the change in coefficients overall, but negative coefficients on parents raise doubts 
not necessarily about identification but rather about possible measurement error. Since 
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Dependent variable is a dummy variable: 
child stays on at school after age 16 
Sample: All siblings 
Probit Probit IV (control fu nction) I Probit Probit IV (c.f.) 
Joint parents' education (HKPARENTS) 
Mother's education 
Father's education 
# Siblings 
Ability (factor) 
# Siblings (parents) 
Child female dummy, l=female 
CF aggregate 
CF Mother 
CF Father 
Constant 
N 
.054 
(.03) 
-.165 
(.04) 
.145 
(.03) 
-.028 
(.01) 
-.389 
(.06) 
1.086 
(.37) 
3634 
.039 
(.15) 
.108 
(.05) 
.042 
(.02) 
-.167 -.188 
(.04) (.05) 
.151 .128 
(.07) (.04) 
-.028 -.024 
(.01) (.01) 
-.389 -.396 
(.06) (.08) 
.018 
(.19) 
1.132 1.68 
(.60) (.54) 
3634 2311 
Table B.2: Second stage probit using all siblings: marginal effects 
.397 
(.31) 
-.205 
(.11) 
-.163 
.07 
.121 
.14 
-.017 
.01 
-.393 
(.08) 
-.388 
(.41) 
.480 
(.21) 
1.23 
1.24 
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the coefficients change in the right direction, we might have an additional measurement 
error problem. 
B.2 Details relating to the estimation of the censored quan-
tile regression model with endogeneous regressors 
The censored quantile regression model uses first stage estimators of the conditional 
quantile of the following format. 
(i',q) = argmin tKw (Wi; Wl) pa (Yl- q - g(wi - wf,p, 1')) . 
l=l n 
Here Wi represents a vector of covariates x and the instruments z of dimension 
r. In particular we are the continuous covariates of w. Kw is an r-dimensional product 
Kernel on the uniform distribution from U E (-0.5,0.5), and thus determines if any of 
the bandwidth-adjusted differences in all covariates fall outside this interval, and assigns 
them value zero; 6
n 
is a bandwidth chosen to satisfy 6n = en-I", for some e > 0 and 
I< E (2P~S' 1.) where s = dim( wf), and p is the order of the polynom ia I with p > 3z'. 
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The function Po: is the quantile regression check function, and gO represents a 
polynomial of order p in the differences of the continuous variables in w. 
We estimate this equation on all the pairs of differences in the control variables. 
The estimated intercept of this equation q, is then used to construct the second stage 
estimates, outlined in the text. 
Some remarks seem important to the practicality of this estimator. We use only a 
multivariate polynomial of order four in the continuous variables of w although Blundell 
and Powell (2004) suggest a much higher order. This is however unfeasible, given that we 
have only around 1700 observations to fit such a model. We also choose a bandwidth 
that does not trim off many observations in the first stage quantile regression. The 
trimming of observations is problematic in the presence of dummy variables. Suppose 
a dummy is only informed for 10% of the observations. If we trim away 50% of all 
observations, the dummy might only consist of zeros. This will render the design matrix 
singular and stop the algorithm. 
We use non parametric first stage regressions to estimate the first stage control 
functions. We use a local-linear fit. The bandwidth chosen for the local-linear regression 
follows Blundell and Powell (2004) in setting it at hn = cnn-'Y, where Co < Cn < cOl 
for some Co > 0 and r E (2XJ' ~L:;:)' where additionally M is the order of the second 
step kernel, K is again the first step bandwidth and L = dim(vi). While staying within 
the range proposed by Blundell and Powell (2004), we conduct a cross-validation check 
to assess the validity of the bandwidth choice. The lodit package of Loader (1997) 
suggests a bandwith of 2.21 , smoothing in each window over about 23% of the sample. 
This is a fairly large value, and in contradiction with the theoretical values. Since these 
two values differ and since the bandwidth does influence the results, we prefer to apply 
the theoretica I ba ndwidths. 
In doing so, we implicitly make the assumption that our nonparametric control 
function estimate 
A {h = Xi - ITZi, 
satisfies 
IOn the graph are shown the degrees of freedom, not the bandwith 
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by virtue of including higher order terms in the first stage estimation. The choice 
of bandwidth is therefore determined by this consideration rather than by choosing the 
lowest variance bandwidth. 
Finally, as the asymptotic results for the estimated variance are given for n, we 
need to re-scale our variances not by the full sample size (considering degrees of freedom) 
but by a smaller sample size. In fact, by using the approach of Blundell and Powell 
(2004), we articfially construct a much larger sample of size N = ~(n - 1), which 
amounts in total to aproximately 1.444.150 observations in our case. In fact, we need to 
count how many original observations are present in the construction of our final Kernel 
weighted estimator and re-scale the variances accordingly. Notice as well the special 
way the weights enter into this estimator. 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
20 30 40 50 60 
Degree of freedom of fitted model 
Figure B.1: Graphic illustration of the GCV-criterion for various choices of bandwidths 
in the locfit package 
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8.3 Additional results and summary statistics 
As outlined in the text, we estimated principal components for ability and social class. 
For ability, we used all the available test scores of the cohort member up to age 11 (if 
we had used later test scores, this would be inconsistent with the identification which 
relies on a schooling reform implemented before age 16) and extracted one common 
factor, labelled ability. 
For social class, we decided to also use a single factor, although with the method-
ology proposed by Tipping and Bishop (1999) which allows us to impute missing values. 
This is done via the iteration of an EM algorithm and can be executed with the STATA 
command pemav for example. The social class variables are affected by missing values. 
With this method, we are able to recover most of the missing values through imputa-
tion. We are not interested in the coefficients of the social class variables: we think 
that these might be endogeneous as well. But we want to control for social class in 
the censored regressions and thus such an imputation is reasonable. Below we illustrate 
the correlation of the factors with actual outcomes. Note that we never used the social 
class variables in the estimation of the IV estimates. 
The abbreviations in Table B.3 stand for mathematics and reading tests at different 
ages (7,11,16) and the British Social Adjustment grade (BSAG) at age 11. The latter 
is measured on an inverse scale to the other test results, thus the negative correlation 
is consistent. 
Table B.4 shows a similar correlation matrix with the social class measures. Note 
that the imputation gains are large, since we recover nearly the whole sample of families 
(compared with the ability measure which is observed for the whole sample). The 
abbreviations in the table are em for cohort member and p for partner. The numbers 
indicate the year in which social class was recorded. Note that a higher social class 
factor implies a lower social class - the factor being inversely ranked because lower 
social classes have higher values in the data. 
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Correlation of ability factor and test scores 
Ability Math16 Read16 Math11 Read11 Math? Read? 
Ability 1.0000 
N 4243 
Math16 .69.,1 
.00 
N 4243 
Read16 .(j.,13 
.82.,1 
.00 
.00 
N 4243 4243 
Math11 .802 . .,10.,1 
.294 
.00 .00 
.00 
N 4243 4243 4243 
Read11 . j.,1.,1 
.310 .295 .796 
.00 .00 
.00 .00 
N 4243 4243 4243 4243 
Math? .688 .229 .218 .412 .393 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
N 4243 4243 4243 4243 4243 
Read? .659 .229 .178 .411 .333 .702 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
N 4243 4243 4243 4243 4243 4243 
Bsag 11 
-.188 -.176 
-.143 -.091 .056 -.126 
-.078 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
.00 .00 
N 4243 4243 4243 4243 4243 4243 4243 
Table B.3: The estimated principal component "Ability" and its correlation with test 
scores, p-values in small font below estimates 
B.3.1 Robustness check: Modifying the specification 
In our specification, we use as control variables the sex of the child, the inter-sibling 
birth-spacing intervals, the ability measure of the cohort member, the number of siblings 
of the mother, the number of siblings of the grandmother and cohort dummies for both 
grandparents. Ability is a variable that could suffer from endogeneity, as schooling and 
unobserved components could be correlated with ability. In order to minimise the effect 
of schooling, we only take ability measures up to age eleven of the cohort member, that 
is well in advance he or she entered post-compulsory education. Nevertheless, ability 
could still be correlated with the unobservables in our transmission equation and thus 
we should test if the results change significantly if we exclude ability. Also, we have 
not included measures of age of the children, as we feared that these might nearly 
perfectly explain the censoring mechanism and therefore bias the results. In Table B.5, 
we present the estimation of the two-generational model including and excluding the 
ability and child age measure (age and age squared of the child). 
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Correlation of social class factor and social class measures 
Social class cm1981 cm1970 cm1980 p1970 cm1991 p1981 cm2000 
Social class 1.0000 
(estimated factor) 
4184 
cm1981 .-19-18 
.00 
N 3529 
cm1970 .68U .232 
00 .00 
N 2952 2952 
cm1980 .711 .312 .966 
.00 .00 .00 
N 2997 2997 2952 
p1970 .9-12 .094 .213 .164 
.00 .00 .00 .00 
N 2231 2209 1868 1886 
cm1991 .466 .107 .293 .207 .142 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
N 3425 2951 2481 2510 1892 
p1981 .961 .071 .151 .150 .952 .124 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
N 2278 2256 1904 1925 2231 1926 
cm2000 .247 .177 .333 .258 .152 .359 .105 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
N 3495 2942 2455 2493 1892 2916 1933 
p2000 .141 .145 .188 .155 .377 .087 .285 .155 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
N 2186 1877 1556 1577 1285 1851 1307 1965 
Table 8.4: The estimated principal social class component and it's correlation with 
social class measures, p-values in small font below estimates 
8.3.2 Robustness check: implementing a RD design 
The attempts to identify causal effects in this paper rely extensively on schooling reforms, 
implemented in the UK in 1947 (grandparent) and 1973 (partners). There has been 
a growing trend in the education achievement of the partners and parents of cohort 
members over time. A split in pre- and post reform cohorts is likely to confuse the reform 
and the age effect. While we acknowledge that this might be of some concern for the 
partners of the cohort members, we argue that our results are, overall, not substantially 
biased. The main conclusions still apply, implying that our data shows positively biased 
coefficients for education when not taking endogeneity into account. First we illustrate 
in Figure 8.2 the impact of the reform on the education achievement of grandmothers 
and partners of cohort members, using a RD-type design by fitting quartic polynomial 
in the age of partners and grandmothers respectively. One can see that while the effect 
is substantial in the case of grandmothers, the effect for partners is smaller although 
still statistically significant (estimate at the threshold: .38 with standard error .15). 
Secondly we re-test the over-identified, two-generational transmission between 
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HKPARENTS 
Mothers' education 
Fathers' education 
Control function mother 
Control fu nction father 
Control function (aggregated) 
HKPARENTS 
Mothers' education 
Fathers' education 
Control function mother 
Control fu nction father 
cfa 
HKPARENTS 
Mothers' education 
Fathers' education 
Control function mother 
Control function father 
Control fu nction (aggregated) 
Dependent variable: childs' education 
Child age and ability included 
Censored reg. IV I Censored reg. IV 
.382 -.684 
(.05) (.45) 
1.360 
(.57) 
.434 
(.08) 
.126 
(.05) 
.354 
(.59) 
-.791 
(.40) 
.22 
(.75) 
1.720 
(.74) 
No ability measure but age included 
.438 -.325 
(.04) (.41) 
1.009 
(.54) 
.524 
(.08) 
.127 
(.04) 
.542 
(.42) 
-1.008 
(.43) 
-.038 
(.57) 
2.147 
(.82) 
No ability measure but age included 
+ additional instrument: presence of an older brother 
.438 -.323 
(.04) (.41) 
1.006 
(.54) 
.520 
(.08) 
.128 
(.04) 
.398 
(.39) 
-.983 
(.43) 
.154 
(.52) 
2.102 
(.82) 
Table 8.5: A robustness check: Including/Excluding age and ability measures 
parents and grandparents, replacing cohort dummies by a cubic fit in age of grandparents 
(and all cross-products). We reproduce the main results below, and thus it appears that 
education coefficients are over-estimated even when modelling the trend in age with 
a cubic fit rather than with cohort dummies. This increases the confidence that our 
two-generational model is capturing at least the appropriate direction of the effect, that 
is smaller coefficients on education transmission in the IV models. 
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Dependent variable: parents' education 
OLS IV OLS IV 
FEDUC .173 -.419 
(.02) (.50) 
MEDUC .264 -.066 
(.03) (.25) 
HKGPAR .434 -.488 
(.03) (.39) 
Cons 9.913 30.041 -4.143 14.701 (2.90) (14.87) (2.49) (8.74) 
R-squared .091238 .04 .11354 .05 
N 2123 2123 1825 1825 
F-test (IV first stage) separate aggregated 
measures measures 
ROSLA Father 16.51 
ROSLA Mother, Birthorder 17.27 
ROSLA Father,Birthorder,ROSLA Mother 4.85 
Overidentifiaction 
Sargan (N R2) 1.11 X2(1) 0.324 X2(1) 
p= 0.29 p = 0.56 
Table B.6: Grandparents two-generational effect on parents 
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Figure B.2: The reform impact on the educational achievement (in years) of mothers 
(top) and partners (bottom) of the cohort member 
226 
Appendix C 
Chapter 4 
C.l Model identification 
In its most general form, the model reads as follows: 
Yo fo(X) + nb11 + co, 
Yl h(X) + n~11 + Cl, 
W g(X) + (311 + U, 
Z h(X) +,1] + V, 
where 1] is a K x 1 vector of endowments, W is a Ll x 1 vector of pre-treatment 
outcomes, Z is a L2 x 1 vector of instruments, and {3 and, are Ll x K and L2 x K 
matrices of parameters. 
We require the following set of assumptions: 
JE (calX, T) = IE (calX) ; IE (clIX, T) = JE (clIX) , (C1) 
IE (UIX, T) = JE (UIX) , (C2) 
11 ..1 (co, Cl, U, V) I X, T, (C3) 
V ..1 (co, Cl, U) I X, T, (C4) 
Rank ({3) = Rank (,) = Rank (Var(77IX, T)) = K, (C5) 
Var (calX, T) = Var (calX) ; Var (clIX, T) = Var (clIX) , (C6) 
Var (UIX, T) = Var (UIX) . (C7) 
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We start by selecting I( linearly independent rows of (3, and K linearly independent 
rows of ,. For notational simplicity we still denote the subsets of K pre-treatment 
outcomes as W, the matrix of factor loadings as (3, and similarly for the instruments. 
In the submodel, Assumptions (C.1)-(C7) are satisfied, L1 = L2 = K, and (3 and, 
are invertible. 
We have, using (C3) and (C4): 
COY (1', ZIX, T = j) 
Cm" (W, ZIX, T = j) 
aj Var (17IX, T = j) ,', 
,B Var (171 X, T = j) " . 
Hence, making use of (C.5) we obtain: 
, (3-1 a· J ajIE [Var (17IX, T = j) IT = j] " {,'} -1 {IE [Var (17IX, T = j) IT = j]} -1 ,B-1, 
ajIE [Var (17IX, T = j) IT = j] " {,BIE [Var (17IX, T = j) IT = j] ,,}-1 
IE [COy (Y, ZIX, T = j) IT = j] {IE [COy (W, ZIX, T = j) IT = j]} -1. (C8) 
Then we also have, using (C1) and (C2): 
from which it follows that: 
~ IE (Y1 - Yo) 
IE (Y1 - a~(3-1W - Yo + a~(3-1W) + (a1 - ao)' (3-1IE (W) 
IE (IE (Y1 - a~(3-1 WIX) - IE (Yo - a~(3-1 WIX)) + (a1 - ao)' (3-1IE (W) 
IE (IE (Y1 - a~,B-1WIX, T = 1) - IE (Yo - a~,B-1WIX, T = 0)) + (a1 - ao)' ,B-1IE (W) 
IE (IE (Y - a~(3-1WIX, T = 1) - IE (Y - a~(3-1WIX, T = 0)) + (a1 - ao)' (3-1IE (W), 
(CI0) 
where we have used (C9) to show the fourth equality. 
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Similarly we have: 
~ TT _ lE P"l - }"o IT = 1) 
lE P"lIT = 1) -lE (}o - o~f3-1WIT = 1) - o~f3-1lE (WIT = 1) 
- lE P "liT = 1) - lE (lE (Yo - o~f3-1WIX, T = 1) IT = 1) - o~f3-1lE (WIT = 1) 
- lE P "liT = 1) - lE (lE (Yo - o~f3-1WIX, T = 0) IT = 1) - o~f3-llE (WIT = 1) 
- lE P"IT = 1) -lE (lE (Y - o~f3-IWIX, T = 0) IT = 1) - o~f3-llE (WIT = 1). 
(C11) 
The formula for /)"T1YT is obtained by interverting T = 1 and T = 0 in this expression. 
Then, the ATE on variances is obtained as follows. Let 
/)" v = Var(YI ) - Var(Yo). 
Let the index j take two possible values, j = 1,2. We have: 
Var(Yj) = Var(lE (Yj IX)) + lE (Var(Yj IX)) . 
We have, using (C3): 
Var(WIX) 13 Var (1JIX) 13' + Var (UIX) , 
and, using (C3) and (C2): 
Var(WIX, T = j) 13 Var (1JIX, T = j) 13' + Var (UIX). 
We obtain: 
Var(WIX, T = j) - Var(WIX) 13 [Var (1JIX, T = j) - Var (1JIX)] 13'· 
Likewise, making use of (C1) we have: 
Var(Yj IX, T = j) - Var(Yj IX) - OJ (Var [1JIX, T = j) - Var (1JIX)] oj. 
It follows that: 
Var(Yj IX, T = j) - Var(Yj IX) { -I}' Ojf3- I [Var(WIX, T = j) - Var(WIX)] Ojf3 . 
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Hence the within-.\ component of the variance: 
IE l\Tarpjl-Y)) = IE {V"U'P-IT = j, -Y) - Ojj3-1 [Var(WIX, T = j) _ Var(WIX)] {Ojj3-1 }'}. 
(C.12) 
Lastly, using (C.9) we obtain the between-X part, as: 
\Tar (IE () j IX)) = Yar {IE () -IX, T = j) - Ojj3-1 [IE (WIX, T = j) - IE (WIX)]} . (C.13) 
The within-.\ and between-X" components ofVar (YoIT = I), that intervenes in /lv,rr, 
are obtained similarly as: 
ElYaq1 l1 IT=l.X)IT=1) - IE{Var(YIT=O,X) 
and 
_Ojj3-1 [Var(WIX, T = 0) - Var(WIX, T = 1)] {Ojj3-1}' IT = 1 }, 
(C.14 ) 
\Tar (IE (YoIX, T = 1) IT = 1) - Var {IE (YIX, T = 0) 
_Ojj3-1 [IE (WIX, T = 0) -IE (WIX, T = 1)] IT = I}. 
(C.15) 
C.2 Parameter estimation 
We rewrite (C8) as: 
'j3-1 Q. = J COy [Y - IE (YIX, T = j), Z - IE (ZIX, T = j) IT = j] x 
{COy [W - IE (WIX, T = j), Z - IE (ZIX, T = j) IT = j]} -1. 
(C16) 
Then, we write the ATE and ATT estimands as: 
(
T (Y - Q~j3-1W) _ (1 - T) (Y - Q~j3-1W)) + (a1 _ ao)' j3-1IE (W), 
IE 7r(X) 1 - 7r(X) 
(C17) 
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and: 
lE(1"IT=l)-lE - - 0 - 'j3- 1lE(WIT=1) ( 
rr(X) (1 T) (Yo.' j3-1 w) ) 
P(T = 1) 1 - rr(X) 0.0 . 
(CI8) 
To derive these expressions, see Hirano et al. (2003). 
Lastly, we estimate the ATE on variances on the basis of (CI2) and (CI3), 
replacing conditional expectations by linear projections. We proceed similarly for the 
ATT on variances. 
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Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Non Lea school 6,287 38.78 38.78 
Com prehensive 5,895 36.36 75.15 
Grammar 1,294 7.98 83.13 
Secondary modern 2,582 15.93 99.06 
Technical 65 0.40 99.46 
All-age school 1 0.01 99.46 
Day special school 1 0.01 99.47 
Other 85 0.52 99.99 
Res./Esn. school 1 0.01 100.00 
Total 16,211 100.00 
Table C.l: The raw distribution of schools at age 16 
C.3 Data Appendix 
C.3.1 Construction of samples 
Samples We construct various samples from the NCDS to estimate our model. Here 
we justify the samples selected and also explain how they relate to other samples used 
in the literature. It is useful to examine the raw data (see Table (1). 
Note that all authors only keep either comprehensive, grammar or secondary mod-
ern students. All others (notably private schools, here denoted "non-LEA") are dropped. 
Notice as well that the "non-lea school" reflect also missing values, since there is no 
other category to code missing values in this question. 
This gives the distribution of comprehensive versus selective pupils at age 16 in 
1974. 
The information in 1969 is given by three variables. First of all, one variable 
contains the response of the teacher to the question: "What type of school is the 
NCDS child likely to attend in the next year 7" The answer can be 1) non-LEA (Local 
Education Athority) school, 2) selective school, 3) maintained (comprehensive) school. 
Another variable in 1969 indicates the year a school went comprehensive. Yet 
another variable indicates the number of years a child spent in a given school, recorded 
in 1974. This last variable allows us to form three groups of pupils. Those who stayed 
five years or more in a comprehensive or a selective school system. We call this sample 
of pupils sample 0, our basic sample. Sample 0 gives a close approximation to what 
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Kerckhoff (1986) and Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) used. 
We also construct a sUbsample keeping only schools in either purely selective LEA's 
or purely comprehensive LEA's. We use the list in Manning and Pischke (2006) and 
select only those LEA's from the NCDS. This suggestion was made to avoid the cream-
skimming effect, i.e. able pupils still attending a grammar school if in there are still 
grammar schools present within their catchment area (i.e. grammar and comprehensive 
schools coexist in one LEA). 
In addition, we keep in a sample we call "sampleOGS" only those pupils who 
have been at either grammar or secondary modern school for five years before 1974 to 
evaulate the effect of attending a grammar vs. a secondary modern school. 
Finally, we construct a sample in order to control for LEA fixed effects. Some 
LEA's have only a observations, and there might be for example, only grammar or only 
secondary modern students. This presents a problem in estimation, since the fixed effect 
cannot be estimated in these cases. We decided to drop these problematic LEA's, and 
we retain a sample of LEA's where we at least observe people in the three systems, 
which we call "sample 0 mixed" . 
Political variables In order to match local election results, we need to map con-
stituency information into Local Education Authorities (LEA). We only have information 
on constituency level election results for the period. There can be an overlap between 
sets of constituencies and LEA's in the following sense. LEA's are larger administrative 
units than constituencies, since they are bodies of the local authorities and these may 
regroup one or more constituencies. LEA's are defined as a collection of electoral wards 
and these electoral wards mayor may not coincide with the boundaries of a set of con-
stituencies. Furthermore constituency boundaries are subject to change in the period 
we are considering. Since we have no information on which electoral wards made up an 
LEA exactly, and we do not have access to local election results, we cannot pin down 
precisely what happened at the local level. Instead, we tried our best to match con-
stituencies to LEA's, that is we checked with various sources, such as the Constituency 
boundary commission and local authority websites to establish which constituencies be-
longed to which LEA's in the end of the 1970's. A majority of constituencies can be 
233 
aggregated into an LEA. Some constituencies have some electoral wards in one LEA 
and other wards in the other LEA because of redrafting of boundaries. In this case, we 
aggregate the results using the "redrafted constituency" results for both LEA's. The 
NCDS has only confidential information on constituencies, so a first step was to assign 
each constituency an LEA identifier. Several constituencies can fall within one LEA 
, 
sometimes just a single constituency. Then we aggregated the results taking simple 
means to the LEA level. 
A more satisfactory solution to this problem was provided by the matched LEA-
variable data, described below. In this data a variable indicated the proportion of Labour 
control in the period 1957-1970. We use this variable in the IV regressions, the results 
did not change, no matter which variable we used. 
LEA variables We matched a set of LEA-wide variables, collected in a special dataset 
provide by the Data Archive! to the NCDS data. These variables contained useful 
information on the proportions of pupils enrolled in different school types within the 
LEA in two time points, 1967 and 1972. It provides furthermore some political variables, 
namely the proportion of years the LEA was labour-controlled, and it provides measures 
of school quality, such as teachers salaries, total cost per pupil and indebtedness at the 
LEA level. 
Missing values Missing values are of some concern, especially in longitudinal studies, 
where there is attrition. The NCDS is no exception in this respect, and if we did not 
address the missing values problem, we would loose a part of our data. 
First we checked roughly if the missing values are missing at random. For this, 
we replace missing values with the sample means of the variables and run some of our 
regression equations. If the coefficients do not change drastically from the specification 
before, we conclude that the missing values are at random. We find very little change 
in our estimates when we do this. In a next step, we replace the missing variables by 
dummy variables, taking the value 0 if the variable is not missing and 1 if it is missing. 
Using this method, we preserve most of our sample intact. 
lEffect of LEA resources and policies on educational attainment, 1972-1974, SN199 
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Additional education measures used The NCDS has a "years of education" measure 
as a proxy for educational achievement but a wealth of individual qualifications obtained. 
We created a 6-way classification of academic and vocational achievement (see Jenkins 
and Sabates (2007)). For this purpose we scanned the NCDS qualification variables 
in the 1991, 2000 and 2004 sweep for the highest qualification a cohort member has 
achieved. For each sweep, we have academic, vocational and the highest qualification 
(the maximum of academic or vocational). We have thus 9 variables, these relate to 
total qualification level up to the year of the sweep. The education levels correspond to 
the following classification, which in turn corresponds also to the ranking in the National 
qualifications framework. 
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I\..) 
W 
0'1 
level I Vocational Academic 
o no qualifications 
1 National Vocational Qualification Levell no formal education 
2 
3 
4 
Royal Society of Arts (RSA) Levell CSE/O-Levels 
GNVQ (Foundation)/Other GNVQ at grades 2 to 5 (or D-G) 
Pitmans Levell 
HGV license 
Other vocational qualifications not specified 
National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) level 2 
Pitmans level 2 
RSA Level first diploma (2) 
Apprenticeships 
City and Guilds qualification 1 and 2 
GNVQ (Intermediate) 
Diploma of TEC/BEC/SCOTEC/SCOTBEC 
National Vocational Qualifications (NVQj level 3 
City and Guils qualifications Level 3 (final) 
RSA Advanced Diploma 
National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) level 4 
Higher National Certificate (HNC,HND) 
also HND TEC/BEC/SCOTEC/SCOTBEC 
Nursing Paramedic 
RSA Higher Diploma 
Other teacher training qualification 
City and Guilds Part 4 Career Ext/Full Tech 
GCSE grade A*-C 
O-Levels grade A-C 
O-Ievels D-E or CSE grade 1 
A-level 
AS-Level 
Degree, Higher education Diploma 
5 National Vocational Qualifications (NVQllevel 5 
Post graduate certificate of education Higher degree 
Professional degree qualifications 
Table C.2: Table of equivalence between vocational, academic and the 6-Level Classification 
In our analysis, we used only the variables relating to the highest qualifications 
obtained until 2004, thus total qualifications obtained up to 2004. 
Different specifications used The specifications labelled (1), (2) and (3) used in the 
ATE/ATE variance tables are as follows: 
• (1) is a specification using parental and social class characteristics and a child 
female dummy. The variables included are: Fathers and mothers education, num-
ber of older siblings, Social class categorisation defined from all the social class 
measures available in the 1958, 1965 and 1969 survey rounds. Measures of fathers 
and mothers income (only banded/categorized income measures are available in 
NCDS) are included as well as missing variable indicators as mentioned in the 
Missing variables section. 
• (2) is specification (1) augmented by: if parents want child to stay at school after 
minimum age (1965), if mother is working in 1965, number of children in child's 
lass (1965), number of schools attended (1969), pupil teacher ratio (1969), if child 
in junior school in 1969, sex of the headteacher (1969), Age of the main school 
buildings (1969), dummies for an ability streamed class in 1969, The proportion 
of unemployed and sick in the census ED, the proportion of mining workers in 
the census ED, the proportion of working mothers (census ED), the proportion of 
skilled, semi-skilled, managerial and unskilled workers in census ED, the proportion 
of households with indoor WC in census ED, the proportion of immigrants in census 
ED, and the proportion of labour voters in the 1970's general election, percentage 
of Labour votes in the local area, regional dummies for the Government Office 
Regions in England and Wales . 
• (3) is (2) with LEA dummies, but without regional dummies and the precentage 
of Labour votes in the local area variable. Note that specification (3) is used only 
in conjunction with the sample of mixed LEA's, as described in the section on 
Samples in this appendix. 
Notice that we only include variables which intervene before or at the date of treatment. 
We fear that any variables in 1974 might suffer from endogeneity bias. 
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C.3.2 Variable statistics 
The following statistics are given for sample O. 
Table (.3: Family and child characteristics 
Varia61e Mean StCi. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Female dummy 0.494 0.5 0 1 6870 
Mathematics score at 16 12.766 6.747 0 31 6472 
Reading score at 16 25.744 6.538 1 35 6496 
Mathematics score at 11 16.987 10.077 0 40 6070 
Reading score at 11 16.3 6.012 0 35 6070 
Verbal score at 11 22.747 9.125 0 40 6072 
BSAG score at 11 7.793 8.414 0 57 6075 
Mathematics score at 7 5.246 2.418 0 10 6132 
Reading score at 7 23.662 6.691 0 30 6154 
Average weekly net income 4.657 0.585 2.187 6.919 1644 
1981 log weekly net wage in 1981 prices 4.211 0.359 1.609 5.106 3712 
1991 log weekly net wage in 1981 prices 4.425 0.721 1.329 7.351 3036 
2000 log weekly net wage in 1981 prices 4.487 0.787 -0.863 7.469 3484 
2004 log weekly net wage in 1981 prices 4.76 0.68 1.678 7.98 3072 
Age when left full-time continuous education 17.303 2.24 14 30 4866 
Academic qualification level (up to 2004) 1.896 1.346 0 5 5675 
Vocational qualification level (up to 2004) 1.569 1.525 0 5 5500 
Total qualification level (up to 2004) 2.355 1.36 0 5 5694 
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Table C.4: Family and child characteristics - continued 
variaEile Mean StCl. Dev. Min. Max. I\] 
Fathers completed education, years 3.086 2.226 0 11 6870 
Mothers completed education, years 3.104 1.98 0 11 6870 
Total number of older siblings (girls/boy~ of NCDS child 0.366 0.616 0 8 6870 
Do you wish you had left school earlier, CDS child answer 0.234 0.424 0 1 6870 
Age you like to leave school, NCDS child answer 1.346 0.940 0 3 6870 
Will child benefit staying on ? Teacher answer 0.42 0.494 0 1 6870 
How long (in years) has child been at this school 5 0 5 5 6870 
Total school attendance 83.355 24.933 0 100 6870 
Child has a room to study 0.835 0.371 0 1 6870 
Natural father takes care of child in 1974 0.712 0.453 0 1 6870 
Natural mother takes care of child in 1974 0.771 0.42 0 1 6870 
Father born in British Isles 0.903 0.295 0 1 5828 
Mother born overseas 0.03 0.169 0 1 5828 
Mother born in British Isles 0.918 0.274 0 1 5828 
Child has no father figure, 1965 0.025 0.156 0 1 6085 
Child has no mother figure, 1965 0.003 0.053 0 1 6085 
Natural mother in household, 1965 0.002 0.048 0 1 6085 
Natural mother in household at age 7 0.013 0.112 0 1 6085 
Persons per room in 1974 1.091 0.782 0 4 6870 
Accomodation type in 1974 1.632 0.894 1 6 5543 
Social Class 1958 - I 0.107 0.309 0 1 6870 
Social Class 1958 - II 0.091 0.288 0 1 6870 
Social Class 1958 - III 0.478 0.5 0 1 6870 
Social Class 1958 - IV 0.115 0.319 0 1 6870 
Social Class 1965 - I 0.038 0.192 0 1 6870 
Social Class 1965 - II 0.115 0.319 0 1 6870 
Social Class 1965 - III 0.088 0.284 0 1 6870 
Social Class 1965 - IV 0.408 0.492 0 1 6870 
Social Class 1965 - V 0.014 0.119 0 1 6870 
Social Class 1965 - VI 0.141 0.348 0 1 6870 
Combined social class measure 
Proportion in Class I 0.045 0.206 0 1 6870 
Proportion in Class II 0.17 0.375 0 1 6870 
Proportion in Class III 0.526 0.499 0 1 6870 
Proportion in Class IV 0.181 0.385 0 1 6870 
Proportion in Class V 0.052 0.222 0 1 6870 
Fathers and mothers income categories 
Father 0 1 6870 Category I 0.08 0.272 
Category II 0.248 0.432 0 1 
6870 
Category III 0.162 0.368 0 1 
6870 
Category IV 0.101 0.301 0 
1 6870 
Mother 0.497 0 1 6870 Category I 0.444 
Category II 0.044 0.205 0 
1 6870 
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.Table C.5: School characteristics 
Vanable Mean 
Enrolled ~n a grammar school 1974 0.148 
Enrolled In a. secondary modern school in 1974 0.29 
Years s~ent In comprehensive between 1969 and 1974 0.667 
Proportion ~f LEA comprehensive in 1974 59.02 
Comprehensive school formed out of a Grammar school 0 142 Comprehens~ve school formed out of secondary modern 0:303 
Comprehens~ve school purpose built 0.194 
Comprehensive school formed by amalgamtion 0.329 
Ch~ld ~s ~ot in an ability streamed class, 1969 0.561 
Child IS In low ability streamed class, 1969 0.085 
Child is in average ability streamed class, 1969 0.093 
Child is in high ability streamed class, 1969 0.133 
Nu.mber of schools attended since age of 5, 1965 1.084 
In Infant school in 1965 0.49 
In junior and infant school in 1965 0.373 
In other school, 1969 0.012 
Free school meals at school, 1969 0.076 
Sex of headteacher, 1969 0.15 
Age of the main school buildings, 1969 40.036 
Std. Dev. 
0.355 
0.454 
0.471 
28.064 
0.349 
0.46 
0.396 
0.47 
0.496 
0.279 
0.291 
0.34 
0.681 
0.5 
0.484 
0.108 
0.264 
0.357 
37.984 
Min. 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Table (.6: Local area and political variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
RE161 0.145 0.352 
RE162 0.084 0.278 
RE163 0.081 0.273 
RE164 0.087 0.282 
RE165 0.098 0.297 
RE166 0.188 0.39 
RE167 0.068 0.251 
RE168 0.065 0.247 
RE169 0.121 0.326 Matched census statistics 
% Unemployed and sick, 1971 Census ED 2.635 4.996 
% Married women working, 1971 Census ED 21.102 23.828 
% Mining & Manuf. Employment, 1971 Census ED 20.869 23.949 
% Managment Employment, 1971 Census ED 6.514 10.902 
% Skilled manual Employment, 1971 Census ED 15.622 17.615 
% Semi-skilled manual Employment, 1971 Census ED 10.272 12.597 
% owner occupied, 1971 Census ED 45.364 34.409 
% council tenants, 1971 Census ED 38.857 39.255 
Persons per room, 1971 Census ED 0.327 0.319 
Households lacking inside We. 1971 Census ED 5.38 13.106 
% New commonwealth immigrants, 1971 Census ED 0.879 4.008 
Matched political variables to local authority level 
Labour win in Local Authority 0.29 0.101 
Conservative win in Local Authority 0.352 0.067 
Liberal win in Local Authority 0.06 0.049 Matched data on LEA resources, 1967-1972 
% 13 year olds in comprehensives, 1967 12.489 19.067 
% 13 year olds in comprehensives, 1972 29.252 26.819 
Percentage of years 1958-1969 that LA was labour controlled 31.156 34.8 
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Max. 
1 
1 
1 
99.900 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
11 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
193 
Min. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.077 
0 
0 
0 
0 
N 
6870 
6870 
3865 
6870 
3825 
3825 
3825 
3825 
6870 
6870 
6870 
6870 
6870 
6870 
6870 
6870 
6870 
6870 
6870 
Max. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
60 
80 
100 
78.570 
80 
71.42 
111.11 
103.33 
1.1 
97.72 
57.28 
0.509 
0.448 
0.316 
99.8 
99.900 
100 
1\1 
687< 
687( 
687( 
687( 
687( 
687( 
687! 
687! 
6871 
6871 
6871 
6871 
687 1 
687 
687 
364 
364 
687 
687 
687 
687 
654 
654 
67C 
6n 
6n 
C.4 Complementary tables and figures 
First stage IV First stage IV 
Dep. variable Dep. variable 
Maths score at 16 Maths score at 11 
Comprehensive LEA Dep. var 
-1.12 Dep. var 
-3.074 (.54) (1.01) 
Labour control 
.009 
.009 (.001 ) ( .001) 
Ability at 11 (factor) 
-.012 2.423 
( .006) (.12) 
Ability at 7 (factor) 
-.004 4.917 
( .006) (.23) 
Female dummy 
-.019 
-1.85 
-.020 
-.69 (.014) (.30) ( .013) (.55) 
Father's education 
-.008 .33 -.007 .51 (.004) (.24) (.004) (.14) 
Mother's education .009 .178 .006 .24 (.008) (.16) (.008) (.40) 
Constant .280 12.67 .27 8.80 (.25) (2.08) ( .217) (4.18) 
R-squared 
.689 .577 .69 .52 
N 1168 1094 1257 1168 
Table C7: Instrumental variable regression using political colour of the LEA as instru-
ment for the indicator of being in a comprehensive LEA 
Maths Years Academic Vocational Log wage Average 
16 education qual. qual. 2004 log wage 
One-dimensional 'T} 
Grammar .23 .01 .01 .68 .13 
Secondary Modern .72 .01 .04 .08 .68 
Two-dimensional 'T} 
Grammar .49 .87 .92 .24 .9 .93 
Secondary Modern .66 .98 .96 .82 .74 .38 
Table C8: P-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions, K = 1 and 2. Specification 
(3). for Grammar vs. Secondary Modern Schools 
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Figure C.1: The estimated propensity scores of attending a comprehensive vs a selective 
school (up), and a grammar vs a secondary modern school (bottom). In both panels 
the density for the treated group is given in solid line. 
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C.5 The comprehensive policy in the UK and mobility be-
tween LEA's 
This part of the appendix is designed to retrace the reform of the British education 
system: the implementation of comprehensive schools in the period 1945-1975. Our 
dataset covers the period 1958-1974. It is important to be aware of the details of the 
comprehensive reform, since this leads to the modelling choices we made. This section 
is divided into two parts. We describe in a first part the comprehensive reform in greater 
detail. In a second part, we address a potential misspecification issue of our model, 
related to this reform: the mobility of families. Was there moving to selective areas 
after the reform was implemented? Mobility is important if children and parents move 
as a consequence of the reform. This would yield very different intakes for comprehen-
sive and selective areas and it would be difficult to compare them without taking the 
possible endogeneity of moving into account. Thus, we illustrate in this second part the 
decision of parents to move and will argue that it was not linked with moving to a less 
comprehensive area. 
C.5.1 The comprehensive reform 
This subsection will draw extensively from a volume of the Oxford Review of Education, 
published in September 2002, "A century of local education authorities" . 
The postwar English school system was either bi-partite or tri-partite. It consisted 
mainly of grammar and secondary modern schools in the bipartite version, and to a 
smaller extend of grammar, secondary modern and so-called technical schools in the tri-
partite arrangement. Both variants were part of a 'national system, locally administered', 
Chitty (2002). The linkage between government, local authorities and schools should 
provide "checks and balances" and ensure no single element would acquire excessive 
power. The 1944 Education Act left indeed a large margin of autonomy to LEA's. It 
was for them to decide on curricula and the implementation of secondary education, 
Crook (2002). Often, the central government was not aware of the exact curriculum 
choices, this being implemented by individual schools and headmasters, Chitty (2002). 
Already in 1947 some 54 LEA's were making plans for establishing non-selective 
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schools in their area, Simon (1991). While a majority of LEA's maintained their exist-
ing grammar schools, some decided to provide some new form of secondary education, 
Peterson (1965). The term comprehensive schools was used instead of the term "mul-
tilateral" schools. Haydn (2004) argues that a movement for multilateral schools com-, 
posed of socialist politicians and union officials, is identifiable from the 1920's onwards. 
Some multiateral schools existed already before the great reform, purpose built for chil-
dren aged 11-18, Crook (2002), in the aftermath of the Second World War. Kerckhoff 
(1986) states that comprehensive schools were, in the beginning of their existence, often 
thought as being viable only if they were big enough, needing to accommodate at least 
some 1500 pupils. This conception, so Crook (2002) says, was "to be substantially 
revised over the next 30 years" . 
Crook (2002) argues that "the post-Second World War drive for comprehensive 
education was a grass roots initiative". This is confirmed by Kerckhoff (1986). 
The fact is that there has been a growing local movement against the 
eleven-plus examination and all that it implies. The movement has not 
been politically inspired or imposed by the Centre. It has been a sponta-
neous growth at the grassroots of education, leading to the widespread 
conviction that separation is an offence against the child as well as a 
brake on social and economic progress. (p.28) 
Crook (2002) and Chitty (2002) describe some LEA's experimenting with non-
selective schools well before the Crosland Circular implemented this option officially. In 
the 1950's the West-Riding and Anglesey went fully comprehensive, Crook (2002). In 
urban areas the authorities saw comprehensivisation as adequate in areas where wartime 
bomb damage was large. Peterson (1965) describes fears by local authorities, that in 
a period of housing shortage and insufficient construction, additional resources should 
be devoted to purpose built comprehensives instead of using the existing stock of build-
ings. Thus Bristol, Coventry and North London, Crook (2002), experimented first with 
comprehensive schools, due to the increased destruction they had faced during the War. 
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Figure C.2: Comprehensivisation at different speeds: proportion of thirteen year olds in 
comprehensive schools by LEA, plotting only those LEA's which had a positive proportion 
of comprehensive pupils in 1967 
In London, comprehensive schools were established in former senior and central 
school buildings, Crook (2002), but these did not tempt parents to opt out of the 
grammar school system. When the London LEA wanted to abolish selective schools in 
this area, they were stopped by the newly elected conservative majority in 1951, Peterson 
(1965). Even though some former grammar schools became comprehensives, the II-plus 
exam still continued to operate in London and denied these schools a comprehensive 
intake. Crook (2002) cites Bristol LEA, which established 14 non-selective secondary 
schools between 1954 and 1963, serving working class housing estates. Bristol LEA 
also continued to allow the LEA to purchase direct grant places for pupils up until 1965. 
Also Coventry, seems according to Crook (2002), to have kept open all of their grammar 
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schools along the re-organisation. This was obviously a drawback of the policy, since 
parents could still apply to the LEA to have their children sent to a grammar school 
within the local catchment area. 
An increased awareness that psychometric testing was flawed, Yates (1971), and 
that success on the eleven plus exam was influenced by social background and the 
inputs of parents, the pressure on LEA's increased for comprehensive reorganisation. 
Some LEA's, starting with the West Riding of Yorkshire, introduced what was known 
as the "Thorne scheme". This scheme consisted of abolishing the eleven-plus exam 
and allocating to each primary school a fixed number of grammar school places, which 
eliminated tests. The ablest pupils were then to go to Grammar school based on teachers 
recommendations, whereas tests were only used for borderline cases, Peterson (1965). 
By 1964, two thirds of the West Riding adopted this scheme, and some other LEA's 
were to follow, Crook (2002). 
The election victories of Labour in 1963 (local elections) and 1964 (general elec-
tion) became one of the motors of comprehensive re-organisation. Even though Macmil-
lan's educational minister, Edward Boyle, was sympathetic to a comprehensive reform 
without closing Grammar schools, the real impetus to comprehensive organisation was 
provided by the Labour governments 1964 general election victory under Harold Wil-
son. The outline of the Crosland Circular was produced relatively quickly, but the 
cabinet did not enact legislation at this point, Crook (2002). Instead, a circular was 
sent to all LEA's requesting, Crook (2002), them to submit plans for comprehensive 
re-organisation. There seems to have been an extensive debate in the Department of 
Education and Science "whether the proposed Circular should require or request the 
local authorities to prepare plans for comprehensive reorganisation" , Chitty (2002). An-
thony Crosland seemed to have opted for the wording request, following the established 
system of local autonomy in implementation of reforms. Six methods for implementing 
the reform were announced in the Circular, Yates (1971). These were, citing from Yates 
(1971): 
1. All through comprehensives, age range 11-18 
2. A two-tier system, all pupils attending a junior comprehensive from 11-13 years, 
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some moving on at age 13-14 to a senior school, the remainder staying behind 
3. A two-tier system, all pupils attending a junior comprehensive and some moving 
on at age 13-14 to a senior school, the remainder staying behind 
4. A two-tier system, in which all pupils attend a junior comprehensive school and 
then, at the age of 13 or 14, all have the choice between a senior school catering 
for those who propose to leave when they reach the statutory school leaving age 
and one which provides for those who wish to continue education at this stage 
5. Comprehensive schools with an age range from 11-16 combined with sixth form 
colleges for pupils over 16 
6. Middle schools with an age range from 8-9 to 12-13, followed by comprehensive 
schools with an age range from 12/13-18. 
According to Crook (2002) most of the large, Labour controlled LEA's adopted all-
through comprehensives, often however funding and long term planning security were 
lacking to implement these plans quickly. "Compromises inevitably took the form of 
interim arrangements, the phased abolition of the 11+ and school amalgamation that 
created comprehensive schools on two or more sites", Crook (2002) p.252. 
Leicestershire drafted a plan for a two-tier model, delaying selection at ages 13-
14 and involved guided parental choice at transfer age to make sure Grammar schools 
would not be populated by the socially advantaged and avoiding the relative disadvan-
tage experienced by girls. This was essentially done to use existing building resources 
appropriately, Peterson (1965). 
Some rural LEA'S defied openly the plans for reorganisation, Crook (2002), and 
were leaning towards the Leicestershire model. Richmond-upon-Thames merely reno-
vated, enlarged and then renamed its secondary modern premises as "comprehensives". 
The Plowden report (1967) advocated middle schools and transfers at the ages 
of 8 and 12, which was particularily attractive to Conservative controlled authorities, 
"seeking to abolish the 11+ without creating 'monster' comprehensives" , Crook (2002) 
Despite conservative resistance by the secretary of State for Education, Margaret 
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Thatcher, more than 1400 comprehensive schools (including middle schools) were es-
tablished between 1970 and 1974. 
Support for comprehensive re-organisation came mainly from big cities and Labour 
dominated areas. But Crook (2002) mentions that support was not unanimous, espe-
cially because many of the Socialist politicans benefited themselves from a Grammar 
school education. Peterson (1965) identified similar resistance to the re-organisation of 
secondary education after the War, as "leading citizens were former pupils of grammar 
schools, regarding them as elite schools, and fought bitterly against any plan to absorb 
them in a new type of common school" p.161. 
The parents supporting the comprehensive movement appear not to be very dif-
ferent from the parents in favour of the selective education system. In general, re-
organisation was a bottom-up process, according to Crook(2002), where parents and 
LEA's where the main stakeholders. Also, resistance to comprehensive reorgansation 
was often focused on the practicality of the reform at the local level. Crook(2002) 
gives the example of defining new catchment areas or the need to bus children to larger 
com prehensive schools. 
C.S.2 Mobility and comprehensive re-organisation 
Mobility of parents caused by the comprehensive reorganisation is a serious concern in our 
analysis. If parents could chose to move to an area of their choice, richer parents would 
be able to re-Iocate to better areas which still maintain selection. Yates (1971) analyses 
the education system as follows: he argues that richer parents chose, in general, the 
more prestigious private schools for their children. Thus, his argument, "comprehensive 
re-organisation for the remainder could considerbaly lead to grosser inequalities than at 
present", Yates (1971, p.58). He asserts that richer parents will anyways chose private 
schools if they can afford them, and that grammar schools serve the able, from middle to 
low class background. Thus, we need at least to establish two results for our analysis to 
be unbiased by factors of moving. First we need to analyse which were the determinants 
of moving and if they were related to comprehensive re-organisation within the local area. 
Second, we need to be sure that there was no additional effect on private schools, for 
example was the comprehensive re-organisation pushing parents to enrol their children 
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in private schools? 
In order to understand the mobility issue better, recall that the English and Welsh 
education system is based on catchment areas. As Haydn (2004) states, LEA's had 
to ensure a balanced social intake for each school, so that schools would comprise 
all different ability groups and social classes. In general pupils would be allocated to 
a specific secondary school by the LEA. There are the above described exceptions, 
the coexistence of comprehensives and grammar schools and some limited influence of 
parents, Crook (2002), but it is to be believed that in the great majority of the cases, 
the LEA would chose. Haydn (2004) describes that each LEA would select pupils, using 
data from primary schools and by drawing up catchment areas, which were pie-segments, 
from the centre to the peripheric areas of cities. Thus the LEA's tried to mix poorer 
inner city areas with the more affluent suburbs. "In cities such as Manchester, which was 
'long and thin' in terms of its population distribution, and which made the application 
of the 'pie' model problematic, pupils were 'bussed' accross the city in order to maintain 
a balanced social mix of pupils", Haydn (2004, p.419). 
Thus, mobility could occur in moving from a comprehensive area to a selective 
area. We can check this by using a variable that indicates if the family moved LEA 
between 1969 and 1974 in our data. We can then estimate a standard probit model of 
the probability of moving. In order to control for the degree of comprehensiveness in 
the origin area and the expected degree of comprehensiveness in the destination area, 
we use the matched LEA level data in our dataset. 
In our matched administrative data, we do not have an exact date match withe the 
NCDS survey. We have records for 1967 and 1972, whereas the NCDS has records for 
1969-1974. We would nevertheless like to use the 1969 and 1972 measures as controls 
for the share of comprehensives in the origin (-) area in 1967, s~i967' the share of 
comprehensives in the destination (+) area in 1967 S~967 and the respective shares of 
origin and destination in 1972 s~i972 and S~972 in order to examine their influence on 
mobility. Furthermore, we include measures of parental background (factor parback) 
and ability of the child (factor ability) and interactions with the share of comprehensives 
as important controls. 
Table (CI0) illustrates that the moving decision overwhelmingly depended on 
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Dependent variable: Dep. var.: 
0/1 variable for moving % C in destination 1972 
only movers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
00 ( in origin 1972 s~i972 -.0061 -.09458 
(.001) (.05) 
~o ( in destination 1972 8~972 .003 
(.001) 
ability .029 .027 -.350 -.394 
(.03) (.02) (1.104) (1.363) 
parback .156 .152 -2.168 -3.107 (.03) (.02) (1.16) (1.458) 
ability x % ( origin -.004 .017 
(.001) (.04) 
ability x % ( destination .004 (.0009) 
parback x % ( origin .003 .042 (.001) (.04) 
parback x % ( destination -.004 
(.001) 
~ .004 (.001) 
ability x ~ x %( destination .004 (.0009) 
parback x ~ x %( destination .004 (.001) 
% ( in origin 1969 (s~1967) -.082 (.06) 
ability x % ( in origin 1967 (S~1967) .056 (.06) 
parback x % ( in origin 1967 (s~1967 ) .012 (.06) 
(onstant -1.377 -1.459 30.990 32.742 (.04) (.02) (1. 700) (2.06) 
R-squared .03 .04 .003572 .008554 
N 6164 6265 478 478 
Table (.9: Moving from one LEA to another, between 1969 and 1974, conditional on 
ability, parental background and LEA characteristics 
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parental background. Specification (1) indicates that if comprehensivsiation in origin in 
1970 was large, and children relatively more able, families were less likely to move, and 
equivalently if comprehensivisation was high in the destination and children more able 
(given parental background), then there were more likely to move. Specification (2) 
asseses the reaction of parents to a change in the speed of comprehensivisation. If the 
difference in comprehensivisation between destination and origin (~ = st972 - sI972) was 
positive, parents were more likely to move. In columns (3) and (4) we regress the share of 
comprehensive schools in each LEA on parental characteristics and interactions with the 
shares of comprehensives in 1967 (column (3)) and 1972 (column (4)) for those parents 
that moved. It seems that parents with high parental background were more likely to 
be in an area with lower comprehensive shares. We see no effect for ability of the child 
affecting the share of comprehensives in the area, which is reassuring in specification 
(4). Also, we see no effect of comprehensivisation in 1967 in the origin area to affect 
the share of comprehensvisation in 1972 in the destination, which is equivalent to saying 
that there was no systematic relationship for people to move from areas with higher 
proportions of comprehensive schools to areas with lower proportions of comprehensive 
schools. 
With respect to assessing the private school system, we use the same set of 
controls as above and determine the likelihood of entering private education, but in 
addition we compare movers' and stayers' private school determinants. 
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Dependent variable: OLI variable for private school 
Proliit estimation 
(iJ (2) (3) {4J (5J (6) 
.'i;-l~)72 > [)o% 8;'-1072 ::; [)()% - r:()(Yc 81'10(;7 > ,) {J 8;'-] ~Jm ::; GO% 
parback .13G .096 .07 .112 .095 .107 
(.02) ( .(1) (.(n) CO 1) (.01) (,fJl) 
ability .01G .001 .051 .()(n .OOOG .004 
(.02) (.Cll ) ( .03) (.01) (.01) (JJ1) 
% of origin LEA compo in 1970 -.0024 
(.0017) 
% of destination LEA compo in 1970 -.00001 
(.0019) 
% of origin LEA compo in 1967 .0056 
(.0028) 
% of destination LEA compo in 1967 -.0065 
(.003) 
Teacher salary (1970) .00007 
(.0003) 
I\.) Per-pupil cost -.0028 01 
I\.) (.001 ) 
Industrialisation index -.0088 
( .002) 
Population density .0152 
( .003) 
Teaching amenities .0126 
( .003) 
Teacher salary 1969 .00976 
(.004) 
Overcrowding index 1969 .0249 
(.007) 
Mobility .383 
(.05) 
~x comp .002 
(.001) 
abi x~x %C dest. -.001 
(.0009) 
par x ~ x %C dest. -.001 
(.0009) 
Constant -.940 -.881 -.959 -.892 -3.949 -.905 
(.03) (.02) (.06) (.02) (.84) (.02) 
N 1736 6212 708 7121 7440 7691 
Table C.10: Selecting a private school between ages 11-16, conditional on ability, parental background and LEA characteristics 
As one can see, parental background is the dominant factor when chosing a private 
school. None of the specifications suggests that more able pupils attend private schools, 
and thus it is unlikely that there be a cream-skimming effect. We observe that there is 
some indication that comprehensivisation in the origin makes one less likely to attend 
private schools. This is perhaps consistent with the fact that more defavourised areas 
where comprehensivised first, leading to there being less pupils attending private schools 
by definition. We also see that various proxies for a defavorised area (industrialisation 
index, teaching amenities and overcrowding measures) affect the decision for a private 
school in the same manner. People who moved were also more likely to send their 
children to private schools, as they were better off financially. Finally, column (6) 
illustrates that there is no effect of the comprehensivisation differential on the decision 
to go private. 
Finally, we compare ability in private schools and selective schools for fully selective 
areas with ability in private schools and comprehensive schools in fully comprehensive 
areas. This graph is given in the next figure. 
Comparing ability in private to ability in public schools 
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Figure (.3: Ability in fully comprehensive vs fully selective areas, graphs by individuals 
in private or selective/comprehensive schools 
There seems to be not more cream-skimming for the private sector when one 
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considers fully comprehensive versus fully selective areas. Actually, more individuals of 
higher ability are in private schools in selective areas than in comprehensive areas. Again, 
there is not much evidence of private schools having expanded more in the comprehensive 
areas, and that high ability students in comprehensive areas attended private schools in 
higher proportions than in fully selective areas - the opposite seems rather the case. 
It seems that we can detect some mobility in the data, but this mobility seems 
unrelated to the comprehensive reform but rather due to parental and local characteris-
tics. Also, we find little evidence that in comprehensive areas, more people moved their 
children to private schools in response to increased comprehensivisation in that area. 
254 
Bibliography 
Abel, A. B.: 1985, Precautionary saving and accidental be-
quests, American Economic Review 75(4), 777-91. available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v75Y1985i4p 777-91. html. 
Altonji, J. G. and Dunn, T.: 1996, Using siblings to estimate the effects of school quality 
on wages, Review of Economics and Statistics 78, 665-671. 
Altonji, J. G., Elder, T. E. and Taber, C. R.: 2005, Selection on observed and unob-
served variables: Assesing the effectiveness of catholic schools, Journal of Political 
Economy 113, 151-184. 
Altonji, J. G. and Segal, L. M.: 1996, Small sample bias in GMM estimation of covariance 
structures, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 14, 353-366. 
Anderberg, D. and Balestrino, A.: 2003, Self-enforcing intergenerational transfers and 
the provision of education, Economica 70, 55-71. 
Anker, R., Ashraf,S., Barge, S. and Levison, D.: 1996, Is child labour really necessary 
in India's carpet industry?, ILO Labour Market Paper 15, 1-36. 
Arrondel, L. and Masson, A.: 2002, Altruism, exchange or indirect reciprocity: What 
do the data on family transfers show, Working Paper DELTA-ENS Paris. 
Baland, J.-M. and Robinson, J. A.: 2000, Is child labour inefficient ?, Journal of Political 
Economy 108, 663-678. 
Barro, R. J.: 1974, Are government bonds net wealth ?, Journal of Political Economy 
82, 1095-1117. 
255 
Bartolucci, F. and Scaccia, L.: 2004, Testing for positive association in contingency 
tables with fixed margins, Computational Statistics and Data Analysis 47, 195-
210. 
Basu, A. K., Chau, N. H. and Grote, U.: 2006, Guaranteed manufactured without child 
labor: the economics of consumer boycotts, social labelling and trade sanctions, 
Review of Development Economics 10, 466-491. 
Basu, K.: 1999, Child labour: Cause, consequences and cure with remarks on interna-
tional labour standards, Journal of Economic Litterature 37, 1083-1119. 
Basu, K. and Tzannatos, Z.: 2003, The global child labor problem: What do we know 
and what can we do ?, The World Bank Economic Review 17/2, 147-173. 
Basu, K. and Van, P. H.: 1998, The economics of child labour, American Economic 
Review 88, 412-427. 
Becci, E. and Julia, D.: 1998, Histoire de I'enfance en Occident - du XV/lIe siecle a nos 
jours, Seuil. 
Becker, G. S. and Tomes, N.: 1979, An equilibrium theory of the distribution of income 
and intergenerational mobility, Journal of Political Economy 87(6), 1153-1189. 
Becker, G. S. and Tomes, N.: 1986, Human capital and the rise and 
fall of families, Journal of Labor Economics 4(3), Sl-39. 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlabec/v4y1986i3psl-39.html. 
available at 
Behrman, J. R. and Rosenzweig, M. R.: 2002, Does increasing womens school-
ing increase the schooling of the next generation ?, American Economic Review 
92(2), 323-335. 
Ben-Porath, Y.: 1967, The production of human capital and the lifecycle of earnings, 
Journal of Political Economy 75, 352-365. 
Bernheim, B. D., Shleifer, A. and Summers, L. H.: 1985, The strategic be-
quest motive, Journal of Political Economy 93(6), 1045-76. available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v93y1985i6p1045-76.html. 
256 
Bernheim, B. and Severinoro, S.: 2000, Bequests as signals, Working Paper 7791, 
NBER. 
Bhalotra, S.: 2004, Parent altruism, cash transfers and child poverty, Technical report, 
Mimeo University of Bristol. 
Bhalotra, S.: 2007, Is child work necessary, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
69, 29-56. 
Bhalotra, S. and Heady, c.: 2003, Child farm labour: The wealth paradox, The World 
Bank Economic Review 17, 197-227. 
Bhalotra, S. and Tzannatos, Z.: 2003, Child labour: What have we learnt 7, Social 
protection discussion paper, No. 0317, The World Bank. 
Bhaskar, V.: 1998, Informational constraints and the overlapping generations model: 
Folk and anti-folk theorems, Review of Economic Studies 65, 135-149. 
Black, D. A. and Smith, J. A.: 2004, How robust is the evidence on the effects of college 
quality: Evidence from matching, Journal of Econometrics 121, 99-124. 
Black, S., Devereux, P. and Salvanes, K.: 2003, Why the apple doesn't fall far - un-
derstanding intergenerational transmission of human capital, NBER Working Paper 
10066 . 
Black, S. E., Devereux, P. J. and Salvanes, K. G.: 2005, The more the merrier 7 the 
effect of family size and birth order on children's education, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 120, 669-700. 
Blow, L., Goodman, A., Kaplan, G., Walker, I. and Windmeijer, F.: 2005, How impor-
tant is income in determining children's outcomes 7 - a methodology review of 
econometric approaches. Mimeo University of Warwick. 
Blow, L., Walker, I. and Zhu, Y.: 2004, Who benefits from child benefit, Technical 
report, Mimeo, University of Warwick and IFS. 
Blundell, R. and Powell, J. L.: 2004, Censored regression quantiles with endogeneous 
regressors. UCL and University of California. 
257 
Blundell, R., Preston, I. and Walker, I.: 1994, The Measurement of Household Welfare 
, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bourguignon, F., Ferreira, F. H. and Leite, P. G.: 2003, Conditional cash transfers , 
schooling and child labour: Micro-simulating Brazil's bolsa escola program, World 
Bank Economic Review 17, 229-254. 
Boutros-Ghali, B.: 1992, Empowering the United Nations, Foreign Affairs. 
Bowning, M.: 1992, Children and household economic behaviour, Journal of Economic 
Litterature 30, 1434-1475. 
Carneiro, P.: 2005, Intergenerational effects of mother's schooling on children's out-
comes: Causal links and transmission channels. UCL and IFS Working Paper. 
Carneiro, P., Hansen, K. and Heckman, J.: 2003, Estimating distributions of treatment 
effects with an application to the returns to schooling and measurement of the 
effects of uncertainty on college, International Economic Review 44(2), 361-422. 
Chaudhuri, S. and Gupta, M. R.: 2004, Child labour and trade liberalisation, The 
Japanese Economic Review 55, 201-211. 
Chen, S. and Khan, S.: 2001, Semiparametric estimation of a partially linear censored 
regression model, Econometric Theory 17(3), 567-590. 
Chernozhoukov, V. and Hong, H.: 2002, Three-step censored quantile regression and 
extramarital affairs, Journal of the American Statistical Association 97(459), 872-
882. 
Chevalier, A.: 2004, Parental education and child's education: A natural experiment, 
Centre for the Economics of Education Working Paper. 
Chevalier, A., Harmon, c., O'Sullivan, V. and Walker, I.: 2005, The impact of parental 
income and education on the schooling of their children. IFS Working Paper 
WP05/05. 
Chevallier, A., Harmon, c., Zhu, Y. and Walker, I.: 2004, Does education raise produc-
tivity or just reflect it ?, The Economic Journal 114. 
258 
Chitty, c.: 2002, The role and status of LEA's: Post-war pride and fin de siecle uncer-
tainty, Oxford Review of Education 28(2-3), 261-273. 
Cigno, A.: 1993, Intergenerational transfers without altruism: Family, market and state, 
Journal of Political Economy 9, 505-18. 
Cigno, A., Rosati, F. and Guarcello, L.: 2002, Does globalisation increase child labour, 
Technical report, IZA Working Paper No. 470. 
Cockburn, J.: 2001, Income contributions of child work in rural Ethiopia, CSAE Working 
Paper. 
Cox, D.: 1987, Motives for private Income transfers, Journal of Political Economy 
95, 508-546. 
Crook, D.: 2002, Local authorities and comprehensivisation In England and Wales, 
Oxford Review of Education 28(2), 247-260. 
Cunha, F. and Heckman, J.: 2006, Formulating, identifying and estimating the technol-
ogy of cognitive and noncognitive skill formation, Mimeo. 
Cunha, F., Heckman, J. and Schennach, 5.: 2006, Estimating the technology of cogni-
tive and non-cognitive skill formation, Mimeo . 
Cunningham, H. and Viazzo, P. P.: 1996, Child Labour in Historical Perspective 1800-
1985, Case Studies from Europe, Japan and Colombia, UNICEF International Child 
Development Centre. 
Das, M., Newey, W. and Vella, F.: 2003, Non-parametric estimation of sample selection 
models, Review of Economic Studies 70, 33-58. 
Davies, R. B.: 2005, Abstinence from child labor and profit seeking, Journal of Devel-
opment Economics 76, 251-263. 
Dayiolu, M.: 2005, Patterns of change in child labour and schooling in Turkey: The 
impact of compulsory schooling, Oxford Development Studies 33, 195-210. 
259 
Dearden, L., Ferri, J. and Meghir, c.: 2002, The effect of school quality on educational 
attainment and wages, The Review of Economics and Statistics 84(1), 1-20. 
Dearden, L., Machin, S. and Reed, H.: 1997, Intergenerational mobility in Britain, 
Economic Journal 107(440), 47-66. 
Dehejia, R. and Gatti, R.: 2002, Child labour: The role of income variability and access 
to credit across countries, NBER Working Papers W9018. 
Dessy, S. and Pallage, S.: 2005, A theory of the worst forms of child labour, The 
Economic Journal 115, 68-87. 
Doepke, M. and Zilibotti, F.: 2003, Voting with your children: a positive analysis of 
child labour laws, Working Paper UCLA 828, 1-57. 
Duflo, E.: 2000, Child health and household resources in South Africa: Evidence from 
the old age pension program, American Economic Review 90, 392-398. 
Duncan, T., Cortreras, D. and Elizabeth, F.: 2002, Distribution of power within the 
household and child health, Technical report, Mimeo UCLA. 
Edlund, L. and Rahman, A.: 2005, Household structure and child outcomes: Nuclear 
vs. extended families - evidence from Bangladesh. UCL and Columbia University. 
Edmonds, E.: 2006a, Child labour and schooling responses to anticipated income in 
South Africa, Journal of Development Economics 81(2), 386-414. 
Edmonds, E. and Pavcnik, N.: 2004, International trade and child labour: Cross-country 
evidence, NBER Working Paper 10317, 1-36. 
Edmonds, E. V.: 2006b, Understanding sibling differences in child labour, Journal of 
Population Economics 19, 795-821. 
Edmonds, E. V.: 2007, Child labour, NBER Working Paper 12926. 
Figlio, D. and Page, M. E.: 2002, School choice and the distributional effects of 
ability tracking: Does separation increase inequality, Journal of Urban Economics 
51(3), 497-514. 
260 
Galindo-Rueda, F. and Vignoles, A.: 2005, The heterogeneous effect of selection in 
secondary schools: Understanding the changing role of ability, Centre for the Eco-
nomics of Education Discussion Paper. 
Gary-Bobo, R. J., Prieto, A. and Picard, N.: 2006, Birth order and sibship sex composi-
tion as instruments in the study of education and earnings. CEPR Working Paper 
5514. 
Goldin, C. and Parsons, D.O.: 1989, Parental altruism and self-interest: Child labour 
among late nineteenth-century American families, Economic Enquiry 27, 637-659. 
Grootaert, C. and Kanbur, R.: 1995, Child labour, an economic perspective, Interna-
tional Labour Review 134, 187-203. 
Grootaert, C. and Patrinos, H.: 1998, The Policy Analysis of Child Labour: A Com-
parative Study - Child Labour in Cate d'lvoire: Incidents and Determinants, The 
World Bank, Washington. 
Grossmann, H. and Michaelis, J.: 2007, Trade sanctions and the incidence of child 
labour, Review of Development Economics 11, 49-62. 
Groves, L.: 2004, Implementing ILO child labour convention 182: Lessons from Hon-
duras, Development in Practice 14, 171-182. 
Gupta, M. R.: 2000, Wage determination of a child worker: A theoretical analysis, 
Review of Development Economics 4, 219-228. 
Hagemann, F., Diallo, Y., Etienne, A. and Mehran, F.: 2006, Global Child Labour 
Trends, I LO Geneva. 
Hansen, K., Heckman, J. and Mullen, K.: 2004, The effect of schooling and ability on 
achievement test scores, Journal of Econometrics 121(1-2), 39-98. 
Harmon, C. and Walker, I.: 2000, The returns to the quantity and quality of education: 
Evidence for men in England and Wales, Economica 67(265), 19-35. 
Hart, O. and Moore, J.: 1999, Foundations of incomplete contracts, Review of Economic 
Studies 66, 115-138. 
261 
Haydn, T.: 2004, The strange death of the comprehensive school in England and Wales, 
1965-2002, Research Papers in Education 19(4), 415-432. 
Hazan, M. and Berdugo, B.: 2002, Child labour, fertility and economic growth, The 
Economic Journal 112, 810-828. 
Heady, C. and Bhalotra, S.: 2000, Determinants of child farm labour in Ghana and 
Pakistan. University of Bath and University of Bristol. 
Hirano, K., Imbens, G. and Ridder, G.: 2003, Efficient estimation of average treatment 
effects using the estimated propensity score, Econometrica 71(4), 1161-1189. 
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W. and Rosen, H.: 1998, Estimating vector autoregressions 
with panel data, Econometrica 56(6), 1371-1395. 
Horrel, S. and Humphries, J.: 1995, Child labour and the family economy in the Indus-
trial Revolution, Explorations in Economic History 32, 585-516. 
Hussain, M. and Maskus, K. E.: 2003, Child labour use and economic growth: an 
econometric analysis, World Economy 26, 993-1017. 
Ichino, A., Mealli, F. and Nannicini, T.: 2006, From temporary help jobs to permanent 
employment: What can we learn from matching estimators and their sensitivity, 
CEPR Discussion Papers. 
ILO: 2002, Every Child Counts: New Global Estimates on Child Labour, ILO Geneva. 
Imbens, G.: 2003, Sensitivity to exogeneity assumptions in program evaluation, Ameri-
can Economic Review 93(2), 126-132. 
Imbens, G.: 2004, Nonparametric estimation of average treatment effects under exo-
geneity: A review, The Review of Economics and Statistics 86(1), 4-29. 
Jacoby, H. G.: 1993, Shadow wages and peasant family labour supply: An econometric 
application to the Peruvian sierra, Review of Economic Studies 60, 903-921. 
Jafarey, S. and Lahiri, S.: 2002, Will trade sanctions reduce child labour 7, Journal of 
Development Economics 68, 137-156. 
262 
Jafarey, S. and Lahiri, S.: 2005, Food for education versus school quality: a comparison 
of policy options to reduce child labour, Canadian Journal of Economics 38, 394-
419. 
Jenkins, A. and Sabates, R.: 2007, The classification of qualifications in social surveys, 
Technical report, CLS Working Paper 2007-2. 
Kandori, M.: 1992, Repeated games played by overlapping generations of players, Review 
of Economic Studies 59, 81-91. 
Kerckhoff, A. c.: 1986, The effects of ability grouping in British secondary schools, 
American Sociological Review 51, 842-858. 
Kirby, P.: 2005, A brief statistical sketch of the child labour market in mid-nineteenth 
century London, Continuity and Change 2, 229-245. 
Kis-Katos, K. and Schulze, G. G.: 2005, Regulation of child labour, Economic Affairs 
25, 24-30. 
Laitner, L. and Ohlsson, H.: 2001, Bequest motives: a comparison of Sweden and the 
US, Journal of Public Economics 79(1), 205-236. 
Levy, V.: 1985, Cropping patterns, mechanisation, child labour and fertility behaviour 
in a farming economy, Economic Development and Cultural Change 33, 777-791. 
Loader, c.: 1997, Locfit: an introduction, Statistical Computing and Graphics Newslet-
ter pp. 1-10. 
Lopez-Calva, L. F.: 2001, Child labour: Myths, theories and facts, Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs 55, 59-73. 
L Cal a L F · 2003, F'llial obligations and child labor, Working Paper Colegio de opez- v, . .. 
Mexico. 
Maffei, A., Raabe, N. and Ursprung, H. W.: 2006, Political repression and child labour: 
Theory and empirical evidence, The World Economy 2, 211-239. 
263 
Manacorda, M.: 2006, Child labor and the labor supply of other household members: 
Evidence from 1920 America, American Economic Review 96(5), 1788-1800. 
Manning, A. and Pischke, J.-S.: 2006, Comprehensive versus selective schooling in 
England and Wales: What do we know 7, NBER Working Paper (12176). 
Marx, K.: 1867, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Progress Publishers. 
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J.: 1999, Unforeseen contingencies, property rights and incom-
plete contracts, Review of Economic Studies 66, 83-114. 
Maurin, E.: 2002, The impact of parental income on early schooling transitions. a 
re-examination using data on three generations, Journal of Public Economics. 
Maurin, E. and McNally, S.: 2006, Selective schooling, Mimeo . 
McElroy, M. B.: 1990, The empirical content of nash-bargained household behaviour, 
The Journal of Human Resources 25, 559-583. 
McElroy, M. B. and Horney, M. J.: 1981, Nash bargained household decisions: toward a 
generalisation of the theory of demand, International Economic Review 22, 333-49. 
McGarry, K.: 1997, Inter-vivos transfers and intended bequests, Working Paper W6345, 
NBER. 
Meghir, C. and Palme, M.: 2005, Educational reform, ability and family background, 
American Economic Review 95(1), 414-424. 
Merkeerk, E. v. N.: 2004, Peter Kirby: Child labour in Britain, 1750-1870, book review, 
International Review of Social History 3, 517-518. 
Michael, R. T.: 2005, Children's reading and math skills: The family's two constraints. 
Harris School Working Paper, 0511. 
Moehling, C. M.: 1995, The intrahousehold allocation of resources and the participa-
tion of children in household decision making: Evidence from early 20th century 
Northamerica. Mimeo, Northwestern University. 
264 
Moehling, C. M.: 1999, State child labour laws and the decline of child labour, Explo-
rations in Economic History 36, 72-106. 
Moehling, C. M.: 2003, The incentives to work: Working children and household decision 
making. Yale University, Working Paper. 
Murray, M. P.: 2005, The bad, the weak and the ugly: Avoiding the perils of instrumental 
variable estimation. Bates College Working Paper. 
Nardinelli, C.: 1980, Child labor and the factory acts, The Journal of Economic History 
40, 739-755. 
Nash, J.: 1951, Non-cooperative games, The Annals of Mathematics 54(2), 286-295. 
Neumayer, E. and Soysa, I. d.: 2005, Trade openness, foreign direct investmet and child 
labour, World Development 33(1), 43-63. 
Nieuwenhuys, 0.: 2007, Embedding the global womb: Global child labour and the new 
policy agenda, Children's Geographies 5(1-2), 149-163. 
Nkamleu, G. B. and Kielland, A.: 2006, Modelling farmers' decisions on child labour 
and schooling: a multinomial logit analysis in Cote d'ivoire, Agricultural Economics 
35, 319-333. 
OECD: 2003, Combating Child Labour: a Review of Policies, OECD Paris. 
Oreopoulos, P., Page, M. E. and Stevens, A. H.: 2006, The intergenerational effect of 
compulsory schooling, Journal of Labour Economics 24(4), 729-760. 
Page, B. R.: 2003, Bequest taxes, inter-vivos gifts and the bequest motive, Journal of 
Public Economics 87(6). 
Perozek, M. G.: 1998, A reexamination of the strategic 
tive, Journal of Political Economy 106(2), 423-445. 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v106y1998i2p423-445.html. 
bequest mo-
available at 
Peterson, A. D. C.: 1965, Secondary reorganisation in England and Wales, Comparative 
Education 1(3), 161-169. 
265 
Pettit, B.: 1998, Children and Work in the UK: Reassesing the Issues, Child Poverty 
Action Group. 
Plug, E.: 2004, Effect of mothers' schooling on schooling of adoptees, American Eco-
nomic Review 94(1), 358-368. 
Plug, E. and Vijverberg, W.: 2005, Does family income matter for schooling outcomes 
? using adoptees as a natural experiment, Economic Journal 115(506), p.879-906. 
Powell, J. and Honore, B.: 2005, Identification and Inference in Economic Models, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Psacharopoulos, G.: 1997, Child labour versus educational attainment: some evidence 
from Latin America, Journal of Population Economics 10, 377-386. 
Psacharopoulos, G. and Patrinos, H.: 2002, Returns to investment in education: A 
further update, Technical Report 2881, World Bank. 
R, D. C. T.: 2005, R, A language and Environment for Statistical Computing, Vienna, 
Austria. ISBN 3-900051-07-0. 
Rammohan, A.: 2001, Development of financial capital markets and the role of children 
as economic assets, Journal of International Development 13, 45-58. 
Rangel, A.: 2003, Forward and backward intergenerational goods: Why is social security 
good for the environment, American Economic Review 93(3), 813-834. 
Ranjan, P.: 2001, Credit constraints and the phenomenon of child labour, Journal of 
Development Economics 64, 81-102. 
Ray, R.: 2002, The determinants of child schooling and child labour in Ghana, Journal 
of African Economies II, 561-590. 
Robson, A.: 2003, A 'bioeconomic' view of the neolithic and recent demographic tran-
sition, Working Paper. 
Rosenbaum, P. and Rubin, D.: 1983, The central role of the propensity score in obser-
vational studies for causal effects, Biometrika 70(1), 41-55. 
266 
Rosenzweig, M. and Evenson, R.: 1977, Fertility, schooling and the economic contribu-
tion of children in rural India: An econometric analysis, Econometrica 45, 1065-
1079. 
Rosenzweig, M. R.: 1995, Why are there returns to schooling ?, American Economic 
Review 85, 153-158. 
Rothstein, J. and Yoon, A.: 2006, Mismatch In law school, Northwestern Law and 
Economics Research Paper No.881110 . 
Rubin, D.: 1974, Estimating causal effects to treatments in randomised and non-
randomised studies, Journal of Educational Psychology 66, 688-701. 
Sacerdote, B.: 2005, Slavery and the intergenerational transmission of human capital, 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 87(2), p.217-234. 
Satz, D.: 2003, Child labour: A normative perspective, World Bank Economic Review 
17,311-324. 
Schultz, P. T.: 2004, School subsidies for the poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa 
program, Journal of Development Economics 74, 199-250. 
Selten, R. and Wooders, M. H.: 2001, Cyclic games: An introduction and some exam-
ples, Games and Economic Behaviour 34, 138-152. 
Simon, B.: 1991, Education and the Social Order, 1950-1999, Lawrence and Wishart, 
London. 
Skoufias, E.: 1994, Using shadow wages to estimate labour supply of agricultural house-
holds, Agricultural Economics 76, 215-227. 
Skyt-Nielsen, H.: 2001, How sensitive is the demand for primary education to changes 
in economic factors?, Journal of African Economies 10, 191-218. 
Skyt-Nielsen, H. and Dubey, A.: 2002, Child labour in rural India: A microeconomic 
perspective, The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 45, 479-497. 
267 
Smith, L.: 1992, Folk theorems In overlapping generations games, 
Games and Economic Behaviour 4(3), 426-449. available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v62y1994i4p939_48.html. 
Solon, G.: 1992, Intergenerational Income mobility In the United 
States, American Economic Review 82(3), 393-408. available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v82Y1992i3p393_408.html. 
Souza, A. P. and Emerson, P. M.: 2003, Is there a child labour trap 7 intergenerational 
persistence of child labour in Brazil, Economic Development and Cultural Change 
51, 375-399. 
Stark, 0.: 1995, Altruism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press. 
Strulik, H.: 2004, Child mortality, child labour and economic development, The Eco-
nomic Journal 114, 547-568. 
Swinnerton, K. and Rogers, c.: 1999, The economics of child labour: Comment, Amer-
ican Economic Review 89, 1382-85. 
Swinnerton, K. and Rogers, c.: 2004, Does child labor decrease when parental income 
rise 7, Journal of political economy 112, 939-47. 
Tanaka, R.: 2003, Inequality as a determinant of child labour, Economics Letters 80,93-
97. 
Tipping, M. E. and Bishop, C. M.: 1999, Probabilistic principal component analy-
sis, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society - Series B (Statistical Methodology) 
61(3), 611-622. 
Todd, P. E. and Wolpin, K. A.: 2003, On the specification and estimation of the 
production function for cognitive achievement, Economic Journal 113(485), 3-33. 
Todd, P. and Wolpin, K.: 2004, The production of cognitive achievement in children: 
Home, school and racial test score gaps, University of Pennsylvania Workig Paper 
268 
Todd, P. and Wolpin, K. I.: 2002, Using a social experiment to validate a dynamic 
behavioural model of child schooling and fertility, Pier Working Paper. 
Udry, c.: 1996, Gender, agricultural production and the theory of the household, The 
Journal of Political Economy 104, 1010-1046. 
Udry, C. and Pranab, B.: 1999, Development Microeconomics, Oxford University Press. 
Wagener, A.: 2002, Intergenerational transfer schemes as incomplete social contracts, 
Journal of Political Economy 13, 337-359. 
Waldinger, F.: 2006, Does tracking affect the importance of family background on 
student's test scores, Mimeo CEP-LSE . 
Woessmann, L. and Hanushek, E.: 2006, Does education tracking affect performance 
and ineqality ? differences-in-differences evidence across countries, The Economic 
Journal 116(3), (63-(76. 
Wooldridge, J. M.: 2002, Econometric Analysis of Cross-section and Panel Data, MIT 
Press. 
Yates, A.: 1971, The development of comprehensive education in England, International 
Review of Education 17(1), 58-65. 
Yoon, K.: 2001, An anti-folk theorem in overlapping generations games with limited 
observability, Review of Economic Dynamics 4, 736-745. 
269 
